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PHILOSOPHICAL CRITICISM IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY





The scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, culmin¬
ating in the impressive achievements of Ke^on, profoundly disturb¬
ed the traditional authority of the classics, the church and the
state, and seemed to offer a new kind of certainty in its appeal to
experimental fact, latural philosophy provided the eighteenth cen¬
tury with a new definition of truth, which came to mean the accurate
correspondence of statements with events as they were observed to
take place in nature. The consequences of this new theory of truth
were felt even in the theory of art.
Thus, whereas Dryden's criticism shows signs of the pre-scienti-
fic notion that truth, the authority for making critical judgments,
transcends natural phenomena, though it may be recognised among them,
Addison clearly regards the facts about the pleasures of the imagina¬
tion as the experimental evidence to ™hich the critic must appeal to
justify his opinions. In effect, Addison calls for research into the
relationship between objects of beauty, sublimity and novelty and the
individual's responses to them.
Burke, Karnes and Gerard all try to provide such experimental
evidence of what causes emotions. Their use of the experimental
method makes them, like Addison, scientific, or, to use the eighteenth-
century term, "philosophical", critics. Their emulation of the
scientific method, however, had a definite and ultimately unscienti¬
fic purpose. They aimed to restore the foundations of authority in
criticism and, by discovering the scientific truth about human nature,
they hoped to set up rules for justifying critical judgments. They
adopted the scientific method in an attempt to restore the certainty
to critical standards which science itself had helped to undermine.
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CHAPTER I : INT(ODUCTION
Twentieth-century criticism is dominated by pedagogy. Its prime
function is the analysis and explanation of individual works of art. It
enlarges its scope, to cover the works of one man, one school, one period
or one country, chiefly to coraphre the individual works in the specified
grouo. The aim is to elucidate, to increase understanding and therefore
to educate.
When the twentieth-century scholar comes to praise the eighteenth-
century critic, he tends to look for evidence of his own concern with
exegesis. Of course he finds it. In the great voluur of eighteenth-
century criticism there is olenty of particular examination of individual
works. But there is also much else.
One of the most important of th° other foms of criticism prevalent
in the eighteenth century, and very much characteristic of the period, is
a concern with theory and first princinles. At that time critics
devot' d much labour to discussing the nature, conditions and improvement
of the ability to respond to works of art, and, indeed, to the appeal of
natural phenomena, too.
Such discussion, needless to say, continues in the twentieth
century, but without the urgency and self-sufficiency of before, and as
a specialist concern. It is no longer seen as a desirable accompaniment
to literary and artistic interests, nor ss a useful study for every
educated man. The historian of the eighteenth century acknowledges the
importance in his period of study of subjects like taste, the pleasures
of the imagination and the distinction between the sublime and the
beautiful, but nerhaps accents them too easily as parts of the mental
landscape of that time. He underestimates the excitement these subjects
inspired. It is surely astonishing, from a twentieth-century point of
view /
view, that so many intelligent men and women should spend so much energy
writing substantial treatises on the pleasures of taste. It is even
more remkarable that they should have a public for such speculations.
People were ready to leave off the enjoyable business of exercising their
taste in order to read about how and why they enjoyed it.
One response to this is to try to find something in the twentieth
century which is equivalent to the literature of taste of two hundred
years before. The result is likely to be the introduction into the
discussion of a very dangerous word - "aesthetics". According to the
Oxford nglish Dictionary, this word entered the English language only
in the nineteenth century, and then against some opposition and with a
confused meaning (because of its adoption as a technical term by Kant).
When applied to works like Addison's essays on the pleasures of the
imagination, or Burke's Enquiry, or Karnes's Elements, or Gerard's
Essay on Taste, "aesthetics" suggests that they are philosophy, not
literature, a distinction not clearly made in the eighteenth century.
The implication is that they required the attentions of a philosopher,
a student of aesthetics, rather than that of a literary critic, or of an
ordinary reader.
Yet the specialised aesthetical philosopher of the twentieth
century finds Burke, Kames and the others, if he bothers to consider
them, disappointing; he would 'ather leave them to the literary critics.
He may condescend to see them as forerunners of philosophical aesthetics,
but seeing them as something is not seeing them as what thoy were in the
eighteenth century, before philosophical aesthetics had developed.
The problem of understanding works like those of Burke, Kames and
Gerard is, however, more than just a matter of definition. If there is
no straightforward way of characterising their work, a very typical
feature /
feature of eighteenth-century culture suddenly appears mysterious and ill-
explained. Elements of Criticism, for instance, is a long book, and Karnes
in several places admits that what he has to say is neither amusing nor easy
to understand. Yet the work was a success, running into many editions on
both sides of the Atlantic and on the Continent. And clearly Kames meant
it to have sane popular esteem, for otherwise he vrouM not have apologised
for being dull - nd urged the reader to rress on; such remarks are unusual
in a formal philosophical treatise, or in twentieth-century literary
criticism.
In any other case one would suspect that Burke, Kames and the rest
were popularisers of more advanced and technical material. But there do •
not seem to be more technical works on the subject of taste and criticism
in their time; Karnes and Burke cannot be forerunners of philosophical
aesthetics and popularisers of it as well. But, in a different sense,
these authors were in fact popularisers, writing to shed new light and
spread new ideas, and there is quite clear evidence of the way in which
they were regarded as such.
The word contemporaries applied to Kames and Gerard, and which
Burke himself applied to his Enquiry, was "philosophical". The term
"philosophy" underwent significant change in the eighteenth century, as
the human endeavour it denoted changed its nature, too. A distinction
arose between "philosophy" and "natural philosophy", and in the early
nineteenth century the latter came to be called "science". It was,
however, common enough in the preceding century to use the adjective
"philosophical" to mean, roughly, "scientific", as the x*ord is understood
since the nineteenth century. Thus, "philosophical criticism" might be
translated into modern parlance as "scientific criticism". In short,
the major influence on the kind of criticism Kames, Gerard and Burke
represent is natural nhilosophy, or science, and their readers recognised
this. Indeed, they themselves say so.
In /
In other words, the culmination of the scientific revolution in the
triumph of Newton, as one would expect, enticed eighteenth-century thinkers
into expectations of similar successes in other fields, and encouraged them
to extend what they thought of as Newtonian methods - "philosophical"
methods - beyond the limits of Newton's physics. And because of the wider
meaning of "philosophy", they did not stop their enquiries where the twentieth
century sees science becomes philosophy, or even note a boundary. One of
these encroachments of fundamentally scientific speculation was into the
domain Of art and criticism. The result was neither aesthetics nor
criticism, but "philosophical criticism".
Before examining in detail the evidence for this interpretation of
"philosophical criticism" and using the insight that the style of thought
of the philosophical critic is scientific to illuminate their arguments and
conclusions, it is as well to attempt a description of the more general
influence of natural rshilosonhy on eighteenth-century culture, with special
reference to literary and artistic criticism. The classic starting-point
is the Copernican revolution in the theory of the universe.
The metaphysical -problem raised by the Copernican revolution was
relativity. !;ven the most unmathematical thinker could grasp that the
heliocentric theory altered the way of looking at the universe without
altering its appearance. The old, geocentric theory possessed the virtue
of seeming to be based on common, everyday experience. The meaning of the
statement "The 3un moves across the sky" seamed unequivocal. But Copernicus
made it equivocal. His theory pointed out that if one body moves relative
to another, an observer on either cannot immediately tell just by looking at
the other body whether he is at rest or not, or whether the body he observes
is in motion or not, for he will always seem to 3ee the other body move.
After /
After Copernicus, no man of intellect could look up into the sky and not
remember that what he might say he saw there differed from a pos ibly true
account. An intellectual choice had to be aade. The concent of apparent
or relative motion, which was fundamental to the heliocentric theory,
undermined confidence in plain perception. One would have in future to be
cautious in one's assertions, and one would have to suspect that one might
occupy a point of view which entailed misleading impressions.
The Copernioan theory, by its telling illustration of the principle
of relativity, directed attention to the significance of point of view.
It made men susoect th~t what seemed obvious from one view-ooint might
appear limited, naive and prejudiced from another. But the heliocentric
theory also introduced the important notion of equivalent points of view,
for it follows from that theory that the view of the solar system had by
ter-"atrial observers does not differ in principle from that of observers
on the other planets. The significance of the opinion is threefold.
P'irst, it suggests that of a series of different descri tions it is not
necessarily the case that some or any should be superior to others.
Second, such equivalent views can be reconciled in principle. Third,
the reconciliation of the differing views will produce a genuine synthesis,
which will be a description of en object such that it could satisfy to a
certain extent the various descriptic s of appearances reported from
separate points of view. The description of the "common object" of the
several observations would, however, be essentially impersonal, for it
need not coincide with any of the actual descriptions from which it is
derived; one cannot, for example, watch all the planets orbit the sum
from a position on one of th" planets.
The theoretical equival nee, in a heliocentric system, of each
planet as a point of view whence to observe the whole system was, of
course /
6. •
course, a conclusion that coincided historically vdth speculation about
the similarity of the earth with other planets and the possibility of
other inhabited worlds. Such notions are imaginative illustrations of
the relativity of the terrestrial observer. The exploratio of the earth
and the enthusiasm for the culture of Greece and Rome brought relativity
and the comparison of view-points down to a lower level, and the Reformation
insistence on questions of personal salvation further reduced it until it
applied to in ividual human beings.
It is at this level that relativity effects criticism, emerging as
the problem of cornering various tastes. The concept of relativity, with
its corollary of a reconciliation of differing oo nts of view in a synthetic
description of the common object of observation, makes it impossible to
reconcile individual judgments of taste by sheer assertion of personal
authority. The critic cann t simply claim that whet he sees from his
point of view is the truth and that others must conform. For one thing,
the others may be seeing equally clearly, except that from their point of
view appearances differ. What the critic must do is discover how in
principle he and the other observers could be experiencing the same thing,
even 1though their accounts differ, and base his judgment on that
generalisation. It is the method of arriving at such generalisations that
Addison, Burke, Kames and Gerard seek to expound.
Sensitivity to the relativity of view-point and the equivalence of
individual observers, however, brings the critics face to face with the
problems of atomism. In the seventeenth century there was a renewal of
interest in the atomic theory, or, as it was sometimes called, the
corpuscular theory, of matter. No doubt this was partly inspired by the
new estronomy, which suggested that the stars were, like the sun, bright
globules of incandescent matter floating in space.
Atomism /
Atomism, however, raises difficult questions which are ultimately of
a logical nature, specially if the atomistic theory is to be applied in a
context of change. If materiel objects, for in tance, co sist of particl s,
when they under o change then their constituent oarticl s hi t be affected.
If the particles ere themselves es entially rltered in the change, then they
can themselves be regarded as nosses, ing alterable parts and hence are not
ultimate constituents. A corpuscle whose nature is changeable is not
therefore the most basic particle of matter; true atoms ere immutable.
Hence changes in the state of matter must be due to the re-arrangement of
atoms. But if objects are merely arrangements of particles which remain
absolutely unchanged in their internal natures, how do these agglomerations
so much as cohere?
The answer to this question is complicated because the theory that
matter is granular entails the concept of an immaterial void among the
particles. The interstices between atoms cannot b® occupied by matter, or
else they would contain other atoms; they must be quite empty. But if
th* t is the case, how can any influence rass from atom to atom? The
coherence of the atoms in arterial objects must be due to forces transmitted
by immaterial means. It is a logical necessity of atomistic theories that
the nature of the ^articles must differ qualitatively from tha nature of the
connections among them.
This logical discord occurs over and over in the work of the
philosophical critics, for they repeatedly adorn atomistic theories. The
most important types of these theories are those to do with psychology and
language, and those to do with the nature of society. They consistently
adont atomistic theories of the mind, according to which thought is a process
of linking up single perceptions or ideas into comclex structures. The
probable source of the details of the scheme was generally John Locke!
Taking /
a.
Taking physics as its model, Locke's science of human nature treated
mind on the analogy of Newtonian matter. It was bound, therefore,
to become atomistic. Elementary ideas, identic 1 in origin with
elementary sensations, made the term of that analysis which would
know only operations. These particulate ideas drop into the mind
through the five funnels of sense. There they boun , rebound, and
combine like the corpuscles of which they are counterparts. In
this kinetic theory of the intellect, the association of ideas i3
the counterpart of the law of universal attraction.1
Eighteenth- century ideas of society are similar. On the one hand is the
individual, with his particular experiences, thoughts and opinions? and
on the other there i3 the community, which is made up of individuals who
somehow have experiences, thoughts and opinions in common, and know this,
although they have no means of direct access to thra thought-processes of
other individuals.
Furthermore, there is a discontinuity between internal, mental
experience and the external world which causes that experience. Objects
and ideas are qualitatively different. The consequence of this view was
to make the eighteenth-century thinker (and others later) feel somehow
cut off from reality, confined in a small space trying to guess what it
was like outside from such impressions as the senses could convey. Such
a sense of isolation made it difficult to justify communal standards.
Social cohesion seemed an accident.
These problems were acutely realised by critics and theorists of
art, for they dealt with nothing so much as the personal experiences of
individuals. Indeed, it is perhaps because the variety of artistic
experience seemed so intractable that the effort to reduce it to common
principles /
1C.C. Gillispie: The Ldge of Ob.1 ctivity. Princeton, 1960, p. 163.
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principles assumed such importance, for if taste could "be regularised the
rest of human nature surely could not long remain unexplained. The
unresolved variations in taste, meanwhile, raised two disquieting
possibilitiesi eith"r human beings intrinsically differed from each other,
so ttr t no two could be certain to respond in the snm way to the same
stimulus, or the works of art and eo on that they experienced were unstable
and ever-changing.
Now, it is evident that the sense of isolation induced by the
atomistic psychology of ideas implies a strong desire to break out of the
apparent confines of the mind and attain sure knowledge of the external
world of objects. Such knowledge would settle the differences of opinion
among men. It was at this ■ oirt in the argument that the e-ample of science
proved so potent. To the eighteenth century, living after the triumph of
Newton, the great fact about science was its success. Laws of nature had
been revealed, a significant part of the truth about the universe had been
discovered, nd there was every reason to hone that further efforts would
bring forth the rest. At any rate, Newton alone had demonstrated a
regularity and orderliness in the great movements of the planets and in
the flickering of the minute particles of light. Natural philosophy
seemed to have answered the question whether the objects and events which
made up the external world were stable with •< confident affirmative.
As Gillispie points out, therefore, there is a real correspondence
between physical atomism and psychological atomism, the first leading the
second towards "objectivity":
t
The new psychology followed the new ohysics in a final respect.
It was permitted by a conditional assumption rather then a positive
discovery. There was no evidence that all ideas derive from
experience, any more than that the texture of matter is atomic.
But /
But atomism and - true to the Rpicurean prototype - sensationalism
allow objectivity. Unless ideas might be related to experience,
they would escape exact and scientific study. No science of human
nature would then be possible.1
In other words, the aripeal of the atomistic psycholo-y of ideas was that
it suggested a real conn ction between ideas and objects whi h would permit
the assurance that experience was firmly rooted in the n tunc of things.
If there are only ide; s in the mind, and if ideas come only from experience
of the outside world, and if the outside world is regular and objectified,
the origins of particular ideas are as open to investigation as any other
phenomena studied by science. It should then be straightforward enough
to define the qualities of ideas stimulated by specific objects, snd with
such knowledge of the atomic ideas go on to discover the mechanics of the
mind.
,
Furthermore, natural philosophy seemed to offer a method for
deriving the general rules from the particular information about ideas,
their origins and their associations, while avoiding the individual
differences among men. Such innate differences the e must be, since
there was some variety of opinion. Conceivably they might warp the
judgment of the investigator, so that he was prevented from arriving at
\
a true account of human nature. The experimental method, however, relying
on facts objectively considered, avoided the distortions of personal
• rejudice. By basing its theories on experimental evidence, cience made
them proof against the charge that they were unduly influenced by the
idiosyncrasies of the scientist. Science asserted that • ny man, in any
place, at any time, could, by o ;s rving any phenomena occurring under the
same gener 1 conditions, onfirm the theory which applied. The theories
of natural philosophy were seen as generalisations drawn from one set of
particulars and applicable to all sirilar instances. The operation of




Again, the example of Newton was most influential. As L,L. Laudan
ssys, "Newton was seen as the harbinger of an inductive, experimental
learning which proceeded by a gradual accent from the particulars of
observation, to general lews which were true and virtually incorrigible",
Laudan go s so far as to say that "it wes Newton's inductivism and
experimentalism - in short, his peculiar kind of empiricism - rather than
his optics or his mechanics that motivated the leaders (and the charlatans)
A
of eighteenth-century English intellectual history".
By means of induction, the philosophical way of reasoning, the
principles underlying the operations of nature coul1 be discovered. "o
derive general principles, of course, m-ans ignoring ; certain amount of
the particularity of the research data. Certain facts have to be
discounted (for instance, Newton's celestial mechanics took no account of
the colour of the planets), while others have to be approximated (Newton
calculated gravitational attractions after mathematically reducin- *:he
attracting bodies to point masses, assuming the bodies to bo regular solids).
Thus, in any particular instance, slight discrepancies rnd some deviations
'were possible, but negligible; even although the inertial motion of a body
according to Newton's fir t law was impossible to observe, becruse of the
\ \
widespread influence of gravity, the principle of the theory was still
regarded as true.
The philosophical critics, therefore, were prepare to be somewhat
acpfrc rimate in their theories. They saw it as worthwhile to try and
resolve the variety of taste in a general way, without promising to
demonstrate en absolute uniformity. Clearly some differences were real,
or else there wo Id be no roint in the effort to r^ach general principles;
if the variations in taste were totally unimportant, there would be no
problem /
"^L.L. Laudan: "Thom s Reid end the Newtonian Turn of British Methodological
Thought" in Robert E. Butts and John W. Davies (eds.): The Methodological
Herite v of Newton. Oxford, 19"0, p. 104.
probl m in asserting that testes w< re comparable. The induct-ivist ao~roaeh,
how ver, regarded differences not as insignificant but as superficial. A
de ocr und rstandi.ng would reveal unifying element:. The laws of taste,
that is to say, existed, but they required to be brought out by analysis,
and he way to do that was to follow the method of natural philosophy, which
had been so successful in discovering other laws of nature.
Behind the spirit of generalis tion typical of induetivict reasoning
lies e conviction of the im ossibility of accounting for all the particulars
separately. If the mass of evidence is considered too large for minute
investigation, a generalising method is n obvious course. The impulse to
use generalising methods is a consequence of the concent of an infinite
universe, which was well-established by the eighteenth century. In the
face of a possible infinity of source-material, no investigator of nature
can be content with a painstaking particular description, taking each thing
at a time. Such e method is useless for comprehending en ndless universe.
The expl nation of the phenomena of taste would consist of two types
of theories. Some of the principles of taste would be generalisations
about the nature of the objects of taste - works of art end litcratur",
nature! gomery, beautiful persons or animals and so on. Like all objects
in the external world, they would be stable end tLred in the!" natures.
From considering these natur s, the qualities which gave th m their appeal
to human beings could be discerned. Generalisation of the external
qualities of objects would therefore form part of the lews of taste and the
principles of criticism. Addison and Burke represent this aproach to the
subject.
The other approach, more characteristic of Kames and Gerard, considers
more especially the reactions of human beings, what it feels like to respond
to the objects of taste. Here the critic would seek to establish
psychological /
13.
psychological theories, generalisations about the internal sensations
characteristic of cert in kinds of experience. In doing this the
philosophicel critic would be investl—ting nrincirl 3 0 human natui*e.
The conclusions he reached would be laws of human nature.
The search for the laws of human nature was the response to the
problem of relativity of viewpoint p.s it affected criticism. The
generalised principles of taste would overcome the fra mentation of society
that the sychology of ideas implied. A knowle ge of the qualities of
objects which affected taste and of the mechanisms of th mind stimulated
by ex eriencin?- uch qualities would permit the synthesis of a common
description of the object experienced such that it satisfied the particular
observations of individuals. A knowledge so objective would enable the
critic safely to judge, without fear of personal prejudice.
The need for such e basis of judgment was, of cou1? , a consequence
of thc- scientific attack on authority, which had not left criticism
unaffected. Just as religion, politics, metaphysics and astronomy had
had their authority of tradition • nd authority of privilege, criticism had
had standards based on ancient precepts and high-minded do w. /II had
been similarly weakened by the scientific revolution. The qu 3tioning of
ancient theories, uch -s Ptolemaic astronomy, made it possible to cast
doubt on doctrines handed down from antiquity, and the tendency of scientists
to appeal to their own observations rnd caloul ij.ons, that i , to experimental
evidence, contrasted with the personal authority of prince an rope, the
fiat of the mighty. Or, as R.L. Brett ruts it, "the breakdown of authority
in literature set up criticism as an autonomous study which had to find the
presuppositions on which to base its enqui ies",1
The attack on authority and the analogy of science and criticism are
summarised by R.F. Jones:
i R.L. Brett: "The Third Earl of Shaftesbury as a Literary Critic" in
Kodera L-. iyonnge 'eview. XXXVII (1942), p. 143.
14.
Since the end of the Middle / gea the attack on authority had proceeded with
little interruption. Authority in religion had been rejected in the
Reformation; authority in government had been contested in the Commonwealth;
authority in learning or science had been overthrown in the Restoration, and
now authority was being expelled from its last stronghold - literature.
Since the situation in criticism was exactly analogous to the earlier
situation in science, it is not strange that the revolt of the latter should
have inspired a similar revolt in the literary world. In this rebellion
science assisted in two ways. First, it set an example of, and furnished
a precedent for, the abandonment of submission to the dictates of antiquity.
The mere fact th? t in one field of intellectual activity an increasing number
of illustrious men had turned their backs u-on the ancients could not but
make its influence felt in other fields. Second, it had demonstrated the
fallibility of those who had been considered in ; llibl? authorities.
Again and again it had revealed the erroneous nature of traditional theories
and ideas in every branch of science, and had thrown light on places which
the ignorance of past ages left dark. Science had refuted in no uncertain
manner that basic argument of conservation, the concert of many men and
many ages, by proving that many beliefs which had received such consent
wre totally false. Certainly the literary critic, looking at the shattered
ruins of an erstwhile potent authority, could hardly fail to harbor
misgivings regarding its validity in poetry.
Jones, however, fails to mention the radical effect on authority
of the scientific concents of relativism, the equivalent" of observers and
the impersonal synthesis of observations; nor does he stress how at least
some literary critics in the eighteenth century saw a new authority in
science itself - an authority to replace that which had been lost.
The /
* R,F. Jones: The seventeenth Century. Stanford, 1951, p. 72.
The success of seventeenth-century natural philosophy misled the next
century into believing that science had replaced the tr-ditional forms of
authority. It was clear enough that science had overturned the authority of
tradition and of supernatural inspiration. Whet was not so obvious was that
it '"ad not simply substituted for these the authority of an appeal to nature,
to the facts of the world of objective phenomena. Th- new kind of authority
represented by science was in fact more complex than previous forms. It
included not only fidelity to empirical observation but "1 o a m thodology in
which the part played by theory wa of primary importance Theory and fact,
not fact alone, was and is, the essence of scientific authority.
It was accidental and in a way unfortunate that Newton's genius had
been able to push the new method to 8 success so complete so soon. It was
not 'lerhsps an accident, and certainly unfortunate, that he should display
some hostility to metaphysics and, in at least one celebrated instance, to
th oy, the framm- of hjrpotheses, "Magnificent, irrefutable achievements"
whites Burtt, "gave Newton authority over the modern world, which, feeling
itself to have become free from metaphysics through Newton the positivist.
has become shackled and controlled by a very definite metaphysics through
A
Newton the metaphysician ..." The achievement of science seemed to be its
accurate description of the world, its positive truthfulness, and from that,
apparently, came its authority.
The old sources of authority - the ancient world and religious ogma -
were impossible. The critics of the eighteenth century therefore turned to
the new - science or natural philosophy. The philosophical critics saw the
philosophical way of reasoning elmo t entirely as a means of coming at the
truth about their subject, meaning by that s rather naive concept of a
straightforward /
1 E.A. Burtt: The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern bvMer,;] ni'-nc -.
London, 1932, p. 227f.
straightforwerd description of the facts. But criticism, like ethics and
politics, hps a social function which involves the formation rnd the conflict
of vslue ju'rments. It i active, where pure science is contemplative, A
critic cannot simply define his subject, describe it, reduce it to principles
and sit back; he has to use his knowledge and ap-ly his skills end theories
in debate with ether critics. Hence he establishes the authority of his
principles in order to equip himself for th^ir use in evaluating works of art
and so on.
The authority of the principles of human nrture which the philosophical
critics hoped to derive, therefore, Ithough analogous in point of their
derivation to that of scientific lews, had a function whi h was beyond the
scon" of scientific authority. The philosophical critics wanta to establish
the truth about human nature, the essential regularity in the variety of
o inion, not just for the sake of it, but for the mr c o of using it as a
tandard of judgment. In gen ral, it would fill the • p 1 ft by the dismissal
of the authority of tradition and dogma. Indeed, th critics sometimes
r-veal the equivalence, for them, of empirical fact with these old-fashioned
forms of authority by naively rejoicing to discover that the laws of human
nature coincide ith the rules of classical cities or the dictates of
orthodox morality.
The essential difference between science and criticism in the matter
of authority is easily seen in comparing their concerts of law. A
scientific law is a statement of a general principle in nature, from which
particular consequences can be drawn. I critical law, however, is much
more like a law of society intended to regulate behaviour and maintain, if
necessary by sanctions against offenders, a certain desired state of human
affairs. The two kinds of law do not have as much in common as their
shared name suggests. In short, as C.C, Gillispie says, speaking mor°
s-ene rally /
generally, "the noble eighteenth-century faith in natural law in olv >d a
fundamental confusion between the declarative and the normative senses of law,
betve n 'is' and 'ought1,"*
Philosophical criticism, therefore, is based on a confusing paradox.
It attempts to re-establish the authority of the critic by justifying his
standards, but it does so by appealing to the very intellr turl movement
which estroyed authoritarianism, at least in principle, in the first place,
Hlose examination o the works of ohilosorhical critics, therefore, reveals
not only their debt to scientific thinking but also the way that thinking is
istorted anr. nut to unscientific uses. Such an examination will reveal
not just what the critics were doing but why they failed to achieve their
aims. It will incidentally iscover the concepts transferred from natural
philosophy into criticism.
All this requires an analysis of philosophical criticism which goes
deeper than the classification of themes, the comparison of influ nee and
the tracing of indebtedness to Classical or Continental urc . Rather
what must be sought for are unconsidered metaphysical assumptions, patterns
of thought which the writers take for granted or state as self-evident
truths. Only by elucidating th"se can the detail of rules and examples
be -fitted into larger schemes end the distinctive, the "philo ophical",





CHAPTER II : DRTDEN
John Dryaen's criticism is unsystematic end confusin . It consists
of p variety of types of work, from occasional pieces, such es dedications,
in which special pleading i evident, to the formal ssgy of rrmaaic Poesy,
from which it is hard to extract Dryden's own opinions because of the problem
of determining when the author of a dialogue spe ks his own min . From this
mass of material, some of it so derivative es to be little better then
translation from other writers, the task of bringing out the principles of
"ryden's criticism seems impossible.
The common response to this has been to say that ryden was en open-
minded scentic of a critic. He therefore never committed him.: If to
consistent principles in criticism. Because of his sceptical turn of mind,
ryden was, it is said, naturally attracted by the sclenti ic movement of
his time - henc^ his involvement with the Royal "'ociety. One mi~ht expect,
then, to find in Dryden a precursor of "ighteenth-century philo ophicel
criticism.
To a certain extent this is true. But the attem t to justify this
supposition about Dryden involves an examination of very basic ideas es they
are found scattered in his criticism and reveals some genuine contradictions.
If some of Dryden's more general remarks about art and criticism are closely
analysed, they reveal a fundamentally unsci -ntific attitude. Hence there
is a real and fundamental confusion, not ju3t a sceptical open-mindedness,
in Dryden's thought. Although he appears on occasion to embrace the new
philosophy, he retains older attitudes as well. This can be clearly seen
in his attitude to the -problem of authority, what it is about a work of art
which justifies a favourable response from the critic. Dryden repeatedly
asserts that the justification of art is its embodim nt of an abstract




Dry-en's clearest statement of the uthority of truth is in A Parallel
ixt Pa n tng • nd
Truth is the object of our understanding as good is of our will:
and the understanding can no moi*- be delighted with a lie than the will can
choose an apparent evil. As truth is the end of all cur speculations, so
the discovery of it is the pleasure of Them; end since a tru knowledge of
nature gives us pleasure, a lively imitation of it, ither in oetry or
rainting, must of necessity produce a much reater. For both these arts,
as I said before, are not only true imitations of n-ture, bu' of the best
nature, of that which is wrought ur to a nobler dtch. They present us
with images more cerfect than the life in any individual; an we have the
pleasure to see all the scattered beauties of nature unite; by a hapry
The discovery of truth by the understanding causes pleasure, and the more
truth, the more oleasure. Since knowledge of truth can be h d of nature,
nature is indir-ctly a source of pleasure. Now art imitates nature, so
that acquaintance with art is like acquaintance with nature, that is to
say, with indirect knowledge of truth, and is therefore pleasurable. The
pleasure of art is, however, greater because it imitates nature heightened,
that is, nature in which more then the usual amount of truth is discoverable.
Because nature has "deformities or faults" it is less truthful than art,
although the artist needs nature as the stuff on which to work.
Basically, the understanding performs the same operation on art as
it does on nature. The process of discov ring truth in nature is easier
when the understanding is not dealing directly with nature but with an
artistic imitation of "wrought uo to a nobler pitch", with its "scattered
beauties ... united by a hapny chemistry". The artistic faculty which
brings about imitation, then, is also able to make selections from nature,
picking /
cherai try, without its deformities or feults
1 References to Dryden's criticism are taken from Of Dramatic Poe3y and
Other Critical ssevs. 2 vols,, edited George Watson, London, 1962,
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picking out "beauties" or sources of pleasure, that is to say, truth.
There is an analogy between the truth-seeking operations of thr understanding
on nature, and the r>le- sure-giving imitation of nature by art.
The artist nredigests the experience of natur and extracts from it
the truth-b aring elements, wMch he then re-describes in an imitation of
nature which ignores what is not perfectly truthful. The work of art is
therefore a more concentrated version of nature, in which the truth, which
incidentally is pleasant to discover. is emphasised, I a similar way the
understanding, in dealing directly with nature, separates ho true end
untrue in its experience of nature, so that the final result is again a
concentration of hat is truthful about nature. What th man using his
understanding regards as true and false is what the -rtist or critic regards
p. beautiful and deformed.
The process of erti tic selection is therefo r nzivel nt to the
rimr ry selective procedures of the understanding, when i cides wh^t is
true in nature, A o-called work of art which ores nt an imitation of
nature which ignored the truthful and stressed what the understanding judged
false would be unnloasant and hence a failure as art, riti ism, therefore,
depends on an awareness of whet the understanding regardr. as true. Art
must conform to that standard to please.
The conformity of art and understanding manifests it: If in the rules
of art, which are nothing so much as the evidence that art is inherently a
function of the understanding. Art is an intemosed sta-;e between nature
and the understanding's discovery of truth, in which more truth can be
discov red than in nature (presumably, in a given stretch of time ) because
art filters out what is not recognised as truthful,
1 Since art imitates nature, it adds no beauties to nature's; hence an
exhaustive study of nature and one of art would accumulate the same knowledge
of truth and beauty, the difference being that studying art would be quicker
and more intensely pleasant. Ovfr any short period, however, sey a human
lifetime, mare truth end more pie sure could be gained from art
than /
As far as contenL is concerned, the artistic process is negative and
destructive. Although art imitates nature, a full knowledge of art will be
a less than full knowledge of nature. Conversely, a full knowledge of nature
vrill contain too much for a knowledge of what art is, unless the understanding*
princinles of selection are also known. The concent of nature is thus too
wide (even if Dryden gave more descriotive details) to be informative about
what art distinguishes as true and pleasing. It is also too weak, since
it3 rart in his system, as the matrix of discoverable truth, is dictated by
the idea of discovering truth.
In fact, good art imitates, not nature, but a select part of nature,
"nature wrought un to a nobler pitch". Granted, if "the best nature" could
be defined, it would urovide a means of identifying its imitations and hence
successful art. But this is only an indirect way of identifying the truth
which nleeses. To say art imitates th° beauties of nature is only a
circumlocution for saying art imitates the truth. The concept of imitating
nature gives way to the concent of imitating truth, that is, the object of
understanding.
Genuine /
then from nature, for time and energy would not be wasted comprehending the
"deformities or faults" of nature. The way in whi:h Dryden's theories thus
lead on to the di: cussion of time is typical of the unseen relations of
criticism with general philosophy. It is evident that neither time nor
the natural universe is, for Dryden, logically beyond total comprehension,
that is to say, infinite.
Genuine art, pleasing art, denends on what the underst nding recognises
as true. Details of what is n-ture and what is art would have significance
in Dryden's scheme by virtue of their relation to the concepts of understanding
and truth. ven the understanding is not autonomous, because as the discoverer
of truth it is to be identified with those operations in which truth is actually
discovered: such an identification cannot be made unless truth is known.
The concent of truth defines what the understanding discovers with pleasure
and therefore what is (successful) art. To say what art is about, it is not
enough to say it is about nature or the imitation of nature; much must be
added concerning truth. All that Dryden says of truth is that it is the
object of understanding. This tends to reduce his system to tautology,
with its parts all explained in term? of each other.
A possible objection here might be that Dryden's criticism provides
plenty of evidence for deciding what he regards as art and what not, thus
allowing a full specification of his system. It could be argued that there
is a wealth of detail as evidence of what Dryden regerde as artistic,
natural and truthful. Unfortunately, mediating principles of selection are
missing. The range of -possible examples of art, nature or truth is greater
than those Dryden himself might give. If it is desired to extend his
series of examples to include similar ones not mentioned by him, then some
common property or properties must be selected as typical of all. But
no-one except Dryden can define Dryden's tyees.
Thus, although it may well be that Dryden's critical judgments are
co-ordinated with his theoretical scheme of art, it does not follow either
that generalisations on his practice will coincide with the concepts of
his theory and supply its defects, or that by extending his criticism by
analogy his theory can legitimately be made to cover other examples than
those /
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those he himself gives. Dryden's theory lacks explanatory power; there is
a gar> between what he says art in general is, and what are, even what he says
are, examples of art.
Two further points must be made. Dryden's scheme could be said to
be-in with truth and end in pleasure. Pleasure is another identifying
feature o^ good art. Indeed, although all fryden's other concepts -* art,
nature, truth, the understanding - seem emptily dependent on each other for
meaning, the occurrence of pleasure seems less problematical. From it,
one could discover what is successful art, natural beauty and truth,
Dryden's theory of art, then, ben-ins to look pleasure-centred; what is be3t
in art is what pleases. In fact, since pleasure is the effect of the
discovery of truth, where there is -pleasure there is still truth* By
aiming to please the artist also provides the opportunity of learning truth -
that is to say, art instructs. Dryden states this in his Heads of an Answer
to Rvmer. numbers 47 and 48;
The chief end of the poet is to please; for his immediate reputation
depends on it*
The great end of the poem is to instruct, which is performed by
\
making pleasure the vehicle of that instruction; for poetry is an
"i
art, and all arts are made to profit. (Vol* 1, p* 219).
Elsewhere Dryden tends to emphasise thra importance of pleasure as the end
of poetry, because that is what distinguishes poetry (indeed, ell art) from
other human activities* But although he does for this reason claim, in
A Defence of "An Essay of Dram? tic Poesv11
^ (Watson, vol. 1, p, 113f,)f
that "delight is the chief, if not the only end of poesy", he cannot fail
to add that "poesy only instructs as it delights", thus repeating the
association of delight with instruction. Otherwise poetry would not be
an /
an activity or on interest of the truth-seeking understanding at all.
Dryden's stress or pleasure in poetry can be misleading if it i8 forgotten
how important is the ide of truth.
That is the second roint, Bryden believes that art is truthful as
well as pleasing and that any account of art must show how it is truthful.
The understanding is for him directe to truth; no high or serious claims
can be mode for ony activity which does not participate in the investigation
of truth. Dryden do s not doubt that art is ultimately justified thus:
Indeed the poet dresses truth, and adorns nature, but does not alter
them:
1
ficts voluptatis causa sint nroxima veris.
Therefore that is not the best noesy which resembles notions of
things that ore not to things that are: though the fancy may be
great and the words flowing, yet the soul is but half satisfied
when there is not truth in the foundation. (Vol. 1, p-. 120f)
The important conclusion to be drawn from this examination of some
of Dry en's more theoretical remarks on art is not, however, that his
conceptual scheme is tautologous or that truth is a prime value for him,
but rather that he conceives of truth and nature as distinct, if related,
entitles. No matter how lacking are positive assertions about truth or
nature, one negative proposition is clear: truth and nrture are not
equivalent. It follows that sheer knowledge of nature does not represent,
for Dryden, knowledge of the truth.
In Dry-;.en's view, truth is the object of she understanding. This
object may be gained by studying nature for the truth it contains. The
study of nature, therefore, is a means to an end, not an end in itself.
It would be possible to know a great deal about nature without also knowing
the /
Horace, Ars Poetica. 1.338s 'Let fiction made for delight be near to
the truth'. (Watson's note).
the truth at all (in such a case, thp understanding would remain unsatisfied
and no pleasure would, says Dryden, be taken in the investigation). Hence,
knowledge of nature by itself is worthless end likely to hinder the quest of
the understanding for its real goal, truth.
The strong impression given by Dryden is that truth is something
behind nature and covered by it. The understanding csn come at truth
through nature, and the artist imitates truth by imitating nature. Truth,
therefore, transcends nature. In contrest, the scientific revolution which
was goinr on in Dryden*s own lifetime was presenting an alternative
arrangement, whereby truth represents the highest degree of accuracy of
the correspondence of the understanding's ideas and concepts with the
circumstances of nature, and the artist imitates nature by imitating
truthfully. In this view, 3tated in extreme terms, the study of n-' ture is
an end in itself, and the study of truth a means to achieving that end.
Obviously such a reversal of role3 alters the meaning Of literary
criticism. The pre-scientific work of art can claim a higher verisimilitude
than likeness to nature. No degree of familiarity with neturel phenomena
will alone make a man a critic. The judge is he who knows the truth and
can determine when it i3 being successfully imitated to give genuine
pleasure worthy of the human understanding. The scientific critic,
however, faces a very different task. He still wishes to rraise the poet
for telling the truth, but he means by that the truth ebout nature, A
knowledge of natural phenomena is therefore indispensable to him.
Consequently, he is vulnerable to the charge that his criticisms are false
because his knowledge of what the work of art is about, his knowledge of
nature, is inadequate.
A major part of criticism, then, becomes the attempt to state the
reasons why the critic thinks his apnreciation of what art is about is as
good /
good as or better than the next man's. The first difficulty encountered by
a scientific critic is the establishment of his authority, hi3 claim to know
and state the truth. And since truth means truth to nature, his first
obligation is to show he grasps the principles of the true understanding of
nature. 3y and large, these principles are those of science.
The critic who believes truth transcends nature of course must also
convince others of his authority. An advantage he enjoys is that he has
not constantly to convince himself; once he has the truth, no-one can take
it from him against his will. The scientific critic can be forced to
acknowledge that nature is nnt as he says it is; how the transcendental
critic can be enjoined to recant his fundamental principles is a mystery.
His authority cannot be questioned save by his leave.
It is clear enough that, at any rate in theory, Dryden is an
authoritarian, not a scientific, critic. No natural evidence necessarily
counts against a critical judgment. It is perfectly rational to admit
that one thing arrears to be the case yet continue asserting that the
opposite is in fact the only truths
The liking or disliking of the reople gives the play the denomination
of good or bad, but does not really make or constitute it such. To
please the people ought to be the poet's aim, because plays are made
for their delight; but it does not follow that they are always
pleased with good plays, or that the plays which please them ere
always good. The humour of the people is now for comedy, therefore
in hone to please them, I write comedies rather than serious rlays;
and so far their taste rrescribes to me: but it does not follow from
that reason that comedy is to be rreferred before tragedy in its own
nature; for that which is so in its own nature cannot be otherwise,
as a man cannot but be a rational creatures but the opinion of the
people may alter, and in another age, or perhaps in this, serious plays
may be set up above comedies. (Vol. 1, p.1?o).
Dryden /
Dryden here confesses that though he has consulted the preference of the
public in writing rlays he do s not share that preference end indeed feels
it is untrue. The truth about the relative values of comedy and tragedy
is something he knows despite the experience of a career in the theatre.
It is not a generalisation from the opinions, based on observation and
experience, of men, but exists as an absolute beyond such opinions. True
comparisons of value in criticism, therefore, do not derive from studies
of the responses and reactions of human beings, but from knowledge of the
ab olute value of each work of srt "in its own nature". Such idealism
wanes in the eighteenth century. So great was the impact of empirical
science that no eighteenth-century critic could remain as undisturbed as
Dryden by evidence counter to his beliefs. This is because no eighteenth-
century critic was unaware that truth could be, and had been, defined as
the relation between opinions and the facts of nature.
In his attitude to truth, therefore, Dryden, at least in the cases
considered here, is in contrast with the philosophical critics who, impressed
by the empiricism of natural philosophy, attempted to secure their own
principles on the same experimental basis, Dryden, who was both a critic
and a member of the Royal Society, was nevertheless not a true philosophical
critic. Indeed, he must be seen as a critic some o ' whose theories are
more nearly related to the traditions of supernatural idealism and personal
authority which science did so much to weaken. He may h ve asked, in the
spirit of the Royal Society, "why should there be any Ipse dixit in our
poetry, any more than there is in our philosophy?" (Vol. 1, p. 148), but
he himself suggested a theory of art which actually justifies that kind of
pronouncement.
In other respects, however, Dryden is like the philosophical critics.
In the first place, he does show some interest in explicitly defining the
authority /
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suthority of the critic. In other words, whet is remarkable shout
Pryden's criticism is not the comparative lack of statements of principle
hut the presence of the few there are. Secondly, Dryden is like the
philosophical critics in giving his concept of truth the function cf a
standard in criticism. The details are sketchy, hut it does seem to be
the case that he believed that the goodness or badness of a work of art
depended on its truthfulness. To ascertain the truth of a v/ork of art
w.r s therefore to judge it. Finally, both nature and emotion were
rominent in Dryden's theories, as they are in later speculation about
criticism. What does not survive is the distinction between truth and
nature.
29.
CHAPTER III s ADDISON
Compared with the case of Dryden, the influence of science on Joseph
Addison's critical theory is obvious and deeo. Addison's employment of the
psychology of Locke and his advocacy of en empirical basis for criticism are
enough to make him the first significant really "philosophical" critic of the
eighteenth century, and as such his own influence was considerable. Yet he
betrays a certain disquiet at the direction his theories take, end hints at
a regret that the authority of scientific fact seems to be takring over from
the charminr rule of fancy. ' In Addison's work there are signs of a conflict
of art and science, imagination and 'understanding. On the whole, Addison
seems to believe that science and understanding are the mightier (and more
truthful), though his sympathies are with the side of art and imagination.
Addison's most systematic effort at a theory of art is his series of
essays on the oleasures of the imagination in numbers 411 to 421 of the
Spectator. The1 beginnings of Addison's discussion are clear and concise
enough for quotation:
...by the Pleasures of the Imagination or Fancy (which I shall use
promiscuously) I here mean such as arise from visible Objects, either
when we have them actually in our View, or when we sail un their ideas
into our Minds by Paintings, Statues, Descriptions, or any the like
Occasion. We cannot indeed have a single image in the Fancy that
did not make its first Entrance through the Sight; but we have the
Power of retaining, altering end compounding those images, which we
have once received, into all the Varieties of Picture and Vision
that are most agreeable to the Imagination... (Spectator. 411).
In th«se few sentences Addison outlines the psycholo y of ideas and the
empiricist appeal to an "outside" world of fixed objects as 'he justification
of those ideas. The theory that the mind works with ideas which are
related to the objects with which the senses have contact clearly has the
consequence /
consequence th- t en idee which lacks such a correspondence with an object is
false, indeed meaningless. Hence reference to real objects secures the
meanings of ideas,
Addison avoids the difficulty that, if the mind never possesses an
idea which has not been -produced by the impression on the senses of an object,
then no idea at ell can be without a referent and hence meaningless or
doubtful. Since, according to him, "we have the Power of retaining,
altering and compounding those images", it is nos ible for the mind to pervert
its ideas into things not accurately reflecting objects as experienced by the
senses. There is therefore room for debates and decisions about the truth
or falsity of ideas, that is to say, their correspondence with objects,
which may have been distorted in the process of "altering and compounding"
our ideas.
Thus, when Addison writes, in Spectator 523» that "no Thought is
beautiful which is not just, and no Thought can be just which i3 not founded
in Truth, or at least in that which passes for such", although he appears
to agree with Dry-den's emphasis on truth in beauty, and art, there is a
fundamental difference. For Addison, truth is the correspondence of ideas
in th mind with the objects which impinge on the senses; in Dryden truth
is an independent entity discoverable by the understanding. Whet makes the
data of art veracious for Addison is not, as it is for Dryden, that they
are imitations of a nature in which truth is discoverable, but that they
are derived accurately from a steady source of experience and reflect the
objects in the real world.
The theory that the mind knows only ideas of objects and that the
truth of its ideas is secured by their relation to these objects is, of
course, a basically scientific notion. The world of observable objects
plays the pert of source-material for the mind and ultimate authority for
its conclusions. Just as experiments verify scientific theories, experience
verifies /
verified ideas. The theory of ideas, of course, is also basically atomistic,
so that the question of how ide-^s combine and r°act together is cepeble of a
quasi-mechanical answer.
But the psychology of ide-s also has an unwelcome consequence, because
it b-comes impossible to secure the full authority of natural phenomena for
human knowledge, although that would seem to be the theory's -rime intention
and v. lue. If the mind knows objects by ideas of them, it is never actually
in contact with the objects themselves. ^he mind therefore knows nothing
but its ideas. Ju gments about the truthfulness of ideas cannot then be
based on anything else but other ideas. For a superhuman being able to know
objects in themselves snd simultaneously to observe human ideas of them, the
comparative truth of the latter to the former could be investigated. But
for human beings confined in their minds to examining only ideas, such a
standard of truth is not possible. There is no apeal to anything more
substantial th-n ideas.
Truth is not therefore entirely unknowable. Assuming some degree of
permanence in the state of obiects, the sens- s, and the mind, it is probable
that ideas which resemble each other strongly have a common source in a stable
object. Other, more complex relations smone- ideas might be compatible with
similar conclusions. Absolute certainty may be unlikely, but high probability
is "-ossible. But the point is that what started as a concept of truth in
which physical reality was a source of authority, a standard, has become a
concept of truth relying on nsychological investigations and the description
of-mental states. Addison, Burke, Kames and Gerard all adopt psychological
speculation as a means to establish the principles of taste and criticism,
almost as if they were deliberately avoiding the difficulty that the psychology
of ideas does not in fact permit the direct appeal to objective re; lity it
seemed to allow.
Whether /
Whether in fact .Addison recognised the problem or not, he avoided it
by turning his attention to emotional responses. Th^se he could plausibly
represent as caused by qualities in objects. Hence the emotional "ideas"
of objects wo Id be as closely and stably related to their respective objects
as effects to causes. Addison thus reduces the meaning of knowledge to an
automatic recording capacity. It must be admitted that that is not an unfair
re'ding of the psychology of ideas, and suggests how opposite that psychology
appeared to Addison for explaining the pleasures of the imagination.
Addison divides these pleasures into two kinds. The primary pleasures
of the imagination arise from objects actually before the observer. Objects
"Great. Uncommon or Beautiful" (Spectator 412) are seen and immdiately
pl-ase. The validity of these pleasures is dependent on the existence of
the objects perceived. Addison here peaks of objects, and not ideas,
which give pleasure. Deliberately or not, he is vague about whether primary
pleasures result from direct knowledge of the reel qualities of things rather
than of the ideas created of the things for the mind by the senses. This
vagueness disguises the problem of verification.
The secondary pleesur s, on che other hand, involve ideas, not objects:
"it ip in the Power of the Imagination, when it is once Stocked with particular
ideas, to enlarge, compound and vary them at her ovm Pleasure" (Spectator 416).
That is to say, the secondary pleasures of the imagination are so on the
grounds of their agreeableness to the imagination itself; and since this
secondary pleasure arises from the comparing of ideas, not from the ideas
themselves, or their objects, it appears that the imagination, once stocked,
can amuse itself without reference to any object at all. It might be said,
therefore, that Addison is exploiting the logical disharmony of the theory
of ideas to fash-'on a distinctive role for the imagination.
He /
He goes even further. Since ideas are still supposed to be the
result of perception of objects, any idea the mind has presupposes an object
to stimulate it. Hence, the imagination, he says in his last P8rer, "has
something in it like Creation: it bestows a kind of Existence, and draws
up to the Header's View, several objects which are not to be found in Being"
The scheme of primary and secondary pleasures has a distinguished
precedent, well known to Addison, in the division of the qualities of object
into primary and secondary made by Locke. In discussing one of the final
causes of the primary pleasures of imagination, Addison himself explains
the difference between primary and secondary qualities: "Li ht and Colours,
as apprehended by the imagination", he writes in tnectato - 413. "are only
ideas in the Kind, and not Qualities that have any Existence in Matter".
Now there is clearly a parallelism between the scheme of two kinds
of qualities and that of two kinds of pleasure. In particular, both
schemes have e second term which is more intimately psychical; that is
to say, the secondary qualities and the secondary pleasures are both more
inherently functions of the mind, psychological states, than their primary
counterparts. And since -Ithout a hunrn mind they may very well not
exist, they ten. to seem more human, too. Indeed, the secondary qualities
of objects were created by God expressly for the pleasure of human beings,
it seems. "Things would make but a poop appearance to the Eye", says
Addison in Spectator 413, "if we saw them only in their proper '"igures
and Motions: And what Reason can we assign for their exciting in us many
of those ideas which are different from any thing that exists in the
Objects themselves, (for such are Light and Colours) were t not to add
Supernumerary Ornaments to the Universe, and meke it more agreeable to
the imagination?"
Addison's reference to the primary qualities of objects as their
pro er figures an motions implies his awareness that the distinction
between /
between primary end secondary qualities is a scientific, a "philosophical",
theory. The mathematical reduction of objects to figures and motions,
which had so helped the progress of mechanics, was elevated to a metaphysical
proposition. A qualitative difference was postulated between the geometrical
characteristics of bodies, their size and movements, which were thought to
be objectively described by mathematical means, nd those qualities -
co. our, taste, smell and so on - which seemed to depend on a relationship
with e sentient observer, a human being. The primary qualities could be,
and had been, mathematically defined} the secondary ones, on the whole,
could not - or at least they had not been submitted to quantification in
Addison's time. Hence the primary qualities were regarded as impersonally
and objectively demonstrated, whereas the secondary qualities were still
only described from personal points of view. The primary qualities and
the secondary qualities therefore differed as science did from unscientific
thinking, which was uncertain and usually prejudiced.
In the distinction between primary and secondary qualities there
i3 a clear contrast between the nature the universe as it really is
and as it appears to be to human experience. The apparent world of
secondary qualities is confined to the mind. If art principally concerns
itself with secondary qualities then it is similarly circumscribed in its
subject matter. The drawback is that if truth is the accurate correspondence
of ideas with the objects which stimulate them, an idea corresponding to
a secondary quality is somehow as true to human experience as but less
true to the real world than an idea derived from a primary quality.
Conversely, an idea derived from a primary quality must be true to things
as they are humanly experienced and to things as they really are. The
superiority of primary-quality descriptions over secondary-quality
descriptions as knowledge of the world is evident, while the appeal of
secondary-quality descriptions to human nature is no less so. Addison
thus finds himself in a - osition to compare and contrast art and science.
Addison /
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Addison does this by discussing non-ficticnrl writing in Spectator
420. After describing some of the pleasures provided the imagination by
"the Authors of the new Philosophy", he go-s on to assert that unfortunately
what is scientifically acceptable concerning the vastness of the universe
or the minuteness of microscopic creatures is inconceivable to the
imagination:
The Understanding, indeed, opens an infinite Space on every side of
us, but the Imagination, after a few faint Efforts, is immediately
at a stand, end finds her self swallowed up in the Immensity of the
Void that surrounds it: Our Reason can pursue a Particle of Matter
through an infinite variety of Divisions, but the Fancy soon loses
sight of it, and feels in it self a kind of Chasm, that wants to be
filled with Matter of a more sensible Bulk,
Evidently something (and it is noteworthy that here it is a written statement)
may be scientifically true, that is, Addison would doubtless agree, true
of things as they are, but not be capable of being entertained by (or of
entertaining) the imagination. Addison here makes an explicit opposition
of the understanding and the imagination in the context of credibility and
truthfulness. An earlier passage is relevant, in which Addison strangely
speaks of the pleasures of the understanding:
JjPhe pleasures of the understanding^ are, indeed, more preferable,
because they are founded on some new knowledge or improvement in
the Mind of Man; yet it must be confest, that those of the
imagination are as great and as transporting as the other.
(Spectator 411)
What the pleasures of the imagination are founded on begins to seem
different from truth as it is recognised by the understanding. The
imaginative is being forced further and further from the secure basis
of /
of empirical, scientific truth; correspondingly, the understanding and its
science are being edged into an unpleasant world of cold facts where the
imagination has limited power. The drift in Addison1s thinking is towards
a division of everything into the imaginable end the unimaginable.
Addison's attitude to the imagination is not entirely straightforward,
however. The importance to it of secondary qualities means thrt "our Souls
are at present delightfully lost and bewildered in a pie-sing elusion,
and we walk about like the Enchenged Hero of a Romance" (Spectator 413).
There is surely something equivocal about this picture of the world of
secondary qualities. delusion and romance, however pleasant, are not
truthful. Secondary qualities, writes Addison earlier in the seme paper,
provide "Supernumerary Ornaments to the Universe" so that "we ere every
where entertain- d with pleasing Shows and Apparitions". Addison's
metaphors suggest the pleasure of secondary qualities, but they also imply
their unreality and deceptiveness.
Further signs cf ambivalence in Addison can be revealed by returning
to his remarks on the final causes of the pleasures of the imagination.
The four final causes of the primary pleasures are all ordained by God,
who, as the source of all t oodness, thus lends those pleasures moral value
and ultimate justification. Obviously, Addison at this oint retains an
old-fashioned, pre-scientific way of thinking.
The first of the final causes makes greatness pleasing in order to
encourage the worship of the deity. This idea is a clear gesture in the
direction of orthodox moral sentiment, which Addison shares. Vhat is
perha s remarkable is that this is neither the only final cause of pleasure
nor the one which occupies most of Addison's attention.
The second cause makes novelty pleasing in order to encourage the
search for knowledge of the creation. The third makes members of one
species /
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species mutually pleasing in order to encourage propagation. This hintB at
a biological theory of pleasure, not developed by Addison, but prominent in
Burke. The fourth cause makes objects beautiful by mean3 of "secondary
qualities" in order that "the whole Creation^may bejmore gay and delightful"
(Spectator 413). The finsl cause of the secondary pleasures, of comparison
of ideas, is the encouragement and improvement of th mind's search for truth
by "observing the Congruity or Disagreement that appears among the several
Works of Nature" (Spectator 416).
Addison regards four things, it would seem, as self-evidently
valuables the worship of God, the propagation of the species, the pursuit
of knowledge and, simply, pleasure. The acceptance of both the last two
is the source of the smbivalence in the essays on the pleasures of the
imagination. If God can decide his creation shall be pleasant for the
sake of it, thrn the pleasures of the imagination are justified independently
of the satisfaction of the understanding; but if He al30 made it pleasant
in order to encourage its investigation then He leaves the artist, and the
critic, in a quandary. For then the pleasures of the imagination are
justified, not in themselves, but by their result in terms of knowledge.
r~
Thus Addison is undecided whether the imagination's interest in pleasure
is justified in ios own terms, or as it leads to true knowledge of the
world.
Such indecisiveness abcut the justification of pleasure means that
Addison must also be indecisive abcut the justification of critical
judgments. The alternatives he presents the critic are plain. He
could insist that the scientific inaccuracy of a work of art, its failure
to make a contribution to knowledge of the world, no matter how pleasing,
debars it from his approbation; or he could insist that a work no matter
how scientifically accurate is artistically inept because it fails to
please /
please. Works could be judged as true to external reality, or true to
feelin j but in both cases the truth would be a relation between the signs
and symbols of the work and a set of other data, whether physical or
psychological.
Whatever the confu3icns raised by the psychology of ideas, whether
ide 3 or objects ere the sources of pleasure, the form of the justification
of critical judgments is clear enough. It will consist of references to
fects, experimental observations, either of objects, or of human responses.
It is because thi3 cannot be doubted that Addison is to be classed as a
philosophical critic, one for whom a scientific attitude i; basic.
In conclusion, then, let us return to Addison's remarks on the
psychological justification of critical principles, the causes of pleasure,
in Spectator 412:
Though in Yesterday's Paoer we consider'd how every thing that is
Great. Nmr or Beautiful, is apt to affect the imagination with
Pleasure, we must own that it is impossible for us to assign the
necessary Cause of this Pleasure, because we know neither the Nature
of en Idea, nor the Substance of a Human Soul, which ad ht help U3
to discover the Conformity or Disagreeableness of the one to the
other...
What 'ddison rejects here is the possibility, in his time, of a physical
or mechanical explanation of the reaction of an idea with the wind. This
is not because he thinks such en explanation of the mind's workings
inannroriate or undesirable. On the contrary, he regrets not being able
to extend mechanical knowledge into psychology. The reason for this
inability is simply that there is no evidence of what ideas and the mind
are like from which to suggest how they affect each other.
At about the same time as Addison wrote, Newton himself was
speculating /
speculating about a subtle fluid which carries information 'Ion-'7 the nerves
to the brain, into s receptive area he called the "sensorium". It is just
that sort of theori ing that Addison rejects. Instead, he suggests an
empirical investigation which will ignore microscopic ques ions of actual
causes in favour of more widely~focussed descriptions of pleasurable
i.itua tions:
...all that we can do in Speculations of this kind, is to reflect
on those Operations of the Soul that are most agreeable, and to
range, under their proper Heads, what is pleasing or displeasing
to the Mind, without being able to trace out the several necessary
and efficient Causes from hence the Pleasure or Displeasure arises,
(Spectator 413).
In this suggestion Addison parallels Newton's response to the problem of
the cause of gravity. Newton had thoughts on this, but was -unwilling to
be free with them. He refused to see any fault in his theory of gravity,
however, because it lacked -ositive assertions about a cause. Instead,
he stressed the descriptive accuracy of his mathematical formulations of
the forces involved and held that such success in application was
sufficient. How gravity operates over vast distances was ■ mystery, but
that it does and does so more or less according to the laws Newton proposed
was, in his view, indisputable. Similarly, Addison regarded it as a
mystery how ideas interacted wit the soul (or mind) to produce pleasure,
but that they did so was evident and he believed the instances could be
observed and usefully formulated, in the manner of n tural laws,
Newton's derivation of his law of gravity depended for its
persuasive mathematical precision on Kepler's laws of plrnetary motion,
which in turn were derived from the accurate astronomical data collected
by Tycho Brahe. Without those facts, Hewton's achievements in celestial
m chanics would have been impossible.
What /
What Addison proposes is in effect that the facts of the pleasures
of the imagination must be similarly collated and classified, with a view,
presumably, to ever more powerful generalisation. Without such data (and
obviously Addison felt it was lacking in his time) the Newton of taste
could not appear.
Bacon had made a similar demand for factual investigations at the
beginning of the seventeenth century; perhaps Addison felt that to reneat
it at the beginning of the eighteenth with respect to taste, the imagination,
pleasure and criticism would further the scientific revolution xrith which
Bacon was credited. In short, /ddison suggests a research programme, an
investigation of pleasure in a scientific way. Althou, h ho was ambivalent
about scientific values and shows some preference for secondary pleasures,
secondary qualities, the artistic and the strictly human, his recommendation
to the critic is to become a natural philosopher of the im ination, a
scientist of taste. Burke, Kames and Gerard, in producing work of the
kind Addison seems to request, fulfil the role he speci ies; whether they
were aware that they did so or not, it is difficult to say.
One remaining question is why Adison thought it important to
explain the pleasures of the imagination. In Spectator 409, in which he
announces his series of papers on the pleasures of the imagination, he
also wishes that there were critics "who beside the Mechanical Rules
which a Man of very little Taste may discourse upon, would enter into
the very Spirit and Soul of fine Writing, and shew us the several ources
of that Pleasure which rises in the Mind upon the Perusal of a noble Work".
Apparently Addison's interest in the pleasures of the imagination is a
result of a dissatisfaetion with the traditional rules of formal criticism,
and a positive interest in the explanation of the emotional reactions
literature evokes. These attitudes are typical of the eighteenth-century
critics.
What /
What la missing In Addison is a concern with criticism as a process
of judgment. He devotes his attention to the description of taste end art,
rather than to the standard of taste.
CHAPTER IV : BURKE
The proposition that the eighteenth-century theorists of taste and
criticism were much in luenced by "philosophical", that is, scientific,
modes of thought is particularly helpful in considering dmund Burke's
Philosophical Inquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of :h - Siablime and
Beautiful.1 It explains what Burke thought he was doing, and indeed how
he was, and continues to be, misunderstood. Too many facile restatements
of his conclusions have obscured the intellectually demanding structure of
his work and its serious purpose. Attention to his theoretical ground¬
work not only reveals his "philosophical" attitude, but also his interesting
if ultimately unsatisfactory, efforts both to apply and to alter that style
of thought.
That theory is important in Burke, and that he felt his was neglected
he himself avowed, especially in the second edition of his book. To that
edition Burke not only added an "Introductory Discourse Concerning Taste"
but also a short preface. In the course of this he comments on the
reception of his work. These observations are a good starting-point for
an interpretation of the Enquiry. The basis of Burke's criticism of his
critics lies in the following remarks concerning theory:
The task would be infinite, if we could establish no principle
until we had previously unravelled the complex texture of every
image or description to be found in poets and orators. And
though we should never be able to reconcile the effect of such
images to our principles, this can never overturn the theory
itself, hilst it i3 founded on certain and indisputable facts.
A theory founded on nperiment and not assumed, is always good
for so much as it explains. Our i ability to push it indefinitely
is no argument at all against it. (Second edition preface, pp. 4f).
1 Quotations from Burke's Enquiry will here be identified by reference first
to the Part and Section of the work, and then by page reference to the
reprint of the second edition, edited by James T. Boultcn, London, 1958,
43.
Thus Burke outlines his concept! n of the theory of exn rimental science.
This is the foundation of one of the moat serious, and explicit, if slightly
misdirected, ettemnts to extend Newtonianisia into the non-Newtonian fields
of social science.
It may well be asked how adequate, how scientific is this theoretical
bac-:-round of Burke's. The first ^oint he makes seems very sound: that
if all the evidence had to be analysed before theorising could commence it
would in fact never begin. But this is really only obvicus to those who
share the view that the amount of significant information is or is likely
to be infinite. In such a case the preliminary evidence for a theory,
its premises, must be a selection. Burke successfully brings out that
the modern concept of infinity forces selectivity on a theorist.
He is not so explicit, however, on another roint. An infinite
quantity of evidence is a daunting prospect. Obviously it cannot be
comprehended as a whole by any individual. To make sense of it some
sort of organised response would seem necessary, else one would be over¬
whelmed by an apparently amorphous mass of detail.
Imagine one letter-sorter in s small bare room; if he is handed
a couple of dozen letters he has floor space to set them out with every
address visible. But if he 1 s given a couple of thousand letters, he
has to cover some with others and in order to fin them again if required
he will need some 3impl? system to guide his search for a letter not
necessarily openly displayed. No system at all will mean, chaos, just as
in the face of 'lie infinite universe no theory at all will mean incoherency
and incomprehension.
Theory itself becomes valuable. The impulse to scientific
theorising is a con equence of the recognition of the infinity of things.
Burke, however, does not give this or any other reason for assuming that
any theory is better than none.
It /
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It is another resrect, however, that Burke's discussion is most
unsatisfactory, an' thr t is in the distinguishing of the relative values of
different theories, In fact, so intent i3 he on justifying the adoption of
any theory that the kind he describes is peculiarly resistent to comparative
criticism, end perhaps even impossible to reject. For in arguing for the
acceotebi ity of a theory based on a selection of the available evidence he
dangerously weakens the significance of possible counters-examples.
The development of an experimental theory is, according to Burke, the
result of two processes. First, there is the derivation of general principles
from the selection of data which is the preliminary evidence; this is
undiction. Second, there is the derivation from these priicioles of the
theory as a whole, by means of deduction. Induction must, says Burke, be
■performed on as much evidence as possible: " ";he greater number of th^se
comparisons we make, the more general and the more certain our knowledge is
like to prove, as built uoon a more extensive and perfect induction" (Preface p.4).
A similar maxim for the deduction is less easily stated. Burke writes: in
considering any comolex matter, we ought to examine every distinct ingredient
in the com osition, one by one; and reduce every thing to the utmost
simplicity; since the condition of our nature binds us to a strict law and
very narrow limits" (ibid.). What the "strict law" is it is difficult to
say; perha s Burke is thinking of the way in which science seems to choose
between rival explanations by preferring the simpler theory offered.
Be that as it may, it can at least be said where Burke thinks real
criticism can be applied; it can be directed at the formation of a theory
in its inductive and deductive stages. The trouble is that Burke virtually
restricts criticism to this narrow range, ruling out, for instance, the
criticism of applicability:
The objections, in my opinion, ought to be pro ^osed, either to the
several principles as they are distinctly considered, or to the
justness /
justness of the conclusion which is drawn from them. But it is
common to raas over both the premises end conclusion in silence,
and to produce as an objection, some poetical passage which does
not seem easily accounted for uron the principles I endeavour to
establish. This manner of proceeding I should think very improper.
(Preface, p.4)
It is interesting that Burke should choose just this point to make against
his critics. The central tonic is clearly the status of anomalies in
relation to a theory.
Ruling out, correctly, the possibility cf a theory based on an
induction from all the evidence, Burke cannot deny that the data unon which
his principles rest are a selection. But he is confident that, provided
the theory is securely derived in an accurate inductive/deductive process,
it is true for that selection. It will lso be true of the whole class of
instances from which the selection is taken. If the theory is to be
extended beyond its premises, the class of evidence it is true of must
exceed the selection of evidence unon which it is based. The vroblem is
that the evidence for identifying the class of data relevant is the same
as the evidence from which the theor itself is derived.
Since s fundamental feature of each item of the selection of
evidence which supports a true theor is that the theor explains it, the
whole class of evidence covered by the theory must also have the character¬
istic of being able to be explained by the theory. And since a theory
is true because it explains the data on which it is based, in the sense of
being competently derived from them, it follows that a theory which survives
criticism at this stage cannot fail to explain any relevant instance; an
anomaly, therefore, can only be apparent or irrelevant.
If /
If the seeming anomaly is indeed in the class of instances covered
by the theory, then it must, ipso facto, be explicable by the theoiy, and
hence is not really anomalous; if it is truly inexplicable, then it is not
in the class of relevant data. Hence no evidence can contradict a true
theory, for there are no genuine counter-examples. Nor, indeed, can
counter-exam les be used against an untrue theoiy, for the fault lies
rather in the derivation, the internal consistency of the theory with the
principles end the consistency of those in tu:n with the data upon which
they are based. For Burke "anomalies" are not faults in the theory; he
sees them rather as faults in the use of the theory, compounded of human
error and incapacity!
This inability £to push a theory indefinitely] may b^ owing to our
ignorance of some necessary hediums; to a want of proper application
to many other causes besides a defect in the principles we employ.
In reality the subject require? a much closer attention, than we dare
claim from our manner of treating it, (Preface, p,5)
As far as Burke is concerned, producing "some poetical passage which does
not seem easily accounted for upon the principles I endeavour to establish"
is a confession cf weakness on the part of the objector rather than a
reflection on the theory,
Burke's position is, of course, tautologous, Bxplicebility and
relevance are defined in terms of e- ch other; anything a theory can explain
is relevant, anything it cannot is irrelevant. Burke excludes a middle
group, of things which are not explained, yet ere relevant; which could be
explained, but are not.
He probably does thi3 because of his attitude to truth, A theory
correctly derived from experimental premises must be true at least in those
instances; it was perhaps unthinkable to Burke that it could be less than
true /
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true for all other relevant evidence. That would suggest that a theory-
could be true and not true at the same time - an absurd situation for Burke,
He avoids recognising this possible absurdity by stressing the
inviolable truth of a well-formed theory. Irreconcilable data "can never
overturn the theory itself, whilst it is founded on certain and indisputable
facts" (Preface, p.5). He does not allow that the explanatory potential
of e theory as estimated at any given time is en approximation, a suggestion
of what mi 'ht be explained rather than of what will be explained. Nor
does he permit the truth of a theory to fell elow one hundred per cent,
into some degree of probability. In no case can a true theory be allowed
to fail.
In infallible theory cannot be wrongly applied. Potentially its
applicability is unlimited, that is to say, the class of relevant data to
which it applies h^s no boundaries. Hence the argument returns to the
problem of what it is the true theory does and, nerhans more significant,
does not explain. On Burke's showing, the answer is all-embracing. The
alternative is dire. Since the theory cannot fail in application, it must,
if it is not to be applied to anything and everything, be prevented from
being applied in some cases. Because there is no way of telling afterwards
whether any particular application of a true theory was its ultimate,
extreme success, since all applications are equally successful, no failure
being possible, there is nothing left but to try to say beforehand whether
any instance is relevant to the theory; in effect, it is prevented from
failing by being prevented from being applied.
Thus, cur letter-sorter has filled his small, bare room to the
ceiling not only with letters but with anything end everything handed in to
him, on the principle that since he is a letter-sorter anything he is given
must be a letter for sorting. Now, faced with a mound of rubbish, his
only /
only recourse, If he is not to abandon his theory of what is a letter (a
theory which has not failed him in many,many trials), is to cease taking
in things at the door. His theory thus remains intact, while he can still
regard it as about something rather than everything (and nothing).
In this case, however, it is clear, not so much how, but by whom
the decision is reached to set a limit to the application of the theory.
In the more general case Burke presents, it is not so apparent who would
decide where the theory ceases. Clearly that person would claim in some
sense to know when the theory is and is not to be applied, but such
knowledge would not be obtainable from the practice of applying the theory,
since that is uniformly successful. This knowledge must surely therefore
be something special. The grounds for such a special insight are mysterious.
Who could make such a claim?
Whoever did would simultaneously claim a privileged position and
authority to go with it. He it would be who pretended to know the class
of evidence to which the theory applied, that is, the meaning of the theory.
With such knowledge he would have the power to approve or disapprove of
other people's use of the theory. This is close to the position Burke
occupies.
Such an authoritarian attitude is not a scientific one. Neither
the meaning nor the conditions of application of a scientific theory are
determined simply by authoritarian declarations. The scientific attitude
is in fact the opposite of Burke's in this respect. It has given up the
notion of absolute proven truth and regards the results of induction
tentatively. Science admits the possibility that what was supposed to be
the kind of evidence covered by the theory could include recalcitrant
material. The value of the theory depends therefore on tests of it, or
the volume of applications, by which its limits of operation can be
ascertained. A scientific theory must extent to data which are not
included /
included in its premises and which are not fore—defined as explicable by the
theory; that is to say, a theory, to be scientific, must be falsifiable,
not proof against fallibility. To claim that a theory can never be over¬
turned is to render it unscientific. Theories of the type Burke describes
are in this resrect unscientific; science tak s risks with its theories,
Burke tries to protect his tyre of theory from failure.
The disturbing feature brought out by this analysis of Burke's
understanding of the theory of the experimental method is not so much that
he has wrong ideas about science as that they have such an unwelcome
tendency. They contradict, by 1 aning towaros authoritarianism, the signs
of open-mindedness displayed by Burke. "The true standard of the arts" he
writes, "is in very man's oower" (i, xix, p.54). It seems to be a noble
invitation to free discussion, and no doubt Burke would by and large have
acce ted this imputation. But in fact the role of criticism is very much
restricted by Burke, and the significance of tests of a theory is even more
curtailed by him.
The centre of the problem is his concept of truth. Although the
true standard of the arts is in every man's power, it is not in ell men's
possession. If any man in fact discovers the true standard, then he is
privileged above all others who have it not. He can hardly consent to
change his ideas to compromise with those who do not know the truth, no
matter bow large a majority they constitute. The assumption is that truth
is immutable and not open to discussion. On this basis authoritarianism
is a logical outcome which cannot be glossed over by a display of liberal-
minuedness. It is obvious that authoritarian knowledge, based on the idea
of nroven truth, rather than falsifisble theories, is not capable of much
development. It is therefore incompatible with a belief in the infinite
variety of the universe.
A clue to the origin of Burke's theorising about science is provided
in /
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in the nineteenth section of Part IV of the Enquiry: he is discussing the
physical cause of love:
The universal voice of mankind, faithful to their feelings, concurs
in affirming this uniform and general effect; and although some odd
and particular instance may perhaps be found, wherein there appears
a considerable degree of positive pleasure, without all the characters
of relaxation, we must not therefore reject the conclusion we had
drawn from a concurrence of many experiments, but we nrust still
retain it, subjoining the exceptions which occur accor ing to the
judicious rule laid down by Sir Isaac Newton in th--- third book of
his Optics. (lV,x:ir, p. 150).
Although in this passage, added to the second edition of the "nquiry. Burke
admits the possibility of exceptions, he gives them no significance, and a
theory is left intact by them. One turns to the "judicious rule" of Newton
in the hone of finding Burke has misunderstood his great mentor. The
±
reference seems to be to the penultimate paragraph of the Opticks.
Frankly, the passage is obscure. It is not clear what part
exceptions play in the development of a Newtonian theory, Newton provides
insufficient grounds for suggesting that a theory is subject to drastic
revision in the face of anomalies, nor does he explicitly support Burke in
saying that exceptions should simply be added to the theory as codicils and
no more. On the crucial point of what to do when the number of exceptions
reaches a high level, Newton is silent. When J.T. Boulton declares that
"the Enquiry... is indeed a prize example of Newtonian experimental methods
applied to aesthetics" (r>. xxviii), he can b^ met with only qualified
agreement.
The foregoing examination of Burke's theoretical assumptions serves





supported by an attempt at a philosophy of science. But in the second place
a critical consideration of his theories shows that they are not truly
scienti ic and tend towrrds an authoritarian standpoint. His misconceptions
of science have this result, however, despite op osite intentions, end indeed
partly because of his good intentions. To demonstrate this it is necessary
to give an exposition of the Enquiry, especially as a psychological study.
As such it is almost entirely confined to the emotions, which Burke
prefers to call the passions. He begins by asking what must be the case
if an objec . excites passion. The most primitive mode of excitement he
finds is novelty, the appeal to curiosity, but this clearly loses its force
as the individual increases his experience. The more lasting emotional
quality which is the basis of most of the passions for Burke is the capability
to excite pleasure or pain. For adult human beings an object is capable of
rousing passion if it is pleasing or painful. It may, however, be neither,
and hence be indifferent; Burke is anxious to establish this third possibility,
partly because he wants to laim that emotional excitement, the exercise of
the soul's "finer organs", whether pleasing or painful, is itself, at least
in moderation, positively desirable.
The various passions can be classified as those of self-preservation
and those of society; the first are, generally, painful, and the second,
generally,pleasant. Some passions can be mixtures of pleasure and pain,
and indeed it seems that no passion, according to Burke, is a pure form of
either, In addition, Burke asserts that the absence or cessation of pain
is not a positive pleasure, but rather a special sensation he distinguishes
as delight, a modification of pain; similar modifications of pleasure are
possible.
Most of these points are made in Part I of the Enquiry. They have
to do with what Burke calls the "final causes" of passion. In a snnse they
are /
are definitions of key terms in his psychology, which he will prove by
illustration in considering particular examples of passions, especially
those associated with the sublime and beautiful. In another sense they ere
a description, given that objects do arous? passions, of hot must, thinks
Burke, be the case regarding them and the beings that respond.
The justification of such preliminary generalisations in Burke's
theoretical scheme is, however, far from obvious, Th. ir position at the
beginning of Burke's nquiry raises the suspicion that they are a priori
statements, not the inductions from observed events which Burke's theory
seems to demand. Basic•experimental research clerly begins only in Part II,
There it is stated that objects with the quality of the sublime
produce in the observer modified pain or delight in the form of astonishment*
Astonishment is like the passions of fear and danger, or, to speak even more
broadly, terror. The likeness, however, although it includes the quality
of threat which induces these passions of self-preservation, does not extend
to the capacity for actual destruction, that is to say, the carrying out of
the threat. There is a subtle distinction, then, between sublime objects,
says Burice, which cause modified terror or astonishment, and really
terrifying experiences. This subtlety is not however invariably maintained
by 3urke, who tends to talk of sublime objects as thcugh they are just like
terrifying ones.
Beautiful objects produce a pleasant passion which is a modified form
of lust. The difference is in the absence of desire} lust minus desire
Burke calls love. He also divides it into sexual, having for its object
individuals of the opposite sex, and social, having for its object mankind
(and animals) in general, a form of sympathy. Addison similarly divides
the beautiful into the sexual, as an encouragement to propagation, and the
merely pleasing (Spectator. 413).
What /
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Whet Burke seems to went is to preserve the use of the word "beauty"
as 8 commendation of individuals (that is, women), end yet also extend it
to symn-thetic responses and "soft" emotions generally. On the whole this
leads to confusion, espedially as the qualiti s of beautiful objects he
lists - smallness, smoothness, gradual variation, delicacy, clarity or
diversity of colour - seem of a different order of discourse, not usually
being thought of as lovable qualities. Some explanation of this difficulty
is provided, hov.<ever, in the fourth part, ' hen the physical cause of love
is conside ed.
Burke believes that physical changes in the body affect one's state
of -ind, and viae versa- Although he regards mind and body as distinct
from each other, yet he conceives their operations as inextricably linked,
in ways not completely discernible:
I do not pretend that I shall ever be able to explain, why certain
affections of the body produce such a distinct emotion of mind, and
%
no other; or why the body is at all affected by the mind, or the
mind by the body. (lVf ±t p. 129)
He does think it possible and useful, however, to examine how this inters¬
ection takes place, end to set out which bodily occurrences go with which
passions,
Burke's reluctance to claim that complete knowledge Of the mind/body
system and hence of the way emotion is stimulated is possible recalls
Addison's similar diffidence concerning the possibility of providing an
explanation of the causes of the pleasures of the imagination. Instead
he, like Buike, suggests the humbler task of gathering information about
what pleases and displeases the mind and arranging the details under headings,
since it is impossible to give the necessary and efficient causes of such
pleasures /
A
Spectator 413, first paragraph. See pp.38ff.
pleasures and displeasures. Addison does not himself embark formally on
this ambitious project, although many details of his discussion of how the
imagination is pleased count towards it, but Burke does.
His general conclusions are as follows. The passions of fear end
danger are accompanied by symptoms of physical tension. If the body is made
tense, then the mind will experience terror; if the mind is in a state of
terror, the body will go tense. In a mild degree such a state is not
positively rainful, but ratter gives the hybrid state of delight. This
is because the exercise of the finer organs whi h respond to th fearful is
a - ositive need of the human organism. To encourage such exercise, an
experience that provides mild shocks to the system is considered delightful;
such experiences constitute the sublime. All Burke has to show is that
the several qualities he has identified as characteristic of sublime objects
and experiences indeed cause the state of mile tension in the body which is
delightful.
The nassion of love, cn the other hand, is associated, not with a
tension, but with a relaxation of the body. Such a relaxation, which is
pleasant, is to be distinguished from the indifferent state of rest. Just
as sublime objects cause tension, beautiful objects cause a nervous
rel'xation which causes the passion of love. Burke proceeds to demonstrate
that the qualities he calls beautiful are relaxing. It is for this reason
that smallness, smoothness, gradual variation rnd so on are related to sexual
admiration and social feeling. Sublime objects can be seen as modifications
of terrifying objects; beautiful objects are not so much modifications of
love-objects as sharers with them ~'n the capacity to induce relaxation.
In thin outline can be seen the stages of Burke's theor tical structure.
By induction from the many several qualities of objects "experimentally"
considered, in Parts II and III, the passions roused by the sublime and the
beautiful /
beautiful are discovered. From an analysis of these is deduced a statement
of what generally constitutes, or causes, them. The answer turns out to be
two effects of objects on the body/mind system, physical tension end fear in
the care cf the sublime, physical relaxation and love in the case of the
beautiful.
The neat opposition of tension and relaxation is suspicious, and the
suggestion might be made that Burke's findings are perhaps controlled more
by a wish for symmetry than by experimental fact, scrutinised without
prejudice. But this is not much more that a d hater's point, and doubtless
Burke would not consider it worth his notice.
Burke expected criticism of a different kind. He felt that the
qu stion his critics should have asked themselves was whether the features
he had selected in fsct caused the emotions he said they did and whether
they shared with those emotions the property of causing tension or relaxation.
Such criticism would lead to refinements in his theory, but not, perhaps,
to a radical change in it, or the postulation of a serious rival.
To produce an example of, say, poetry and claim it was sublime but
not astonishing meant nothing to him, because he could not consider it as
sublime, that is, classifiable with all the examples he had collected in
his book, unless it had that quality. The objector would be forced to find
something else about his example which made it (for him at le- st) sublime,
hence erecting a new theory, but on a much more limited basis than Burke's.
Since he could not therefore take such an insubstantial theory s a serious
alternative, Burice regarded its em irical base as only a minor difficulty
no doubt soluble in time. If his theory was right, local problems could
surely be overcome with practice. The logical foundation for this
confidence, and the accompanying disadvantages, have already been discussed.
If the significant part of the Enquiry is its theory, rather than its
examples /
examples, then it is to that theory that attention ought to be directed,
"Yet" Beys Boulton, "it must be said at once, that among those of his
contemporaries and successors who carried on the debate on beauty • nd
sublimity and allied topics, Burke*s theories caused scarcely a tremor"
(p. Ixxxii), This is hardly surprising, since a large measure of the
theorising centres, not on the sublime and the beautiful, but on the
psychology of emotion. Because of the detailed accounts in the book of
the natur of those two qualities, in Burke's effort to reproduce the
experimental method, this fact may be missed, ["he point can be made by
drawing attention to the way the opuler abbreviation oi the title is mis-
1
leading. Burke did not call his work The Sublime ana Beautiful but A,
Pm insnrMonl Enquiry into the Origins of our ideas of the ,-ublime and
Beautiful. Of at least equal status with the last four words in the
preceding phrase, "the origin of our ideas".
There are dangers here, though. It is too easy to assume that
Burke follows Locke in regard to ideas. In Part I, however, he uses the
word "idea" of such things as pain and dangers
Most of the ideas which are capable of meking a powerful impression
on the mind, whether simply of Pain or Pleasure, o~ of the
modifications of those... (i, vi, p. 38)
Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain and
danger... (l,vii, p. 39)
It is according to this difficult usage that the word appears in the
title.
But perhaps more significant is the word "origin1. In a primary
sense this refers to the objects whose qualities cause the experience of
the sublime or beautiful and hence give the ideas of them, but in another
B@nse /
1 This title appears with the fourteenth edition, Oxford, 1796 (Boulton,
Appendix, pp. 176-182).
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sense it refers to the Physical effects, tension and relaxation, which Burke
identifies as mediate causes of the relevant oassions. The full title, then,
directs attention to those features of the work which have here been stressed
as centrally important.
What, then, of Burke's account of the origins of our ideas of the
sublime and beautiful ? An obvious ferture is his debt to eighteenth-century
empiricism, his claim that the ideas of the sublime and beautiful are derived
from experience of objects. For instance, by beauty he says he means "that
quality or those qualities in bodies by which they cause love, or some passion
similar to it" (ill, i, p. 91). Thus the passion of love may be felt as an
effect of some quality experienced of an object, which may therefore be called
beautiful; similarly, terror or astonishment is caused by objects with
sublime qualities. In the first case the overall effect is pleasant, and
in the second it is neinful, or, a modification of this, delightful.
But although there is a plausibility (not to say a tautology) in
making connections in one direction - from pain, to f^ar, to fear-inspiring
qualities, to objects in which those qualities reside, for instance - there
is a basic implausibility about the reverse argument, beginning with an
O'ject and its qualities. To ssy an object rouses fear because it has a
fearsome quality, that quality should be described independently of its
cane city to rouse fear; yet if that is done there will be nothing about
the description which makes it necessary that the object will in fact cause
fear.
The language of cause-and-effect is just not very suitable in this
case. The nature of a cause is not determined by its effect and so the
cause of an emotion cannot be described as though it contained an essentia 1
quality evoking that ? nd no other response. To inclu e such an element
in a description, furthermore, says nothing at all about the cause of the
emotion except that it was appropriate to the effect.
Thus /
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Thus, although it is possible to give the reason why mountains seem
(to you) ewe-inspiring, ^or example, because of their height, it is not
possible to ive as the csu e some quality like height, for that merely
leads on to the question of what is the cause of th- aw—inspiring-ness
of hei ht, and so on. Once a causal "hain is conjectured as an explanation
of emotional effects, an indefinite argument is embarked ueon, although
sooner or later one runs out of qualities of qualities to cause them and
i left with the bare assertion that x just jls awe-inspiring or whatever.
Bu *ke tries to work round this obstacle by introducing a physiological
rerction, The qualities o objects cause a bodily reaction hich in turn
causes the corresponding passion, a passion the presence of hich can induce
the co-ordinated physical effect. The interaction of mind end body Burke
3ees as an opportunity to escape the vicious degeneration of the cause/effect
analysis of emotion which is noted above. or it makes an opening for a
hesis of biological necessity, apparent in his classification of passions
into those of self-preservation, which ere usually painful, and those of
society, which are pleasant.
The physical presence cf a threat to the system, because of the
biological instinct for survival (self-preservation), causes a physiological
r sponse which communicates itself to the mind as fear? and the presence
of a stimulus to reproduction causes a relaxation (l) of the system, which
is identified in the mind as love. The biological imperatives, to survive
and to reproduce, assumed to be necessary for the continuation cf the
specie:- in its individuals, condition the human system to res ond with
tension or relaxation, fear or love, pain or pleasure, in the presence of
objects with certain qualities.
If, therefore, the awe-inspiring quality of a mountain is its vast
height and bulk, the awe-inspiring quality of vast height and bulk is, to
Burke's satisfaction, the threat of annihilation which they present to
lesser /
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lesser, human entitles; the human observer is belittled by a greet mountain,
he stands at its foot in a danger of extinction directly proportional (or
so it seems) to the difference between his puniness and its pil d-un mass.
Apprehension - a particle of the mountain dislodged from its peak could
in its fall eradicate a man - induces physical tension, a readiness for
flight, nervous strain nd hence fear, a passion of self-preservation.
The feersomeness of a mountain is for Burke a function of its potential
oroo ition to one of his two biological absolutes, survival and reproduction.
Provided biological existence is undeniably important, survival
and reproduction do assume a kind of absoluteness. To achieve these
necessary ends the member of the species must have some appropriate
mech nism for responding correctly to threats and to invitations to
procreate. This faculty, to be truly advantageous, must be efficient,
that is to say, not liable to error, which would be fatal. It is because
the alternative of failure would have such drastic ccnsequences that success
appears so strongly imperative. Hence a kind of necessity seems to
attach itself to the operations of the faculty responsible for ensuring
survival and reproduction by co-ordinating an org?nic being's reactions
with its environment. But although such necessity is derived not
implausibly from the assumption, somewhat hidden in Burke, that existence
is an unquestionable premise (for the species), it is by no means a
necessity in the ■■ hilosophieal sense, logically or metaphysically, for
after all it is possible that both individual and species might ntirely
cease to exist.
Burke seems to confuse the two tynes of necessity and convert e
biological arrangement (or explanation) into a causal hypothesis. Human
bein-s, it might be srid, react with fear to threats for the reason that
rurvival is a biological necessity; Burke translates this to mean that
certain /
certain objects necessarily induce fear, that is, cause it. The reasoning
seems to be this. That the need for survival should in the case of man
hve taken the form of a protective capacity for fear argues that there are
threatening qualities in man's environment. These threats must be constant
and consistent, otherwise the development of a responsiveness to them would
be quite negligible, which it is not. Granting that survival is an
ab olute necessity, and that mankind has by and large survived, it must be
conceded that the relationship between the threatening qualities of man's
surroundings and his sensitivity to them must be close to perfection.
Indeed, so easily and urgently does response follow stimulus that Burke
sees no objection to treating them as effect and cause.
The result is to turn the existence of man into a prime value,
A neutral description of something, that is, a descripticn independent of
human feelings towards the object, becomes impossible; and those feelings
are in turn to be regarded as serviceable to the needs of survival end
reproduction. Everything, therefore, can be measured as positive or
negative towards human existence. Objects, according to Burke (and he
includes other hi:man beings), will have qualities, such as those that rouse
fear, whose nature ana urpose are defined in terms of the responses of
human beings, which are themselves the means by which man ensures his
biological continuance. In addition. Burke claims the same apparatus is
involved in man's "aesthetic" pleasures, so that in his responses to art,
to the sublime and beautiful, he again regards things other than imself
in the light of his most basic needs.
Hence Burke's Physiological explanations of the sublime end
beautiful and his classification of the passions unite to form a biological
theory of human nature and art. The fact that a living organism has
physical and emotional reactions for its own protection end propagation,
without which it (or rather its kind) would cease to exist, explains its
artistic /
artistic pleasures. Burke seems simultaneously to be pressing to a conclusion
the eighteenth-century admiration for "natural" values and anticipating a
Darwin-like outlook.
Assuming a preference for existence over non-existence, he expl ins
why man has passions of self-preservation and of society. He appears to
say that the important features of objects for mankind are those which are
the causes of the passions which ensure survival and reproduction; other
features are of secondary interest. In this way the features of the
environment which are naturally influential and useful in relation to human
b'-dn-^s become the really significant ones. The point of view is not merely
biological, but exclusively human as well.
It would, then, be truer to say that Burke anticipates a misunder¬
standing of Darwin. When the evolutionist talked of "the survival of the
fittest" many took him to imply that biological success rewarded value in
a species. This is far from being the case; to survive natural selection
dots not confer any honour, it does not make the successful species more
natural than the failures. Darwin did not invest the adjective "natural*
with renewed laudatory powers, by demonstrating s naive progressivist
theory of history. Indeed he accomplished the reverse; an or anism, in
Darwin's estimation, -flourishes in a biological context so specific to
itself that it defies comparative judgments.
For Burke is wrong; what is biologically required is just that and
no more, A "vital necessity" could be resented or denied as easily as not;
there is no absolute need for any individual, any species to continue
indefinitely, and so there are no biological grounds for saying some
qualities in objects must have specific effects.1 These biolo- ical
considerations only gsin force if the human species is regarded as
intrinsically valuable and worth perpetus ion. Burke's detour into
biology /
A
x As John Casey says, "although suicide would, as an ethical ideal, lead
to the destruction of the race, it is not therefore rendered impossible
biology does not, therefore, settle the issue of whether there must be
objects with qualities which cause definite responses in humans, but it
does uncover a basic assumption in his thinking and it adds to the under¬
standing of his scientific concerns,
-Mf
Credit must be iven Burfce for his good intentions. His Enquiry
is en attempt to be scientific in an augmented, humanised cense. His
experimental researches were not to lead to a geometrical conclusion of
mathematical coldness, but to a warm, living conclu ion, basd in the
needs of human existence and its griefs and joys. The theoretical
back round bids for scientific exactness, but the whole work is committed
to the belief that the universe has qualities and values from the existence
of sentient, emotional human beings, whose continuance is intrinsically
worthy.
At this noint one can recall Addison's contrast of cience and art,
understanding and imagination.1 Mdiscn seems very symp thetic to art and
imagination, where human emotions and pleasures are more involved, but
unlike Burke he does not try to reconcile art and science, for that would
mean blurring the distinction between primary end second; ry qualities.
But if Burke wanted to humanise the sciences he also w nted to
"sci ntificise" the humanities. His attempt at a.n experimental research
works both ways. It implies that human *alues reflect the truth about
t e qualities of natural objects, and it asserts that human responses ere
directly related to observable physical fact. For every human passion,
therefore, there is a corresponding object or quality of objects which
can be analysed in a scientific fashion. Thus, modern science, which
succeeds in describing nature by objectifying it and adopting an attitude
of disinterest, could be applied to the most subjective area of human
interest, to the relations of psychological states to the qualities of
objects, vrhich are conditioned ov rail by the extra-biological assumption
of humanity's intrinsic value.
The /
to adopt (certain of the Manichaeans did in fact adopt it).' (Language
of Criticism. London, 1966, p, 54).
1
See above, pp. 34ff.
The origins of ideas could, then be identified end systematically
described. Theory could be applied, principles sought and human nature
made the subject of laws. And here the humanising intent has an effect,
for the evaluation and judgment implicit in the premise of human worth
alters the character of these supposedly scientific laws. Burke's laws
must not merely state, they must prescribe the positive attitude which he
has adopted.
To nut it bluntly, the rremise that human existence is necessary and
veltt le r nders Burke's whole psychology unsci ntific. For that premise
is not merely unfalsifiable but beyond discussion. On^ either accepts it,
nd hence the system of responses built on it, or not. It has to be
nr-seated as absolutely true; exceptions are inconceivable. It does not
therefore have the properties of a scientific statement about th world.
It cannot be open to doubt, rather it must be made to seem r. most inviolate
':ruth, for from it flows all the force cf Burke's argument for objects as
causes of emotions.
Thus his actual examnle of scientific theorising needs the authoritarian
and absolutist quality discernible in his philosophy of science, and needs
it because he refuses to compromise his estimation of human worth. His
attempt to humanise science, basing it in human needs, hence assuming the
po itive value of those needs, leads him to a practical demonstrati n of
what he describes theoretically - a "science" founde on prejudice, albeit
very human prejudice.
It is not altogether regrettable that Burke did not succeed. If
pain and pleasure were conditioned by biological needs, they !*70uld be
instinctual end almost Pavlovien in their functioning. Human beings would
be reduced to dependence on insistent stimuli, like salivatin - dogs on
dinner-bells. Burke does not seem to have beer very sensitive to such an
objection. Fixity of response is desirable for him, it seems. He says
in /
in his "Introductory Discourse" that "my point in this inquiry is to find
whether there are any nrinciples, on which the imagination is affected, so
conon to all, so grounded and certain, as to sunnly the means of reasoning
satisfactorily about them" (o.13). Satisfactory r^asonin n ns that
agreement is reached and the truth acknowledged. Such a process has, says
Burke, its rul s in matters of reason, though not yet in matters of taste.
Yet, "it is probable that the standard both of reason end Taste is the same
n all human creatures" (introduction, p. 11); it remains only to find it
out, and then settle all differences.
Remarkably, the firmness of the principles Burke desires to establish
is derived from the nature of their origins, that is to ;.ay, the stability
of real objects. He seeks a sure foundation for the standard of taste not
in the passions of men, nor in an abstract notion of tru h, but in the
qualities of objects, the data of experience. It is a testimony to the
prestige cf experimental science that he should do so. In this respect
Burke again shows a similarity to Addison (rather th n to Dry.en).
With principles based on empirical evidence the critic can support
his judgments with appeals to his or any men's experience, for it is the
virtue of the objective to be available for inspection by all. The
sources of the authority of a critic's taste are thu open to investigation,
"imply and straightforwardly his right to criticise can be examined and
appraised, doubts and uncertainties dispelled and art and criticism
grounded on the har- facts of objective experience.
Neither science nor experience is, of course, as fixed and objective
as lurke hoped. The philosophy of science, for instance, is haunted by
elusive, "aesthetic" requirements: a theory must be "concise" or "economin",
in/
A
in ways not easy to grasp. Buike ignores this, if he ever recognised it,
For him scientific knowledge fits the world it describes more or less
exactly, and he is not troubled by this happy circumstance, because on it
he bases his claim for certainty an truth in human reasoning, Cnce
a-" in th° insufficiency of his theoretical truth-conditions b comes
apparent $ repeated confirmation of even an observatio- lessens only its
falsity, not its falsifiability, and hence adds little to the certainty
o its being true in an infinite universe.
The fundamental weaknesses of Burke's philosophising can be
further illustrated by considering the last pert of the nuuiry. which
deals with the subject of words and how they affect the emotions,
Burke's theory of language is a form of emotional expressionism,
at least as it applies to poetry and rhetoric. Words convey passions.
This conelusion is not very surprising, for without it, or ometlin like
it, Burke would be at a loss to name those passions which he says are
caused by the qualities of objects. It is obviously useful to him that
V rbal language should be available as evidence of nrssion to supplement
what he can collect from ohysical manifestations, which include gestures
and facial appearances. In effect Burke nuts words in the same relation
as the body to the mind and its passions.
B'-rke points out that tinlike painting or architecture words cannot
affect people merely by imitating those "motions and configurations of
bodies" (Part V, sec. i, p. 163) which naturally cause passions. Poetry
for /
^ See, for instance, the following:
Pierre Buhem: La Thcorie Physique,. Son Qbist et .Ja. ru :ur . Paris, 1905
Part II, chapter vi, section 10.
Sir Karl Popper: Conjectures and Refutations. London, 1969, p, 241.
Imre Lakatos: "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research
Prograones", pp. 105, 131 end 187, in Briticism and the
Growth cf Knowledge, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave,
Cambridge, 1970.
Jeremy Bernstein: Einstein. Fontana Books, 1973, p. 61.
for him is not an imitative art, for words do not resemble the things for
which they stand; a proving exception to this rule is dramatic poetry, or
the imitation of the verbal behaviour of men. In support of this anti-
mimetic theory of language Burke attacks the notion that • ord raise ideas,
or images, of what they represent in the minds of hearers or readers, and
that these ideas or images ere the meanings of the words.
Burke objects that some meanings are too complex to be imagistically
rerr- ented with any ease and with the rapidity a Ion , involved sentence
would require. Besides (and, incidentally, here is an example of Burke's
enthusiasm for the experimental method), "on s very iligent -xamination
of my own mind, and getting others to consider theirs, I do not find that
once in twenty times any uch picture is formed, and when it is, there is
most commonly a particular effort of the imagination for that purpose"
(V, iv, p.167). In addition, words are freely used before experience
could provide ideas to match with them, and indeed it is the virtue of
education, proceeding on this assumption, to provide, in Burke's opinion,
the inexperienced with salutary preconceptions.
Exactly how words are affecting is, however, described with some
difficulty by Burke, because in section ii of Part IV he attacked the
theory of the association of ideas. In fact, that theory lurks very
near Burke*3 explanation of why words are able to move the passions,
although he avoids the key tenrts, including, of course, ''idea" itself;
instead he uses "habit" and "custom". Words operate "not by presenting
any image to the mind, but by having from use the same effect on being
mentioned, that their original has when it is seen" (V, iv, p. 167).
A word is ?ffecting because of the constancy of its conjunction with an
emotion, or rather because of the conjunction with that emotion of the
word's referent. Thus "descriptive poetry operates chiefly by
substitution /
substitution: by the me ns of founds, which by custom have the effect of
realities" (Vt vi, p. 173). The ubstitution may be less than exact, as
long as the passion raised is the seme. Descriptive poetry may affect the
reader by rousing appropriate passions without directly referring to the
objects which cause them. The business of poetry is "to.din lay rather
the effect of things on the mind of the speaker, or of others, than to
present a clear idee of things themselves" (V, v, p.172). It is by the
power cf sympathy that words rouse emotion.
So great is the force of sympathetic emotion that it can override
intellectual objections. In an illuminating passage durke compares
1 nguage to gesture:
Now, as there is a moving tone cf voice, en impassioned countenance,
an agitated gesture, which affect independently of the things about
which they are exerted, so there are words, and certain cisrositions
of words, which being peculiarly devoted to passionate subjects and
always used by those who are under the influence of any passion;
they touch and move us more than those which far more clearly and
distinctly express the subject matter. We yield to sympathy, what
we refuse to description. (V,vii, p. 175).
Passionate responses can be triggered off in hearers almost regardless of
what is said. In addition, how something is said is en indicator of the
passion felt by the speaker.
Consequently an emphasis is placed on the emotions. ords ere not
thought of as about emotionally neutral ideas but about passionate
experiences. In expressionism what is known cannot be emotionally unfelt
if it is to be communicated. Hence knowledge requires a passionate holder,
a human being who feels. It is not possible, under an exnressionistic
theory, for something to be known and coirmunicated apart from its context
as /
as a whole experience, involving the emotions. Indeed, expressionism
rari'ly inclines to regarding the emotional charge as the ixnificant factor,
and th- capacity for feeling as essential for communication.
For these reasons human nature comes to occopy the centre of attention,
because upon it rather than on the nature of what it experiences do the
form and meaninr of utterances depend. The abiding featur- of language and
the feature therefore most amenable to systematic s udy, acoot, ing to en
expressionist -theory, is its range cf emotional tones, nd thr se tones
collectively define the shape of man's capacity for emotion.
Because he is required for expression, the emotion-lly-sentient
being assumes a kind of authority; his claim thr-t it is fret that he has
felt what he expresses cannot be dismissed unless it is decided that he
has failed to be expressive. But to fail to be expressive is to fail to
express some thing; to judge that such a failure has tak n place some
knowledge is needed of what it is (or was) that is supposed o be expressed
in a particular instance. The only source of such knowl dye which could
b- indisputable is the person who is supposed to be expressing whatever
it is. His claim to expression has to be allowed at least provisionally
in order to be judged.
Hence anyone can claim to be authoritative (about his own expressions),
and "very true expression must have authority - what it says is truly what
it moans, "'or a true source of expression, a re.-Hy emotional being,
authority is, logically, indispensable. This is close to saying, however,
that true expressions are unfalsifiable,
Burke's attempt at a theory of language not only aims at making human
motions central to knowledge, not only makes language a source of informati n
about, indeed evidence of, these emotions and their circum tances, but it
also offers the possibility of authoritative statements, nd hence the
justi ication /
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justification of authority. It is difficult, however, to see this
possibility converted into actuality. Real authority would exist only if
expression were successful, Expressionistic authority is fin "if/then"
proposition. The proposition that, if expression genuinely takes place,
then it lends authority, is true (for expressionists), but it does not
imply that either expression or authority exist. That existence requires
an independent basis of proof. The expressionist theory of authority
depends on the prior proof of the theory of expressionism. Unfortunately,
such a proof would probably involve assumptions of authority, without
which expression could not be said to have succeeded.
To establish conditions of authority in statements is no trivial
object, certainly not in the eighteenth-century. For consider the idea-
transference theory of communication Burke is opposing. It requires of
its participants only the ability to have ideas and words to represent
them. To possess an idea is no special achievement, and to communicate
it is to make it common property; ideas are as common coin as words, and
the peculiar circumstances of their getting and goin are unimportant.
Hence claims to authority are void, because personal point of view is
irrelevant. A person cannot assert that his viewpoint is different or
superior without transferring ideas to someone else; the justification
of an authority would paradoxically proceed on the assumption that those
to whom it was being justified had no impediment to understanding fully
what claimed to be special.
All viewpoints would, therefore be equivalent, and from the
equivalent descriptions of a number of observers a synthesis could be
made, a description of what in principle was common to the experience of
all. Once this was established, further descriptions would be justified
Uy /
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by their conformity with it, uch en authority is essentially impersonal,
and therefore, in a sense, hot human. It transcends human limitations,
although its content lacks the individuality and density of any actual human
observation,
Burke's language theory, then, aims to discover grounds for authority
in statements, rather as his scientific philosophy seeks grounds for
authority in theory and his theory of criticism seeks grounds for authority
in critical response. But he falls into similar pitfalls in all three
cases. His science is composed of rigid theories whose meanings are
subject to authority, not experiment; they are authoritarian rather than
authoritative. His theory of the origin of our ideas of the sublime and
beautiful has embedded in it a tendentious premise, which he maintains
without examination, and is designed to produce a uniformity of opinion
rather then discussion or criticism. And his linguistic theory similarly
restricts the role of criticism, in two ways.
Firstly, the element of associationism introduces the tendency to
automatism observable in the theory of physiological responses to causal
stimuli; it is not clear how the habitual connection of a word or phrase
with en emotion can be broken or modified, end hence it is difficult to
see how or why it should be criticised. Secondly, Burke's expressionism
opens up the possibility of authoritative utterance, but again at the cost
of criticism; for an authoritative expression would be beyond question,
since it would completely say what it meant, so that modification would be
unthinkable. An expression would be quite true and as such past debating.
In respect of poetry, then, it would be lu-'icrous to suggest an improvement
or the possibility of improvement, for then the critic would claim either
to know from an inadequate expression what was meant to be said, or that
some other expression was better than the one he found in the work;
clearly /
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clearly the poet oould dismiss both claims as presumptuous.
In Burke's theory of language, then, certain fundamental assumptions
are once more discernible. Human nature i once again quite central, and
in particular human emotion is at the focus of attention. Another basic
element is the quest for authority, an explanation of how it would be
possible to justify claims made by any individual to be telling the truth.
In connection with this, Burke displays a bias towards causal mechanisms
and explanations which are essentially physical descriptions. Thus
there is a vague but unmistakable scientific air about the whole
proceedings.
The present chapter can conclude with some remarks about Burke's
understanding of the word "philosophical" and about Burke's concept of
criticism. The presence of the word "philosophical" in the full title
of Burke's Enquiry provides the clue which has been followed here, but
*
it leads beyond the simple equation of that word with the more modem
"scientific".
From an examination of Burke's theory of experimental research
and his practical enquiry into the sublime and beautiful, as well as
his theory of language, it has become clear not only how Burke understood
"philosophical" but also how he tried to extend it slightly in a direction
which can be regarded as unscientific from the twentieth-century point of
view. Thus, not only does he mean his Enquiry to be based on a theory
of research involving induction from observations, but also it should
provide at least the method for arriving at assured judgments and
authoritative descriptions; furthermore, he does not see any inconsistency
in maintaining at the same time a positive attitude to strictly human
values and allowing his philosophical investigations to be directed by
preconceptions which are ultimately moral.
To /
To consider Burke's concept of criticism, however, is to see the seme
range of topics from the other direction. Not only must criticism be moral
and human, taking account of the passions and needs of human beings, it must
also, in Burke's view, be capable of settling disputes, solving problems
and justifying itself. For that it needs authority. It can gain
authority, says Burke, by becoming philosophical, by being based on
observations, methodicsl and inductive. The area where philosophy and
criticism join is occupied by the concert of authority.
Burke attempts to fuse the two at that point into philosophical
criticism, to the benefit of both:
If we can direct the lights we derive from such exalted speculations,
upon the humbler field of the imagination, whilst we investigate the
springs and trace the courses of our passions, we may not only
communicate to the taste a sort of Philosophical solidity, but we
may reflect back on the severer sciences some of the graces and
elegancies of taste, without which the greatest proficiency in those
sciences will alweys have the appearance of something illiberal.
(Preface to the Second "dition, p.
"hat attracted Burke to science was its •solidity''. He obviously felt
taste and criticism lacked this. But he also felt science lacked the
human qualities of grace and elegance characteristic of taste. His
inquiry is an effort to make up both these deficiencies.
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CHAPTER V : LOHD KAMKS
The purpose of Karnes's Elements of Criticism is simply to establish
the authority of criticism by a "philosophical" enquiry into human nature.
Kam«s plainly sets forth this aim in his dedication to the King, where he
states that the following work "attempts to form a standard of teste, by
unfolding those principles that ought to govern the taste of every
individual" (p.vi).*
When Kames published the Elements in 1762 he had already reached an
eminent position in the legal system of his country. As a man of law, he
would be ful^y aware that criticism traditi n^lly involves passing judgments
on works of art. "To censure works" he writes in his Introduction (p.14)
"is the just prerogative of criticism". Because of his interest in the
theory of law, he would also recognise that judging suggests the need for
principles of di crimination, or laws, with which to support critical
judgments. Thus, if Elements of Criticism has a more than titular
resemblance to Euclid's book on geometry, it is to a legislative Euclid.
It is upon the facts of emotion that Kemes bases his justification
of critical authority. He asserts that authoritative critical pronounce¬
ments can be identified by their congruence with human responses. His
theory of criticism is therefore empirical. In the last analysis a critic
stands by his knowledge of whet human beings are really like.
Kames derives his explanation of the -lements of criticism from
research into human nature. His plan, he declared, was "to ascend
gradually to principles, from facts and experiments; instead of beginning
with the former, handled abstractedly, and descending to the latter" (p.13f).
1 Quotetii ns are taken from the seventh edition, "with the author's last
corrections and additions", two volumes, Edinburgh, 1788.
2 The "^uclidean overtones" of Karnes's title are remarked on hy Ian Simpson
Ross in Lord Kemes md the Scotland of his Day, Oxford, 1972, p. 265.
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Contenroorari s reedily acknowledged these features of the work. The
Scots Magazine declared that Karnes's critical theory "will render him, in
the critical art, what 3fcon, Locke and Newton sre in philosophy - the
parent of regulated taste, the creator of metaphysical criticism, the first
interpreter of our feelings and of the voice of nature, and the law-giver
A
of capricious genius upon principles too evident to be controverted".
Vicesimus Knox, in an essay on "Philosophical Criticism" has ^his
to say of Kames:
The author of the Elements of Criticism has penetrated deeply to
discover the cause of those emotions which literary compositions
are found to produce. He has displayed great taste, great elegance,
and a subtilty of inquiry which must have resulted from laborious
attention, and from a singular share of natural sagacity.2
Karnes's biographer, Alexander Tytler, Lord V/oodhouselee, sums up,
with perhaps too much emphasis on his subject's originality, the significance
of Elements of Criticism thus:
In treating this subject, it was his design to proceed altogether
on a new plan, and to adopt s mode of investigation different from
that which had been followed by any preceding writers, either among
the ancients or moderns: a design, therefore, in which, I think,
he has the merit of originality, and is justly entitled to the
praise of being the inventor of a science; I mean that vjiich has
been with propriety termed Philosophical Criticism.3
The stress on the philosophical or scientific aspect of Karnes's critical
theory refers to his foundation of it in the facts of emotion and to his
method of deriving general principles from those facts experimentally
observed,
^ Scots Magazine, XXIV, 1762; quoted in William C. Lehmann: Lord Kames
and the Scottish Enlightenment. The Hague, 1971, p. 228.
* Vicesimus Knox: Essays. Moral and Literary. London, 1778; quoted from
the seventeenth edition, three volumes, London, 1815, volume II, p. 144.
3 Alexander Eraser Tytler, Lord Woodhouselee: Memoirs of the Life and
Writings of the Honourable Henry Home of Kames. two volumes, Edinbur *h,
1807, volume 1, p. 272f.
The logicel starting-point of Kamo3*3 criticism an--: of any examination
of it is therefore his psychology. ""his noint is nerha s obscured by the
fact that the clearest and most helpful explanation of Karnes's psychology
comes at the end of the work in an appendix of "terms Defined or Explained".
Kames commences by stating th t the mind has two powers or faculties,
consciousness and perception (Appendix, section 2). The objects of
consciousness are internal to the mind and include passion, thinking and
volition (section 1); the objects of perception are external (ibid.) and
are the qualities (for example, the colour, taste or sound) of subjects or
substrata. A subject is "a being with respect to its properties or
attributes" (section 4). Kames holds, however, that to perceive the
qualities of a subject or substratum is to perceive the subject or substratum
itself, which he frequently and confusingly calls the object. Although
he therefore considers himself in opposition not only to Berkeley but also
to Locke (section 14, note 1), it is obvious that he is firmly in the
tradition of British empiricism, and he moves on from the division of the
world into the mental and the physical, the internal and external, to a
psychology of ideas.
A perceived object may, according to Kames, be recalled to mind by
the memory, appearing there as it did on its original perception, only
less distinctly. "This indistinct secondary -erception" he writes, "of
an object, is termed an idea" (section 14). On the basis of this definition
he dismisses the terms "innate idea" and "general idea", fbr these imply
the impossible notions of ideas without antecedent perceptions to be
recalled by memory (section 14, note 2).
All ideas may be ut into language and thus communicated to others
(section 18). Visual perceptions are "more complete, lively and distinct"
than /
than others, an^ the seme is true of visual ideas compared with other ideas
(section 17). Ideas can be fabricated into images which have no reel
existencej this is the work of imagination (section 19). Imaginary ideas
seem to escane the strictures on innate and general ideas.
There are, then, three kinds of ideas: ideas of memory, derived
from perceptions; ideas communicated by language; and ideas fabricated
by the imagination (available only to the im-giner himself). '.-"hen the
last sort of ideas are communicated, they become the second kind; end when
those are recalled, they become the first kind (section 20).
The idea of an object and the original perception of it differ only
in distinctness. Kames makes it very clear that he considers that the
responses to both are similar. ^his is his theory of "ideal presence",
which he applies in turn to ideas of memory, and ideas of imagination:
When I rccal £sic] any thing to mind in a manner so distinct as to
form anidea or image of it as present, I have not words to describe
that act, but that I perceive the thing as a spectator, and as
existing in my -presence.., (Vol. 1» n,90)
A lively and accurate description of an important event, raises in
me ideas no[t] less distinct than if I had been originally an eye¬
witness... (Vol. 1, p.92)
"In idea" he continues, "we perceive persons acting and suffering,
precisely as in an original survey: if our sympathy be engaged by the
former, it must also in some degree be engaged by the latter, especially
if the distinctness of ideal presence approach to that cf real presence"
(1, b.93).
In this way Kames closely relates human responses to the real world of
objects and responses to the "ideal" world of memory and imagination.
Andres /
Anriras Horn is therefore fundamentally correct in saying that "the
relevant question when analysing his work is not 'What should, according
to Kames, liter' ture be like ?* but rather 'What are we like ?' or more
precisely 'What is it in man that makes a given nhenomenon aesthetically
pleasing 2"1 But the use of the word "aesthetically" is a mistake; there
is no suggestion in Kames of a specifically aesthetical emotion.
So far, however, the separate perceptions and ideas are not unified,
or amalgamated into structures or a whole by Karnes' -psychological principles.
He does talk loosely of the mind, which i3 both conscious and perceiving
and so contains the operations of memory, imagination and so on. He also
refers to the existence of the self, knowledge of vdiich is due in the
individual neither to consciousness nor to perception but to a mysterious,
anonymous third faculty, which is neither internal nor external (Appendix,
section 3). But in addition to the self there is another, more important
attempt at a cohesive factor.
The first chapter of the Elements contains a thesis of Kernes'
psychology not yet mention d here - the theory of perceptions and ideas in
a train, or association* Both objects and ideas, says Kames, easily
succeed one another in trains of thought, formed on consistent principles
of relation. "Cause and effect, contiguity in tin® or in place, high and
low, prior end posterior, resemblance, contrast, and a thousand other
relations, connect things together without end" (Vol.1, p.18), Observable
among objects, these relations are also observable among ideas. It
follows, then, that a relation conceived of as subsisting among real objects
is analogous to what must pertain to equivalent ide s, so that those
relations shape the mind's trains of thought. Furthermore, the mind takes
pleasure in the orderliness of its ideas ana the consistency of their
relations with those of perceived objects. Hence a series of im gined
ideas /
Andras Horn: "Lord Kames and the Anthropological Approach to Criticism"
in Philological Quarterly, XIIV, 1965, p.211.
ideas is bound to please when it conforms to the principles of order of real
objects, or our ideas of them:
Every work of art that is conformable to the natural course of our
ideas, is so far agreeable; and every work of art that reverses that
course, is so far disagreeable. (i, p.27)
The pleasure of imaginative constructions, therefore, can be explained
in terms of the connections among their constituent ideas, rrovided that
those connections are in accordance with the supposed principles of connection
of real objects. Thus the general principles of the fine arts are id. ntified
by Kames with the relations observed among associated ideas and objects. The
theory of association of ideas not only gives Kames a general licence to
relate ideas or mental states with other, "associated" ones to form structures,
but also the oprortunitv to extend the systematica of description of objects
by analogy to the description of ideas, end, in prrticular, to the series
of imaginary ideas which constitute the fine arts. A large part of the
Elements is devoted to exploring this line of approach in order to prove that
the essociational relationships are the principles of taste.
There is nothing in Kames to make the theory of association of ideas
coherent with the rest of his psychology. The problem of Karnes's kind of
epistemology is that it deals in discrete entities of experience which have
to be articulated into series in order not only to make thought a possibility
but also to make it arise out of rercertion. But because Kames is reluctant
to postulate a faculty which invariably takes perc rtions or ideas and
rerforms op<=rati ns on them, thus creating a thinking process, he seeks to
make the parts of trains of thought themselves the causes of their own
association. The principle of association, then, not only requires that
there be things to be associated, non-reducible particles, not further
an- lysable, from which larger series are built up and which therefore have
to /
to be linked, but also, in the form Kames gives it, en impulse to associat
a propensity in "hose same particles to overcome their own separateness,
deny their discreteness and form quasi-causal chains. In addition, they
form uch relationships on principles - hich are not themselves directly
perceptible, but can only be inferred fror. the trains of thought which
occur.
The basic difficulty is at least as old as Greek philosophy.
Atomistic theories assert that what exists is composed of discrete entitie
This entails some separation between atom and atom. If atoms are all
that exist, then they re separated by non-existence or the void, across
whic communication of influences atom to atom is impossible. Since
there is no contact between atoms, each is absolutely isolated, and to
talk of relations or groupings among atoms is absurd.
A theory which on the contrary speaks of the continuity or flux
of all thin.-3, however, entails another logical difficulty. Strictly
speaking, such a continuum cannot cover more than one entity, that is to
say, the whole universe. A ccntinualist theory is incompatible with
talk of separate particles.
It is obvious that pure atomism and pure continualism are both
unwieldy doctrines when deployed as explanations of physical nature. In
practice, etomists tend to violate the discreteness of their fundamental
particles, end talk of them as if they r re related to each other, and
oontinuelises similarly abandon the proposition that all thin s are in
flux in order to single out objects for attention. Both come to occupy
roughly the same middle ground, but for antithetical reasons.
The theory of ideas is, of course, basically atomistic. One idea
is dirtinnjish'ble from another; ideas are not thought of as melting
into each other so that they lose their separate identities, "he
eighteenth-century /
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eighteenth-century psychology of ideas begins with statements about the
discreteness of ideas. But it cannot proceed for long before it comes on
the difficulty of making relations between ideas possible. The favourite
method became the theory of the association of ideas.
Such psychological atomism was influenced by the physical atomism
of the science of the day. Newton had stated this unequivocally in his
Onticks:-1-
All these things being consider'd, it seems probable to me, that
God in the beginning form'd Matter in solid, massy, hard,
impenetrable, moveable Particles...
The corollary of this is that the spaces between such paricles are
immaterial. It follows that influences atom to atom, matter to matter
across such void spaces operate immaterially, or not at all. Thorough¬
going materialism thus entails a no less thorough immaterialism.
Newton was embarrassed by this consequence and was therefore
reluctant to speculate abcut the nature of the1 force between material
particles with which his name is most associated - gravity. "The Cause
of Gravity" he wrote to Richard Bentley on 17 January, 1692/3, "is whet I
2
do not pretend to know". But it was on this very point he was severely
criticised and accused'of re-introducing "occult" powers into physics, in
the shape of action at a distance.
The effort to exel' in the dispositions and mutual relations of
bodies in space inevitebly led to the theory of a power operating among
them and in the void. This power was essentially unlike the matter from
which /
1 Opticks. Book III, part i, Query 31. In the edition of I. Bernard
Cohen, New York, 1952, page 402.
4 See I. Bernard Cohen and Robert £. Scho^ield: Isaac Newton's Papers
and letters on Natural ^v-nnsophy. Cambridge, 1958, p.298
which it emanated end which it influenced. The power of association is
similar. Indeed, Hume explicitly compares them. He says of the association
of ideas that "here is a kind of ATTRACTION, which in +he mental world will
be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to shew
itself in as many and as various forms".2 And Hume, like Newton, hesitates
to speculate about the cause of the power of "attraction", "Its effects
are every where conspicuous; but as to its causes, they are mostly unknown,
and must be resolv'd into original qualities of' human nature, which I pretend
2.
not to explain".
Newton's mechanics and eighteenth-century psychology such as Kernes
presents shared, as Hume perceived, the logical structure of a modified
atomism. In elements of ^ritlcism this pattern of thought dominates Karnes's
theories at various levels of the discussion of taste and criticism - not
only at the level of individual psychology, but also at the level of
criticism as a public expression of individual responses.
When he has laid the foundations of his system in the theory of ideas
and the theory of association, Kames is prepared for two tasks. An outline
of this programme is given at the beginning of Chapter 3:
Having discoursed in general of emotions and passions, I proceed to
a more narrow inspection of such of them as serve to unfold the
principles of the fine arts...instead of a painful and tedious
examination of the several passions and emotions, 1" purpose to
confine my inquiries to such attributes, relations, and circumstances,
as in the fine arts are chiefly employed to raise agreeable emotions.
Attributes /
1 That association is like gravity is suggested by the absence in both
cases of a repulsive counter—force. Unlike electricitj/ and magnetism,
gravity seems only to act by attraction.
^ A Treatise of Human Nature. Book I, Part I, Section iv.
Attributes of single objects, as the most simple, shall take the lead;
to be followed with particulars, which, defending on relations, are not
found in single objects. Despatching next some coincident matters,
I proceed to my chief aim, which is, to establish practical rules for
the fine arts, derived from principles previously established.
(I» PP. 195f.)
The attributes of "single objects" Kames discusses are: beauty; grandeur
and sublimity; motion and force; novelty and the unexpected; the risible.
Each takes one chapter.
He then goes on to the agreeable relations between (or among)
objects: resemblance and dissimilitude; uniformity and variety; congruity
and propriety; dignity and grace; ridicule; wit; and custom and habit.
Although the detail Kames enters into rather obscures the 'urpose of this
part of the book, he does attempt to refer back as often as possible to the
principles of association of ideas, cause and effect, resemblance, contrast
and so on.
In general, he begins a chapter by clarifying what he means by its
title and then he analyses that subject into subordinate parts. He then
considers each part and its emotion' 1 effect, or what relation of ideas it
contains. Basically, his method is to redescribe events and circumstances
to arrive at a terminology which allows a plausible transference into
psychological terms. The repeated divisions of the principal subject give
the impression of a reduction to more and more elementary parts. To
prevent this leading to a regression into ever more subordinate classes of
attributes and agreeable emotions, Kames is capable, for instance, of
claiming that "to inquire why an object, by means of the particulars
mentioned regularity, uniformity, proportion, order and simplicity appears
beautiful, would, I am afraid, be a vain attempt: it seems the most
probable /
probable opinion, that the nature of man was originally formed with a relish
for them, in order to answer wise and good purposes" (i, p.20l).
Such a line of argument is similar to that which Burke seeks to avoid
Tien Burke tries to explain the effect of the sublime, he tries not to have
to make a stand on a claim that some quality in objects just simply is awe-
inspiring, and instead suggests a basis of biological necessity to human
reactions. Kames, however, does not present anything equivalent to the
concerts of self-preservation and propagation Burke uses to try to explain
why objects are disagreeable or not.
Kames, however, shows a similarity to Burke in his attitude to
language, which is the substance of the "coincident matters" he refers to
at the beginning of Ms third chapter. What he tries to show in the first
chapter of this section of his book, "External Signs of Emotions and
Passions," is that "internal objects" (passion, thinking, volition and so on
have perceptible effects which are sure indications of their natures:
Go intimately connected are the soul and body, that every agitation
in the former produceth a visible effect upon the latter. There is,
at the same time, a wonderful uniformity in that operation; each
class of emotions and passions being invariably attended with an
external appearance peculiar to itself. These external appearances
or signs may not improperly be considered as a natural language,
expressing to all beholders emotions and passions as they arise in
the heart. (i, p.426)
Karnes tactic here is to convert appearances into -igns; the first may or
may not be meaningful, the second usually are. Thus there may or may not
be a language of appearances, but there is generally a language of signs.
Of course, a sign-language is atomistic. The meaning of a sign is
established by reference to that which it signals, just as the meaning of
en /
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See above, pp. 57ff.
an idee in Karnes's psychology is secured by reference to a perception of en
object, in most cases. If whrt is signalled is not individually distinguished,
the sign will be ambiguous. The different signs must be apportioned as
nearly as possible to single meanings for the sake of clarity. The syntax
of a sign-language, how the various signs and their meanings relate to each
other, is a problem Karnes does not attempt to solve.
If the external appearances of emotions and passions are in fact signs
of those agitations of the soul, one only needs to know what the signs stand
for to understand the language, and thus be capable of telling how seme-one
feels from the expressions he use3. According to Kames, "mail is provided
by nature with a sense or faculty that lays open to him every passion by
means of its external expressions" (lf p.44l), and so the language of
appearances is readable to him. This new, intuitive (the word is Karnes's)
faculty is an oddity, lifting the understanding of language out of the
realms of both perception end association, not to mention reason.
Kames, nevertheless, is satisfied that just as ideas, which are
"internal", are related to objects, which are "external", words and gestures,
which are "external", are related to the "internal" ideas. Language,
including verbal language, thus becomes a medium through which to view the
mind.
There is, however, something in Kames' scheme between mental states
and the language related to them. "Fvery thought prompted by passion",
he writes, "is termed a sentiment" (lf p.45?). Kames seems to mean that
verbal statements are a combination of thought-content and ^motional charge.
The particular consistency of the combination of thought and emotion in a
person's utterances gives the characteristics of his mind; to create
fictional characters a similar consistency must be caught. For Kames,
character means emotional character.
The /
The chapter, ''Language of Passion", completes the intermediary section
of Karnes's work. In it he makes clear his extension of the expressive power
of language not just to what is said but to how it is said, too. Indeed,
the stress falls so heavily on the latter that it begins to seem that formal
properties ere the more significant bearers of the emotional charge in which
Kames is so interested. In this he anticipates the next task in hand, the
application of his principles to the ideas of imagination, the fine arts
themselves.
Most of the second half of elements of Criticism is devoted to this
second task. Enough has already been said of Karnes's intentions to suggest
what kind of statements he makes about narration and description, epic and
dramatic compositions, the three unities, gardening and architecture.
Except for the two lest subjects, his attention is almost exclusively
confined to the literary and dramatic. Generally, Karnes takes traditional
formulae, from such authorities ss Horace and Vida, and re-describes them
in emotional expressionist terms.
Perhaps the most remarkable chanters in this section of the book are
the earlier ones, on comparison and figures, including simile, metaphor,
allegory, personification, apostrophe, hyperbole and a mixed grouo winch
seems to contain synecdoche, metonymy, and transferred epithets end some
more. Kames himself says he was inclin°d to ignore this material "till
discovering, by a sort of accident, that many of them depend on principles
formerly explained, I gladly embraced the opportunity to show the influence
of these principles where it would be the least expected" (Vol. II, p.227).
Karnes's procedure is first to describe the figures, using terms much
discussed formerly, and then suggest conditions for their use, in the
context of a more or less naturalistic drama, on the grounds of emotional
veracity.
It /
It is interesting thet Kames should fall back so readily on so much
traditional material. It suggests an affinity between the rules of
ancient criticism and rhetoric and Karnes's principles. The difference
between them is that the latter are supposed to be derived from study of
human nature. Their uses, however, as precepts by which to judge works
of art, are very much alike. It appears th*t Kames uses his "philosophical"
approach in these instances to renew the authority of traditional critical
doctrines.
The authority of the critic is, of course, made precarious by
Karnes's atomistic psychology of ideas and its consequence, an atomistic
view of society. If the contents of the mind are ideas derived either
from experience or imagination, then any individual's thinking will be
conditioned by his experience and his own fancy. These are not necessarily
free from particularity. Indeed, one would expect that any individual
would have different memories from others.
It might be supposed that such idiosyncrasies could easily be
observed, and therefore neutralised, because the external signs of passion
and emotion, that is, language, would reveal them. But Kames confesses
that the interpretation of words is not as easy as he might seem to suggest.
Only words referrirg to objects of "external sense" can be unambiguously
interpreted. Those referring to passion are less certain in their meanings,
and "words signifying internal action and the more delicate feelings, are
less distinct", (i, p.443). Hence, says Kames, the difficulty of logic,
the science of i ternal action, although he believes logic has been much
advanced by Locke. He immediately continues:
The same defect is remarkable in criticism, which has for its object
the more delicate feelings; the terms that denote these feelings
being not mare distinct than those of logic. To reduce the science
of criticism to any regular form, has never once been attempted:
however /
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however rich the ore may be, no critical chemist has been found, to
analyse its constituent parts, and to distinguish each by i s own
name. (i, p.443)
The implicit comparisons Kames makes h«re between himself and Locke and
himself and en analytic chemist are incidentally illuminating of his
philosophical purpose. More significant, however, is his opinion that
criticism is the difficult business of arriving at regular rrinciples of the
mere delicate feelings. In so doing, the critic has not the advantage that
the vrords used to express such feelings are unambiguous.
It follows that any particular critic must have doubts whether his
feelings are quite in accord with those of others. He has to be extremely
adert at reading the signs of other people's feelings before ho can conclude
that what he experiences is roughly the seme. He ought therefore to
hesitate before making a general pronouncement on his own experience, for
• hat is true for him may not be so for others. The authority of any
general principles of taste he arrives at need not necessarily hold for
anyone but himself.
In trying to avoid these difficulties and establish the authority of
the critic, Kames makes two major assumptions. The first is, of course,
that the fine arts affect human beings largely by means of the emotions.
Traction here, as so o ten, is contrasted with the understanding. Historically
speaking, the first attempt by Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, among others,
to find a method for identifying authoritative statements had been based on
the understanding, or rather on its method of operation, reason.
Briefly, it was felt that the logical consistency of a roup of
statements was e sign of their veracity, and that the detection of illogicality
and incoherency among statements destroyed their claim to truth. These
opinions were fostered by the growing importance of mathematics. But though
the /
the second suggestion is useful both are doubtful, because they confuse
validity with veracity; that is to say, conformity of a system of
propositions with rules of right reasoning, or logic, does not entail
conformity with existence and hence lend authority. Nevertheless, this
debate at least served to clarify the requirements for authoritative
statements. What was needed was some way of judging the certainty of
the content. Interest shifted from the relationships among statements
to the question of what they were abcxit. Authority then became a matter
of truthful responses.
For its new, responsive role the understanding was fitted out with
sense-apparatus and memory and given language to report its findings. But
its power of reason proved a troublesome associate. There was a real
danger of its intervening too much between the first sensation and the
subsequent report of it, with questionable effects on the authority of
that report. Indeed, since veracity required no further operations or
deductions to be made by the mind afterwards, so that reason was an
unnecessary stage, a superfluous opportunity for introducing errors. By
the eighteenth century, therefore, philosophers were anxious to derive
authoritative statements from truthful responses in the most straightforward
manner. What they wanted was a system of direct, even automatic, responses,
of a high degree of consistency, readily expressed and hence readily observed
these they found in the emotions.
Thus emotional response became the scheme of veracious response and
the basis for authority. Not onlv were emotions free of the inadmissible
confusion of validity and veracity which had oroved so fatal to the authority
of reason, but they seemed in a happy manner to be both valid and true at
the same time. If a man responded emotionally to something, it was
certainly true that he did so, and if he had managed to respohd then such a
response /
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response was permissible and hence valid; he could not be told he ought to
have responded differently, that it was impossible to respond except in a
s ecific fashion, if in fact he had not done so, In the case of emotion,
then, a m^n was in a position to speak with authority, it seamed.
At this point, however, a curious difficulty arises, which also faces
Burke's expressionist theories."1 If b man feels as he feels, then he can
ith authority announce the fact, and others can repeat his statement on his
authority. But what else can be said on this authority? Practically
nothing at all. Thus, whereas reason had proved useful in establishing sure
relations amonr statements, but inadequate to establishing the authority of
simnle statements, the emotions certainly provided a means of authorising
simoln statements, but no authority for relating them together. An
emotional response mie-ht heed a chain of deductive reasoning, but it could
not mrke those deductions veracious, authorised, unl ss they were themselves
emotional responses, which seems a little strained.
Now the unassailable veracity of emotions becomes an embarrassment,
for it makes discrimination among them, and hence standards of judgment,
im ossible. The result is a universe of atomistic statements, all veracious,
all possessing authority, all restricted in scone, all limited in time,
place and person.
Karnes' second assumption is a direct attempt to overcome this
fragmentation of viewpoint. In order that the authority of statements based
on emotions should not be restricted to the erson who has the emotion, which
would mean no -nblic criteria of truth, Karnes assumes that human nature is
by and large uniform. Vfliat one person feels under given conditions, any
other normal person should feel under similar conditions; and since everyone
can know his own nature, anyone can learn about human nature in general. It
follows that Kames is as well -nlaced as anyone to know the truth about human
nature. In addition, all that he says will be readily recognised by other
human beings.
It /
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It is true that this reduces his statements to commonplaces; indeed
if nressed vigorously, it lifts his comments out of the realms of disagreement
and debate. Hence the theory of the uniformity of human nature (incidentally,
a basically continualist notion), although it circumvents the problem raised
by Karnes's first assumption, which tends to limit authority in proportion to
the limits of individual experience, does not escape a second objection, that
authoritative statements require a privileged position in order to be interesting
and informative.
In practice, of course, Karnes does claim some advantage from his
personal stance even in reviewing what he says is universal human experience.
He does this by allowing for superficial differences among human beings, and,
when that fails, by re-defining human nature in terms of potentialities, not
always realised in every human; but now he has to assume both his own
competence in recognising the really fundamental and significant features,
and his own success in realising his full human nature. His authority, then,
remains suspect despite his claim to participate in universal humanity.
Karnes's two assumptions do not combine very well. The atomistic
tendency of emotional expressionism is overridden in a cru^e fashion by the
theory of the uniformity of human nature, 'This brings to mind the relation
between ideas and the association of ideas, according to which ideas have an
inherent tendency to attract and displace one another in a fortuitous
renunciation of self-sufficiency. Both in individual psychology and in
social psychology, Katies finds himself faced with the problem of explaining
how discrete entities relate to each other.
In the twenty-fifth chapter of the book, "Standard of Taste", it
becomes obvious how intractable his problem is. Fittingly, this, chapter
comes at the end, for in it the question of judgment, and therefore of
authority, is specifically confronted.
Boldly /
Boldly Kames begins the chanter facing the argument that there is no
disoutin- about taste - an argument which is based on the atomistic assumption
that the relative differences smug men moke comoarisons and generalisations
im ossible. In thr"" concise nsragra-hs Karnes sets out the argument for
this ooint of view, end cogently sums it upj
...doth it not seem whimsical, end perhaps absurd, to assert, that a
man ought not to be pleased when he is, or that ho ought to be pleased
when he is not? (II, p.488)
But although Karnes admits this opinion is perplexing, he denies its conviction,
"'or it seems to him that the very fact th t men do talk of ood end bad taste
and pass judgments on each other in this respect must, because it is so
widespread, have a solid basis of justification: "what is universal, must
have a foundation in nature" (p. 490). The problem, again, is to discover
on what authority judgments are made.
Kames outs forward once again his grand assumption - the uniformity
of human nature, which now assumes an evaluative role. It is because men
believe this assumption that they expect agreement in their own opinions and
find abhorrent any gross deviations:
A men who, avoiding objects generally agreeable, delights in objects
generally disagreeable, is condemned as a monster: Me disapprove his
taste as bad or wrong, because we have a cle r conception that he
deviates from the common standard. (llf p.492)
From this it appears that the standard of taste is based on agreed descriptions
of objects. Having established from various individuals what their reactions
in any instance are, the critic must collate the evi ence and arrive at a
description, containing all the common elements, such that it accounts, by
and I?rge, for the actual responses on which he based his findings, and
suggests what is likely to be the apt response of any new observer.
The /
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The consensus, then, is the standard of taste. Authority is sought
by en appeal to the common view of mankind. A mere difference of opinion
is not critical except in so far as one or other rarty claims to represent
the general opinion of mankind; "my disgust is raised" says Karnes, "not
by differing from me, but by differing from what I Judge to bo the common
standard" (p.494). Disputes are settled, presumably, by canvassing opinions
nd counting possible votes, Kemes himself uses this metaphor, for on page
499 h writes that "in gathering the common sense of menkin ...a wary choice
is necessary, for to collect votes indifferently would certainly mislead us".
The political parallel is worth exploring. Essentially the problem
is that to establish whet, in any case, is acceptable all those qualified
must state their orinions so that a majority decision crn be achieved;
hose in the minority will then stand condemned, and vri.ll therefore change
th rir minds. It is the last point that makes this scheme differ from an
election in, say, the British political system, because there the defeated
party is not obliged to fall in with their opponents. This is only the
case where numerical superiority bestows not only power but also rectitude,
whore might and right are identified, or where what is normal is regarded
as mandatory. Karnes's attitude to the standard of taste is much like this;
an equivalent political view can be found in Rousseau.
In order to Justify the rower of government (the state), Rousseau
said it had to be grounded in the wishes of its subjects ( ocial Contract.
Book II, charter i) - not their individual whims, but their communal hopes,
what they thought best for their society: this he called the general will
(ibid., II,iii). Once the general vrill was established, opposition had to
cease or become criminal, because by definition it was inimical to the state
as expression of the general will of (all) the citizens (ibid,, I, vii).
Rousseau evidently assumed the undesirability of continuous debate about
olitical ends.
Egalitarianism /
fgalitarianism is a foundation of his system (ibid., II,xi; IV,ii),
just as the uniformity of human nature is of Karnes's. Rousseau has therefore
to allow each citizen an equal say in the formation of the general will. The
right to vote is inalienable. The individuals in Rousseau's system are
therefore like atomic particles. He tended to assume that under certain
conditions the citizens would, by deciding freely, eutom tically coincide
in articulating their sense of what common in luences thoy felt and what
conmcn action they ought to take. Rousseau's difficulties were how the
general will could be expressed and acknowledged, and how it could be
ju tified. Karnes's difficulties are similar - the likelihood of unanimous
verdicts on works of art, the expression of such unanimity end. the recognition
of it.
The state, says Rousseau, will have an absolute right to dispose of
-ts subjects if it acts in accordance with the gener 1 will ( ocicl Contract.
I,vii); the critic, says Kames, will act with similar justice if he praises
and blames in conformity with the standard of taste. 't this point practical
difficulties emerge, because of the difficulty of reaching agreement where
self-interest is concerned.
The general will is not the possession of any individual, nor is its
interpretation his alone; yet any person who tries to judge with state
ruthority implicitly claims not just acquaintance with it but also an under¬
standing of its meaning and consequences. How can such claims to competence
be themselves judged without making similar claims in so doing? Kames,
after all, does not say his disgust is raised "by differing from^...Jthe
common standard", but "by differing from what I judge to be the common
standard", Kames solves the problem of justifying his particular critical
opinions only by ushing the difficulty of justification back to the more
general question of the authority of his judgments concerning what the standard
of taste is.
For /
For Rousseau, this kind of objection is d^ vastatin He shows how
the authority of the state ought to be justified by the general will, but
he is therefore unable to show how it could be so justified in practice,
since no man or grout* of men less than the whole (and son times not even
them, if they remain self-interested) is in a position to claim the
authority of the general will. The same might be said of Kames; he shows
how a standard of taste ought to be made authoritative, but how could 3uch
a project be realised?
To speak with authority has become to speak from no single point of
view at all; but no human individual can be rea onrbly said to fulfil that
condition, and no other entity exists to do the talking, "Ivery person,
merely by being an individual, limited in experience and confined to his
own ooint of view, is disqualified from voicing the critical consensus.
In founding the standard of taste on basic human nature, generally uniform
and. 'universally general, Karnes in fact makes the ineluclible particularity
of individual human beings a telling objection to the actu- licstion of such
a standard. If Is a fine sample of the logical dif iculty of atomism.
Karnes1 solution to this problem is extremely simple. He insists
from the very beginning on a cause and effect relationship between objects
(or qualities) and emotions:
It is a fact universally admitted, that no emotion or passion ever
starts up in the mind without a cause...
(Chapter 2, part I: "Causes unfolded of the motions and
Passions", volum I, page 35)
It follows that an empirical investigation of wh t causes the various
pleasures of taste will reveal general principles of criticism which may
be taken as standard.
3y the principles that constitute the sensative j^sic^ part of our
nature, a wonderful uniformity is preserved in the emotions and
feelings of the different races of men; the same object making
upon every person the same imroessi n, the same in kind, if not
in degree. (Vol, II, p. 503)
These /
These principles provide an independent and objective means of verifying the
consen us. Unlike Rousseau, Kames can by-pass the electoral process and
UK5rely from consideration of the object arrive at an understanding of what
the opinion of the majority ought to be:
As the taste of every indiviiual ought to be governed by the
principles above mentioned, an appeal to these principles must
necessarily be decisive of every controversy that can arise upon
matters of taste. (II, p. 503f.)
Barnes, in other words, claims that a scientific investigation of human
nature will lead to the discovery of the principles of h effect of objects
on the emotions. These rinciples will in fact coincide with the standard
of taste, but, because they are generalised from experiments, from empirical
facts about human nature, and are not merely the per: onrl reactions of the
critic, they will escape the charge of bias or limitation c ' viewpoint.
Karnes's philosophical criticism will therefor^ be based on principles
d rived from synthetic descriptions of objects in which ell the qualities
which commonly cause certain emotional reactions are specifie , along with
notes on their effects. Once such a description is established in any
particular case, the response to the object will be fixed. By appealing
to a description so established, or to the principles employed in establishing
"S
it, a critic can ju:tify hia account of the work as normal or standard, and
legitimately require others to conform. His argument will be that anyone
reacting to this particular object must be affected in the same way if he
is human at all. Anyone who feels differently must admit his mistake and
conform to the majority opinion, the standard of taste.
By making emotions the effects of qualities, Kames virtually asserts
the insignificance of personal viewpoint in responses to worics of art.
Obviously, as lonv as the qualities are free to cause th-:ir associated
emotion /
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emotion, no normal individuals, no matter how apparently different, can fail
to feel the seme effect. But this is not only in conflict with the belief
that emotion , end -perceptions, pertain to distinguishable individuals, but
also with the fact that these individuals do in fact differ in their opinions.
If emotions are caused, then a difference of critical opinion means
not only a difference of emotions, but one of causes, too, "here causes
differ, effects are not just incompatible, they are incomparable. Two
disputing critics would not be talking about the same object if their emotions
differed. Thus there is no disputing about taste.
The authority Karnes appeals to in criticism is the fixity of emotional
responses. But that authority is the justification of nothing more helpful
then the argument that there is no disputing about taste, Karnes himself
removes the possibility of avoiding this conclusion.
The irony of this is that it is a result of Karnes's attempt to be
"philosophical". It is because he takes emotional responses to objects as
the data of his criticism and takes them as fixed entities that he is
lo -ically unable to account for the fluidity of actual experiences of art.
He looks about for a sure foundation of authority. He turns to empirical
experience as such a basis. In doing so he assumes that objects have a
fixity and permanence so that perceptions of them can be constantly renewed
and rejustified. His assumptions that human beings respond emotionally in
more or less the same way to repeated stimuli and that all human beings share
more or less the same emotional nature are only subsequent to his assumption
that there is a universe of objects whose natures are sufficiently stable to
provide reneeted stimuli to human sensory organs.
Such a world is the one which it is the aim of scientific research
to describe. But Kames makes the stimuli of human responses the causes
of /
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of those responses, so that it is impossible for a human being to vary or
improve his comprehension of the universe. The result is inimical to both
science and criticism.
In fact, Kames misjudged the success of natural philosophy, so
impressive in his day. The achievement of seventeenth-century science was
not its positive additions to knowledge, great though these - ere, but the
institution of a dynamic period of thought, in which ohane, innovation and
the effort to improve and develop were at first acceptable and later praise-
•orthy. "gain ironically, Kames himself is consciously rn innovator end a
reformer, yet the change he seeks is in the direction of stability end
uthority.
98.
CHAP? ]R VI : GERARD
It is necesspry to preface any comment on Gerard's Essay on Taste
with some notes on the history of the work. According to an "Advertisement",
dated 28 September, 1758, in the first edition (p.i)* and retained in the
third (p.vii), the original impulse to write the book came from a competition
sponsored by the Edinburgh Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Sciences,
Fanufectures, and Agriculture in 1756. But what Gerard submitted to the
Society, thus winning the medal for the best essay on teste, was merely the
"general principles" (ibid.) of his enquiry, not the whole. After the prize
was won, he was "encouraged to offer the whole, as it was at first composed,
to the ublic" (ibid.). This suggests that the first edition of the Essay
(1759) was substantially completed in or before 1756, and that it reached
its published form after some revisiai by the author. It could be argued,
indeed, that Gerard continued to touch up his r ssay for the next twenty
years or so.
The second edition (1764), however, seems to have been substantially
the same as the first (v. Kinrle, p.xxi), but with the third in 1780 major
additions were made, in particular the whole of Part IV, "Of the Standard
of Taste". "There is every reason to think" writes Hippie, in his
Introduction to th-* facsimile of the third edition (p.xxii), "that the line
of thought, and perhaps even much of the composi-icn, of these additions
had /
^ An Essay on Taste. London, 1759 (facsimile, Scolar press, Menston,
Yorkshire, 1971).
2 An I^ssay on Taste. Edinburgh, 1780 (facsimile, ed. Walter J. Hippie,
Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints, Gainsville, Florida, 1965)
had been worked out years before at the time of discussions in the Aberdeen
Philosophical Society". His source of i formation seems to be The Scottish
Philoso-^hv. (London, 1875) by James KcCosh, who, in en appendix, notes that
the standard of taste was discussed by the Aberdeen Oociety, probably in 1758,
and that the question of poetry as imitation (the subject of Gerard's
appendix to his third edition) was raised in 1768.
In addition, Gerard's Essay on Genius, which is related to the 3say
on Taste, especially Part III, section ii, although probably begun before
1758, was not published until 1774. It is also relevant to note that
Hume's essay "On the Standard of Taste" appeared in 1757? too late to
affect the first edition of Gerard's Essay, it strongly influenced the
additional Part IV of the third edition, and may oerhaps have spurred Gerard
on to a greater exertion in a direction he had held back from in his original
version.
The important question is whether the additional material of the
third edition, especially Part IV, "Of the Standard of Taste", is mere padding
or a legitimate expansion of Gerard's thesis. The external evidence reviewed
above is inconclusive. One could regard the addition of a discussion of the
standard of taste as merely opportunist, as a genuine development of Gerard's
(
thinking, or even as the) re-inststement of material omitted in 1758-9» for
t * "
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reasons of brevity Or such like. In the first case discontinuities in the
third edition would be stressed; in the second case, continuities; and in
the last the twenty year gap between the first and third editions would be
virtually ignored.
Because /
Because the work i3, after all, only an essay, it may be that Gerard
set eloquence, smoothness of diction and ease of reading before minute
logical accuracy; he may have felt that it was more important to present
his ideas on the subject of taste, however sketchy and inconsistent, rather
than labour to make them coherent. On the other hand, no essayist,
however informal, would startle his readers by presenting obvious contra¬
dictions and introducing total irrelevancies. Nevertheless, the style of
an essay is not necessarily that cf a philosophical treatise, although, of
course, it may be.
Given therefore that Gerard's work need not be rigorously systematic,
the treatment of internal evidence of self-consistency in the third edition
is inconclusive and strongly influenced by one's attitude to the external
evidence of dates and discussions.
The claim that the standard of taste is a central topic in Gerard's
Essay is therefore rather weak. Or the other hand, the arguments against
this claim are not themselves very firmly grounded. The dilemma is
sharpened by the recognition that some of the best of Gerard's work is in
these additions of 1780. The charitable student will surely want to argue
that this material is the fulfilment of Gerard's earlier speculations, and
that therefore the third edition of the Essay is structurally as well as
materially superior to its predecessors. The present writer intends to be
charitable to Gerard in this respect. It follows that the work discussed
here is the third edition of 1780.
The /
The structure of Gerard's ?Jssey is not, however, altogether clear.
After a short introduction, Part I deals quite simply with various aspects
of taste as a form of sensetion; Part II goes on to consider the nature
and development of individual teste. But in Part III verious topics are
dealt with, some, like the relation between taste and the imagination,
very closely connected with what has been covered in Parts I and II, others
less so. In Part IV Gerard discusses the nature and development of the
taste of individuals in a community.
From this a pattern emerges. The key concept is, of course,
taste. Gerard considers it first as a psychological concent, ?nd relates
it in a complex theory of mind with the senses, the imagination end the
judgment. In part as a consequence of this he goes on to treat of taste
in two aspects - the private or individual, end the public or communal.
In both cases he wants to trace the development of taste, how the mind
perfects the faculty of response, ; nd how the community develops its
attitudes to these responses. He is certainly aware of the interrelation
of these developments, but, having begun with what is in effect an
excursion into epistemology, where idiosyncratic differences are
philosophically ignored, when it comes to examining the business of criticism
in public and the major fact of variety of opinions, Gerard is unable to
avoid a conflict between private end public taste. He never solves the
findementsl problem of aligning the two, pertly because the discrepancy
is so deeply implicit in the premises of his theory of taste. This also
me' ns that the difficulty arises over and over again for Gerard. The
.ssay therefore appears generally to be a dissatisfied worrying at the
same topic.
In the background of Gerard's discussion is the problem of
relativity. Gerard.concedes 8 high degree of autonomy to the critical
judgments /
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judgments of individuals. He accents that they vary greatly in time and soRce.
He is not willing to concede that such variety can legitimately be ended by
authoritarian assertion. The reconciliation of differing opinions must, he
believes, be made on the basis of general principles of taste. It is to
these he appeals as the source of authority in criticism. The general
principles are the standard of taste by which to evaluate the initially
equivalent critical reactions of individuals. Although Gerard is impressed
by the variety of taste, he is convinced that such variety is not absolutely
random, but can be accounted for and explained. The way to reach such
explanations is, in Gerard's opinion, by scientific, or "philosophical",
investigation of taste.
His ESsay. therefore, has a great similarity in principle with Karnes's
Elements. It also adopts the empiricist attitude recommended by Addison,
end, furthermore, Gerard, like Hurke, pays some att ntion to the theoretical
side of natural philosophy.
Taste, as Gerard defines it in his "Introduction, "consists chiefly
in the improvement of those principles which are coirmonly called the rowers
of imagination'1 (p.l). These pov/ers he in turn defines as "internal or
reflex senses" (ibid.), which are less gross than "our external organs" (p.?),
and involve a further act of mind than mere perception, that is, some
reflection on a "circumstance or mode of the object that was perceived,
besides those qualities which offered themselves to its j^the mind's J
attention at first view" (p„2, note). The concent is clarified by an
example; the sense or taste of novelty cannot be enjoyed until the mind
has reflected that the object it now perceives has not been perceived on
any former occasion.
Unfortunately, Gerard is not so explicit about the acts of reflection
associated with the other principles of taste - sublimity, beauty, imitation,
harmony, ridicule and virtue, "a teste of a superior order" (p. 69). In
most /
most of these cases it is not difficult to speculate, by enalo-y with the
given example of novelty, what the reflex act might be; for instance,
enjoyment of imitation surely involves sn act of mental comparison.
Sublimity and beauty, however, two le> ding nrinciples in the theory of
taste, at leest for the eighteenth century, do not seem readily accounted
for as reflex senses. And the twentieth-century reader may be surprised
to find virtue classed as any kin of e sense, elthcugh immediate perception
of this "quality" is a common eighteenth-century thesis.
The internel senses, say3 Gerard, h ve a mutual influence on each
other. The action of one is strengthened by the simultaneous action of
others. It follows that "all of them mu t at once be vigorous, in order
to constitute taste in its just extent" (p.73). Strangely, the exercise
of a fully developed set of the principles of taste is distinct from
delicacy of passion or sensibility. "Delicacy of passion must be united
with vigorous internal senses, in order to give taste its just extent" (p.82)
There seems to be a difference between sentiments of taste and ordinary
emotions. Gerard hesitates over allowing the pleasures of the imagination
to be assimilated to pleasure in general.
TO understand this hesitation one must consider Gerard's attitude to
the imagination. Although he says he does not believe the imagination is
irregular (p. 212), he is very nervous about its reputed unruliness (v.p.162)
Why this is so may be inferred from the Appendix "Concerning the Question,
Whether Poetry be pronerly an Imitative Art ? and if it be, in what sense
it is imitative ?" Here Gerard dismisses the claim that poetry imitates
in the way the visual arts do, except in the case of drama, by producing a
1
resemblance of a thing, because words do not resemble what they signify.
Poetry cannot form images or pictures of things. But Gerard produces
another sense in which poetry can be said to imitate.
He draws an analogy with a type of painting in which the artist
"instead of copying an individual object with which he is acquainted,
invents /
In this opinion, he is in agreement with Surke. See pp. 65'f.
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invents a subject" (p,280), Imitation in this sense does not denend on the
truth of the resemblance between the imitation end tve imitated, but rather
on its deperture from strict similarity, th falsity. Poetry, writes Gerard
"is not celled an imitation, to express the exactness with which it copies
real things... but for the very contrary reason..." (p.28?). Of course,
Gerard is inhibited about using such a strong word as "false" of poetry, but
*
he does contrast poetry with hi tory, the subject of which, he says, is real
in a way the subject of poetry is not.
It is unfortunate that Gerard does not make use of the most apt term
for the kind of imitation he is seeking to define, that is to say, "fiction".
But it is clear enough from what he does say that he has a certain distrust
of the powers of invention, "which consists in a great extent and comprehensive¬
ness of imagination". (p.163). He fears that the imitation; of poetic
imagination lack rhe straightforward reference to things as they are which
would make them true, and therefore he fears that art can mislead those who
do not recognise its imitations as fictional. But since he sets out with
no hostile attitude to the arts, he has to suppress these fears, for otherwise
they would transform his Bssay into an attack on taste.
Gerard's nervousness about imagination, imitation and fiction
evidently proceeds from his adherence to the theory of truth which regards
knowledge as justified by its correspondence with objects as they really
exist. According to this empiricist attitude, typical of classical science,
any contents of the mind for which there ere no referents in objective
existence are of doubtful status, !nd probably false. It will be recalled
that Addison, under the influence of Locke, also worried about the veracity
of fiction.1
The foregoing paragraphs have anticipated the discussion of Gerard's
theory cf the imagination, an important part of his analysis of taste.
Being /
1
See above, pp. 35ff.
Being subsequent to experience of external objects, taste is dependent on the
senses, but it is more complex, because its principles are reflex or internal
senses. The operations of these can be traced to the workings of the
imagination, "which is considered es holding a middle rank between the bodily-
senses, and the rational and moral faculties", (143).
Basically imagination operates to overcome the atomic seperateness of
sense impressions and the hegemony of experience over meaning. In the
imagination Gerard hopes to locate what flexibility of mental activity he can,
and he needs some flexibility to account for art, in >Mch ideas and figures
appear which are not quite experi- need previously and are organised into
fr sh combinations.
The im- gination has such freedom of action becau e its operations are
not governed by memory. It can in fact supply defects in memory, although
not perhaps with entirely satisfactory results (v. p,151ff.). The date
with which the im- gination works ore loosened from the temporal end spatial
context memory imposes. It is the virtue of the imagination to be able to
re-combine them in novel ways. The term Gerard U3es to describe this
functi n is, of course, "association", which takes place according to "certain
general rul s" (p.154). These include the simple essociational relations
of resemblance, contrariety end vicinity, and the complex ones, custom,
co-existence, causation and order (ibid.).
What a reflex sense is perhaps is clearer now; it is one which
involves the recognition of some of the associations! relationships among
objects experienced. Imaginative association, by addition to sense
experience, constitutes taste; or as Gerard puts it, the operations of
imagination produce taste "by being combined with the general laws of
sensation" )p.162). Gerard and Kames thus have very similar views about
A
association, taste and the principles of sensation; but Gerard differs in
his /
See above, pp. 77f.
his emphasis on the role of imagination.
x
Judgment, however, is also an indispensable part of taste, according
to Gerard. It is "the faculty which distinguishes things different, separates
truth from falsehood, and compares together objects end their qualities" (p.83).
It has a function in perceiving the qualities of Objects, discriminating their
kinds, comparing and compounding them. All these operations are preliminary
to the experiences of taste, Gerard seems to make judgment not only a
prerequisite of clear end accurate perception, but also a precondition of the
sense experience to which taste is subsequent. Indeed, he goes on to speak
of what judgment does that it "may completely exhibit to the internal senses,
the beauties and excellencies of nature".
Judgment is used in making measurements, reckoning proportions and
discovering beneficial tendencies, "It uses" writes Gerard, "all the methods
which art and science indicate, for discovering those qualities that lie too
deer spontaneously to strike the eye" (^,84). Overall, its business is
comparison, especially in order to make generalisations. Gerard realises
that if such relationships as judgment finds are part of the subject-matter
of teste, then they must be apparent before, not after, the presentation of
the experience of the work of art to the "internal senses"; but he also sees
that these relationships are not strictly speaking qualities of,the objects,
but rather, as it were, between or among them. Hence if these relations ere
discovered by judgment, the aots of Judgment must in some cases precede the
functioning of taste.
Thus, when Gerard writes that judgment "is necessarily employed in
that exhibition of the object to the [internal] senses which must be previous
to their perception of it" (p.%), he does not mean the exhibition of a simple
but of 8 complex object. That is to say, the object is e construct, formed
by /
by the postulation of relati ns among simple objects (or qualities) as they
are experienced by the external senses; the result is a proposition about
a number of sense-perceptions. For instance, the discernment of plot and
character in drama is not immediate, it requires exercise of judgment before
the plot and the characterisation c n be appr; ised by the taste.
Judgment and imagination show definite similarities in Gerard's
account of them, which is therefore confusing. Although the section on
imagination was much expanded in the third edition of the Essay, practically
all of the new material is only illustrative.. In Gerard's thinking, then,
imagination and judgment always seem to have had near-identical roles in
arranging end processing sense perceptions either before the operation of
taste is completed or before it is actually begun. Perhaps the difference
is that the imagination works by association and judgment by comparison;
the one is passive, the other active. But the only certain thing is that
Gerard has no less than two ways of making the operations of taste something
more than mere sensation and capable of cultivation.
There is, however, more to Gerard's account of the connection of
judgment with taste. Judgment is also said to fulfil its more traditional
function in criticism o~ settling questions of the relative values of whole
works, establishing the rules of the genres and deciding any work's success
or failure by these rules. Judgment makes decisions about the general
result of the whole series of lesser sensations which cluster together to
form the experience of a whole work of art. When one raises one's head
out of a book or pauses to consider a performance just ended, then judgment
is used to reflect on the whole experience. Obviously judgment in this
sense is a major part of criticism.




Thus in all the operations of taste, judgment is employed; not only
in presenting the subjects on which the senses exercise themselves;
but also in comparing and weighing the perceptions and decrees of
the senses themselves, and thence passing ultimate sentence upon the
whole. (p, 88)
Judrment is not only the shaper of artistic entities enjoyed by taste, but
also the arbiter of taste, with jurisdiction over the responses of the
internal or reflex senses; the legal metaphor is licensed by the quotation
above.
Iniaediately after this Gerard returns to the question of compensating
forces in the faculty of taste. He asserts that "though the reflex s-nses
and judgment must be united, yet, in a consistence with true taste, they
my b united in very different proportions" (-.88). A strong judgment
can make up for weak internal censes and vice vers; . One can mainly
enjoy either the feelings of taste, or the intellectual satisfaction of
knowing what inspires those feelings. Total deprivation of either judgment
or feeling is, of course, a disqualification, because it means a real
deficiency of taste, but differing proportions of each make for the human
differences among critics. Longinus, then, was a critic in whom "the
internal senses were exquisitely delicate" (r>,89), although his judgment
was not equal, whereas Ari totle was quite the reverse, having more judgment
than feeling.
There are signs here of a contrast developing in Gerard's thought
between judgment and feeling. His attitude to the former is slimhtly
ambivalent. He wants judgment to play an im-ortant part in taste, but
only in one harmonious process with the operations of internal sense and
imagination. Judgment must not overbears it must act as arbiter but not
as damr-r on the feelings. Although Gerard is clear that judgment is
indispensable /
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indisuensable, yet at this point in the book it is to the imagination that
he principally refers taste. Later in the Kssay. howev r, imagination loses
its importance for Gerard and he makes a contrast between judgment and sense,
favouring the former.
The discussion of the internal senses, imagination and judgment
comprises a theory of taste as a faculty whose status in Gerard's work is
problematical. The difficulty is whether it describes ideal taste or normal
taste. Gerard has ignored, in a quasi-philosophical, quasi-scientific
fashion, the differences.of particular cases, nd pitched his description
of taste at a high level of generalisation. The question is to what sort
of individual examples do his theories refers is taste a he has defined it
the nossession of a few (if any) perfectly endowed creatures, or is it by
and 1-rge the nossession of most men? The answer is important in relation
to the further question of public critical judgments and the standard of
taste. For given that there are genuine disagreements about taste, is
Gerard inclined to regard these as due either to the distance between actual
taste in individuals and perfect taste or to legitimate variations of
otherwise oerfect taste; or due either to the existence of some eccentrics
who o not share the (happily) normal capacity of the majority, or to the
possibility that no individual exactly matches the collocation of averages
which is taste generally defined? But perhans Gerard thought he knew how
far his abstract description of the mind fitted the facts about real minds,
and assumed this was sufficiently obvious to be unworthy of remark.
This raises a profound difficulty discussed later.
When Gerard goes on to consider not the make-up of the Organs of
appreciation but their use, both in the case of the individual and that of
the community, he immediately raises the kind of question nosed above.
Ee /
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He starts from the position that teste is improvable. The individual must
t
of course be endowed id.th the basic natural equipment, but it can be improved
in use, 3ut is taste as Gerard has defined it the ba3ic natural endowment
or the result of a process of development? The common-sense answer is the
second, for, as Gerard himself asserts, although children 3how an awareness
of beauty, sublimity and so on, it in generally recognised that their
responses require guidance.
Gerard claims that there are four qualities which must be developed
for good taste: sensibility, refinement, correctness end proportion of the'
several principles of taste. To each of these Gerard devotes e section
in Part II of his Sssay.
Sensibility is the degree of delicacy and responsiveness of the
internal senses of teste. It is in fact less improvable by practice than
any of the other qualities of taste. It is "but indirectly and remotely
connected with the soundness or improvement of .judgment" (n.102). Indeed,
it seems in many ways opposed to judgment, which has to curb it when
excessive and compensate for it when it is weak. One of the other qualities
of good taste appears for this reason to be complementary to sensibility.
Refinement is the result of habitual experience end is mainly the result
of improved knowledge and judgment. Refined taste is capable of envisaging
ideal perfection, and therefore of discovering standards by which to measure
the excellence of objects of taste, works of art and so on.
At first glance correctness of taste as Gerard defines it seems to be
little more than a sober ability to expose the sham. Only close attention
to Gerard's curiously guarded language in this section reveals that
correctness is really the faculty for passing accurate moral judgments "that
we may not be imposed upon by false appearances; that we may neither approve
shining faults, nor condemn modest virtues" (p.12l). Despite the fact
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that the sense of virtue is superior to the other principles of teste,
Gerard evidently fears that the pleasures of the imagination mey lure the
innocent into liking what is vicious. Here is further evidence of his
distrust of fiction and the fanciful.
The concept of correctness has a quite negative tend ncy; Gerard
is most specific about the prevention of incorrectness o" taste. This
is achieved by the erection of standards, based, of course, on the
experience of correct works of art. A touch of insipidity enters the
discussion when he claims that it is better to base one's standards on
mediocre works, if they are correct, than on superior works which have
occasional faults.
It might be thought that in discussing correct standards Gerard has
already moved over to considering taste in its uublic aspect. In fact,
he makes it clear in this section that his subject is an internal standard
of taste, based on personal experience; the correctnes. he advocates is
r
to be established "within ourselves" (p.13l). Nevertheless, the whole
topic is obviously closely related to that of the standard of public taste,
though Calvinistic traditions of nersonal moral autonomy may possibly have
obscured this for Gerard.
The last topic re-opens the question of compensating capabilities,
the meaning of proportion among the principles of taste is clear enough;
no one reflex sense should unduly predominate (Gerard seems to have
forgotten the superiority of the sense of virtue). vor really excellent
taste, then,"al3 the internal senses must be equally exercised" (^,137).
"Till this enlargement and extensive amplitude of taste is once acquired"
h continu s, "our determinsti ns must be essentially defective" (ibid.).




But the same is not true of the four qualities of teste just discussed.
"When none of them is wanting" he writes, "a peculiar predominance of one
will by no means vitiate taste" (p.141), and he goes on once more to comment
on the idiosyncrasies of actual critics, Longinus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus
and Aristotle, in terms of their bies towards sensibility, refinement,
correctness or "enlargement" (although it is not clear how any critic worthy
of the name can do without a full share of the last quality).
Still, it is possible to imagine en ideal cri ,ic, a superman of fully
developed taste, not weak in sensibility or refinement, correct in all his
responses and with a perfect balance of reflex senses. Such a person would
b" rood taste personified, the non-pareil, in Gerard's estimation!
Could any critic unite them all J^ser sibility, refinement, correctness
and enlergementj in a great degree, to his sentiments we might appeal,
as to an unerring standard of merit, in all the productions of the
fine arts. The nearer one comes to s complete union of these
qualities of taste, the higher authority will his decisions
justly claim. (p.141)
Two points must be strongly emphasised. The possession of oo< taste
grants authority, and good taste manifests itself in actual, and successful,
judgments; "this excellence of taste supposes, not only culture, but
culture .judiciously applied11 (p.96). Gerard is not dealing with a power of
self-amusement, a closet study performed by one man on his own, but with a
practice of speaking to be heard and, what i3 more, to secure agreement and
deference.
How far such authority is personal to the man of supreme taste and
how far it depends on the principles he embodies is not obvious. Gerard
does not face the question whether the excellence of a critic is derived
from the excellence of the principles of taste or the excellence of those
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principles is derived from their habituel use by nen of good teste. In the
first case, any man, however uncultivated, could, if he discovered the truth
about taste, make excellent criticisms, but in the second no judgment could
pass until sanctioned by a recognised master, Both these possible cases
Gerard's argument.
Nevertheless, it is cle< r enough from Gerard's treatment of the
improvement of individual taste that the aim of a man of taste is to practise
a form of criticism which is both public and judicial. The perfectly
developed man of taste, an ideal to which all men presumably aspire, does not
merely sit and enjoy but also pronounces on his enjoyments and exrects his
pronouncements to be respected and noted by others. The possession of good
teste not only enables one to discriminate among works of art for oneself
but also authorises one to advise other people about the merits end demerits
of works of art. It could well be said that here Gerard had the basis of a
th>ory of the standard of taste twenty years before the publication of Part IV,
The first edition obscures this, however. Compared with its predecessors,
Part III lacks cohesion. Although its title, "The Province and Importance
of Taste", certainly suggests that Gerard will here deal with public taste,
in fact what follows i3 a collection of essays, lackingUthe purposeful
development of the first two parts, or of the later fourth one.
The first section of Part 'II, "How far Taste denends\on the Imagination",
is surely out of place; thp theory of imagination is part cf Gerard's
epistemology, and should have ^receded Part II. It has therefore already
\
been considered. That Gerard should position this important part of his
Essay so awkwardly supports the argument that he was unsure about the \
imagination and unable, or unwilling, to sort out its relation tp, for \
instance, judgment. It must also be pointed out that he worried over the
subject, expanding this section with a great deal of illustrative material
for the third edition.
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The second section, on genius, is an ettempt briefly to explain the
creation of art, a vast subject beyond the scope of the I'ssay. extraneous
to its theme. It throws very little light on the subject of taste and
criticism. Of the further sections of Part III, "Of the Objects of Taste",
"Of the Pleasures of Taste" end "Of the Effects of Taste on the Character
and Passions" are only incidentally interesting. The third section, "Of
the Influence of Taste on Criticism", is, however, more important. It
comes nearest to discussion of the subject of nublic taste. Its full
significance, however, will be considered later.
Part III, then provides a weak conclusion to the first edition of
asay. It is as though Gerard loses the thread of his argument and
fills out the volume with miscellaneous capers. Part IV, the result, no
doubt, of reflection on Gerard's part, is much more purnoseful. It opens
with whet in the context is a daring move. The first section is devoted,
not to a first defence of the standard of taste, but to a detailed exposition
of all the divergences possible in critical opinions and of some of their
causes.
Gerard attributes variations in taste to inequrlities in mental powers
and differences in the amount and the kind of education. Some variation is
due to differences in the external senses, but most is caused by differences
in the internal or reflex senses. Individuals, says Gerard, do not share
their associations, their degrees of sennibility or the same perspicacity in
inferring design. The skill of coranarison is, in addition, variable.
Gerard also relaxes his earlier attitude and admits th-t people are more often
than not biased in favour of one or other of the principles of taste - novelty,
grandeur, beauty and so on (p.203). Taste requires opportunity and exercise
to develop, and the circumstances of both will give a particular direction to
the development, hence lefding to diversity.
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The initial emnhasis by Gerard on variety makes for an impression of
confusion among the tastes of men. Once allowance is made for all the
individual differences Gerard suggests are probable, absolute agreement in
matters of taste can hardly be expected. It is quite clear that Gerard is
not going to seek for rules of taste at the lowest level of information, among
the actual preferences of individuals, because they are so diverse; he will
seek for principles at a higher level of generalisation. By presenting a
picture of public taste as a mass of individual opinions all unavoidably
different, Gerard mak s plausible his search for a standard in general terms,
in terms of tendencies and broad inclinations, rather than in single Judgments
and specific cases. The standard of taste, in other words, will be related
by inference or induction to the actual responses and judgments of men.
The aeener significance of Gerard's awareness of the variety of tastes
is that he presents individuals as more or less equivalent in their viewpoints.
Not only do individuals really differ in their judgments, their ability to
make judgments and in their sensibilities, but th y differ in ways difficult
to avoid or correct. Hence there is little justification for a personal
authority in criticism. .An attempt to impose the views of one man can only
lead to violent disagreement and an increase in confusion. The standard of
taste cannot be defined unless critics humbly agree to forego their favourite
views and seek to discover what they have in common with others. The model
for such objective research, which will involve emoiricel descriptions of
critical reactions, is, of course, natural philosonhy.
As Gerard accumulr tes the evidence of varieties! in taste, the reader
is inclined to ask whether there is not some possibility of remedying the
general lack of control and organisation. Gerard, of course, does not
directly deny the possibility of a standard of taste; his hints about it
suggest that among all the varied opini ns some are more justified than others.
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Logically, indeed, this must be so; if there is a standard of taste, some
amcng a variety of opinions must be nearer to conforming to it than others.
That is to say, the claim that there is a standard of taste is synonymous
with the claim that critical Judgments vary systematically end in a measurable
degree from some identifiable fixed poi t. In practice, this means that the
standard of taste will not be immediately obvious; it will have to be revealed
by patient examination. As Gerard says, "it is the variety of tastes obvious
in mankind, that renders it necessary to enquire concerning a standard of
taste" (207). It follows that Gerard regards the variety of tastes not as
pure diversity but as deviation from a norm which, although, practically,
difficult to discern, is not absolutely beyond discovery. And he himself
intends to show, in principle, how it is to be discovered.
First of all, however, Gerard feels bouni to refute the opposite point
of view, which takes the form of the argument "so generally admitted, as to
have passed into a p-overb: That tastes are not to be disputed" (t>.?07).
This quite simply means that the variety of tastes is random. Each one is
strictly incomparable with the rest and bears no relation to them. The
argument that there is no disputing tastes is therefore fundamentally
relativistic. Gerard has to attack it vigorously:
It would imply that every man is to himself an infallible judge of
beauty and deformity, of excellence and defect; it would imply that
the same objects, and the same qualities of objects, may merit at once
approbation and disgust; it would imply that our natural principles
of teste, unlike to all the rest both of our mental faculties, and
our bodily powers, are incapable of being either improved or perferted;
it would infer £sicj that it is absurd to censure any relish, however
singularly gross; it would put all critical discussions precisely




The passage is of considerable interest for the counter-implications Gerard
makes: that one cannot be a judge to oneself, privately and infallibly;
that objects end qualities heve fixed merits; that the principles of taste
can be cultivated or vitiated, and hence are open to influence; and that
it is not absurd to condemn someone else's taste. The last is Gerard's
chief objection. He virtually refuses to accept that the disputes about
taste, which he regards as quite ordinary and usual features of human
behaviour, could be irrational end inexplicable.
1
An opponent Gerard has very much in mind here is Hume. He refers to
Hume's essay "Of the Standard of Taste" specifically in connection with the
question of how far sentiments of taste ere disputable. He offers three
objections to Hume. The first is that if sentiments of taste ere indisputable
because they merely reflect "some congruity between certain objects and out
faculties, and nothing more" (r,213)» much the same can be said of the
"external senses", sight, hearing, taste, touch and smell. But, says
Gerard, "it is readily cknowledged concerning every one of the external
senses, that in one man it is more acute than in another" (ibid.). If,
however, there w^re not accepted practical procedures for verifying claims,
for instance, to see distant objects beyond the range of most people's
vision, dcubts of the sort Hume raises about taste would arise in the case
of 12ie external senses ss well. Gerard's argument glosses over the
essential difference between internal and external senses.
Gerard's second ooint, which has already bcen encountered in discussing
Karnes's concent of the standard of taste, is directed against the supposition
made for argument's sake in the first objection to Hume, that is, that
sentiments are only a sign of congruity between object and faculty involved,
Gerard declares that the sentiment which arises on experiencing an object
is actually caused by a quality in that object. If it fails to have the
usual /
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usual effect on a person, then thet person is convicted of a deficiency in his
receptivity. But Gerard's concept of a cause which,in observable instances,
fails to bring about its effect for no apparent reason is, to say the least,
peculiar, nhe central nroblem, thou -h, is not here but in Gerard's unthinking
usage "a quality acknowledged to belong to an object" (p.214-) to describe the
cause of the natural or usual sentiment. '"his spectacularly begs the question,
for presumably those who acknowledge the quality are those who feel its "usual"
effect; for the rest, the "cause" does not exist, end so they can neither fail
nor succeed in responding to it. besides, the concept of natural and usual
responses really does make it absurd for someone to claim to have better taste
than someone else, or more acute senses. "he second objection demolishes the
first.
Although these two answers to Hune are flimsy, taken together they are
interesting because they bring out a notable conflict in Gerard's discussion
of the standard of taste. On cue hand, there is the frith in the expert
critic, able to guide and improve the taste of others, endowed with greater
sensibility and culture, with a paternalistic role in criticism; on the
other hand, there is the equal conviction that taste is one of the natural
powers of man, able to be studied scientifically, described generally and
attributed universally, in more or less standard form, to ell men.
Thus there are two possible foundations for a standard of taste. One
is individualistic and depends on the proposition that some men are better
critics than others, ■ nd a few ere the best. uch superiority of taste
authorises them to instruct their fellows in what to admire and what to
avoid, and so on, just as, in any grouc, the man with the keenest sight tells
the others what is happening far away, and thus induces them to take appropriate
action. The other type cf authority depends on a quite opposite, egalitarian
point of view, which claims that all men have basically the same nature, and
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therefore all things beinf equal they ought to react I-" the same way to the
same stimuli. Authority 011 this second view is not due to exceptional
powers but to normal and natural abilities, which could be developed in
snybociy.
One of the negative strengths of the argument that there is no
disputing about taste is that it strilcs at both these points of view.
It challenges directly the concept of authority in matters of taste by
denying that any sort of statistically average opinion has intrinsic merit
other than the purely descriptive. Gerard's opposition to these views i3
impelled by his observation that authority is in fact claimed and, apparently,
acknowledged, and that it must be if criticism as he understands it is a
reasonable and explicable business. He cannot conceive that the assertions
of critics and the agreements of their audience could be based on empty
notions of authority, or on ncrte at all. Indeed, he, like Kames, cannot
conceive of a criticism which does not take the form of pronouncements of
quasi-Judicial verdicts. His model is legalistic, or perhaps, in keening
with his profession, fundamentally dogmatical - the elaboration and propagation
of succinct, kernal propositions, whose meanings are taken to be unchanging,
like the Ten Commandments or the Westminster Confession. The limitation is
in his view of what criticism is for, v.rhich is indis: olubly linked with his
authoritarian assumptions. Ironically, his attempts to define the kind of
authority involved leads him in two directions.
Gerard's last point against Hume is that "taste impli s judgm-nt, as
well 8s sentiment" (p.214). Here Gerard is consistent with the earlier parts
of his book, in which he has frequently made judgment a part of taste. It
is one of his ways of expressing his awareness that taste has a public aspect,
for he conceives of judgment as referring "to something beyond ourselves" (ibid.)
Obviously, Gerard's taste and Hume's taste are quite different in this respect.
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Gerard's third objection is little more than en assertion of his conviction
thet teste is not absurd, but based on discernible principles. This marks
the impasse between Gerard end Hume.
The effort to combat the argument that taste is indisputable puts
severe strain on Gerard's theories. He seems unwilling or unable to modify
his concert of authoritarian criticism or to renounce the main points of an
empiricist sensationalism not unlike Hume's. He appears only to forget the
one while dealing with the other. He does not reject or replace th£ theory
of causal sensations and private sentiments, yet he insists that this is only
one aspect of taste and that it is United with judgment and authority.
He begins to open up gaps between sentiment and jud ment, sensation and
reflex acts. Taste, he says, "may be considered either as a species of
sensation, or as a species of discernment" (p.214-). The first aspect is
part of the attempt to relate taste to objects and therefore to experience,
the other is part of the effort to show how taste can be authoritative end
open to standards and improvement.
The further Gerard describes them, however, the more one conflicts with
the other. He must incorporate judgment for the sake of the external standard
it is supposed to acknowledge: "to find fault with any taste necessarily
implies the acknowledgment of a right and wrong, and of a standard by means of
which they may be distinguished..." (p.208). But he has explained sentiment
in such m chanical cause-end-effect terms that there is little scope for
influencing its workings, by judgment or anything else. As a "secies of
sensation" taste is practically indistinguishable from the indisputable
sentiments Hums describes; because the structure of the mind is "unalterable"
(p.215) and various among men, it is not possible "that all men should be
equally pleased, or that they should be pleased with precisely the same things"
(ibid.). There is, then, no uniformity of taste.
Or /
121,
Or, at least, there is no uniformity of taste at that level, the level
of teste as sensation. But Gerard claims that "there may be a standard of
taste in respect of its reflex acts" (p.215). This seems to mean that
although Gerard believes one cannot in fact help one's feelings, one can
*
compare one's ability to justify them or discern their causes with someone
else's, and agree to accent his superior judgment, despite one's inferior
capacities.
This concept of the standard of taste seems to be analogous to the
concent of an objective reality which it is the aim of science to describe.
By comparing various observations and collating them, a description of the
cause of them, the object, can be synthesised, 3uch a description need not
coincide exactly with any actual experience, but clearly any attempt to
compare actual experiences would have to take note of what in principle they
held in common in order to make a genuine comparison. The sum of these
common qualities would form an objective description of the nature of the
thing observed, whether it was an astronomical event, a raachanical experiment
or a work of art. Such a description would be a basis for deciding to what
extent any individual's experience was idiosyncratic. That element of
experience could not be denied, but, once identified, it might be eliminated
as the reason for judgments of taste which could have more than personal
significance.
Gerard seems to conceive that such discriminations' among the information
provided the individual by his senses might be made by judgment, and therefore
that a standard of taste is possible at that level. But at the level of
sensation all information about the outside world is equivalent. There is
nothing to distinguish a sensation which is unique to the individual from
one which is in rinciple common to several; the feeling is always the same
and one cannot help having it. Again there is a contrast between a




The tendency to bifurcation in Gerard's thinking can be further
elucidated by pointing out that not only are there two tyres of authority
involved but also two type3 of standard, A standard can either be a level
of attainment which ought to be achieved, and is occasionally arrpoached and
perhaps even reached, or it can be the level of attainment which as a matter
of fact is actually arrived at. The first is virtually timeless, the second
is retrospective; there is a difference between the standard expected of
participants before they begin to perform and the standard of their performance
reviewed after it has ended. The first standard obviously influences strongly
how end why the activity is c rried cut, the second is m rely a comment upon
that activity after it has taken olace.
The two tynes of standard may, of course, have much in common in their
contents. For instance, a football team's standard is ex ressed in the
number of goals scored and matches won, whether it is the ideal to which
they aspire or the statistics of the results of their games. The real
difference between the two standards is that one can fail to achieve the
first, but not the second, as far as the retrospective standard of actual
achievement is concerned, the language of success and failure is inapplicable.
This important roint is often obscured by the similarity of content of
the two standards. Thus, a football team presumably aims (at all times) for
a standard of victory in all its games, and it may or may not succeed in
reaching that standard, ; nd can be criticised accordingly. But if at the end
of a season its standard of play is uch that it has lost half its matches,
it cannot be said to have succeeded or failed to reach its standard in that
sense, because "standard" here means what is, not what ought to be attained.
In short, the word "standard" itself includes that problem of "is" and "ought"
which Hume studied. It und rlies the question of whether taste is disputable
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or not, whether, as Gerard says, (quoting Karnes)^ it is "absurd to assert....
that in some instances, 'a man ought not to be pleased when he is, or ought
to be pleased when he is not"' (d.?18).
The two kinds of standard differ in the way that the idea of a scientific
law of nature differs from the ordinary concent of law in the sense of a rule
of society. A natural law is a standard of what is the case, whereas the
laws of society state what ought to be the case. It is, of course, confusing
and unfortunate that both terms, "standard" and "law", should have these
nearly-related, but yet conflicting, meanings, but that this is so is perhars
due, not only to the continuity of ideas, but also to the difficulty of
assimilating the change in the concept of authority which is at the centre
of the scientific revolution of modern times.
Natural ohilo ophy developed for its own purposes a concept of
authority based on empirical observation. The novelty of this concept was
not at first sufficiently appreciated, the problem of "is" and "ought" was
not identified and the scientific authority of "is" was assimilated to the
previous forms of the authority of "ought". The difficulty becomes most
acute when writers such as Gerard attempt to base directive laws on a
descriptive, quasi-scientific foundation, since it is logically impossible
to derive imperative propositions from declarative premises.
Thus, to the obvious question of which kind of standard the standard
of taste is, the answer in Gerard's case is that it is both. Or rather,
since he never mrde the distinction between the two kinds of standard which
is suggested above, he moves between both possibilities at his convenience.
r1
This movement is not, however, random, for it corresponds to the shifts in
his argument between consideration of reason and judgment and of the senses
and sentiment. In the case of taste as sensation, Gerard comes close to
defining the standard of taste in the second sense, consistent with the
concept /
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concept of a natural law, as a reti'ospective description of what has been
accomplished; in the case of taste as discernment, he is much nore inclined
to admit a dynamic element of change and improvement, suggesting aims and
ideals, in short, a standard in the first sense.
A revealing difference between the two kinds of standard is in the
matter of regulation. A standard in the first sense is regulative, it
affects behaviour; a standard in the second sense lacks this feature. At
one point Gerard describes the standard of taste as though it were not in fact
regulative of individual taste:
A standard of taste is not something by which all tastes may be reconciled
and brought to coincide: it is only something by which it may be
determined, which is the best among tastes various, contending, and
incapable of coinciding perfectly, (p.216)
The standard of taste in this context is not a source of general rules for
the guidance of those wishing to acquire the ability to appreciate things
of beauty, sublimity, and so on. Rather it is only an independent survey
of the activities of men exercising their taste in order to establish a
scale of comparison out of them.
The criteria of this retrospective analysis are not evident. It is
h^rd, however, to envisage how the distinction of having the "best" taste
could, in this scheme, be regarded as a meritorious achievement, and not
just as an indifferent statement of fact, from which nothing significant
can follow. For how could someone whose taste was stigmatised by the
standard as thoroughly bad do anything to alter his situation, when his
feelings are dependent on the unalterable structure of his mind and he
presumably therefore lacks the material for his reflex senses to work unon?
Gerard does not maintain for long this static version of the standard
of taste. He has to recognise that if someone's taste is condemned he will
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seek to change it for the better, nd if someone's taste is praised that will
inspire emulation in others. Only if he shardon^d entirely the language of
"better" and "worse" in connection with taste - an unnstural and inconvenient
course of action - could Gerard avoid facing these possibilities, though they
are strictly incompatible with what he says of a standard's not being
"something by which all tastes may be reconciled". In the end he compromises.
Although a simple end instantaneous change of sentiment because of a reasoned
judgment is said to be impossible, because it would mean an alteration in the
mental make-up of the individual, a gradual erosion of unwanted habits may
lead to improvement:
The firmest conviction of reason cannot prevent a perverted sensation;
it must, in spight £sic] of that conviction, continue to be received,
till the natural peculiarity or the habit which occasions it, be
corrected by proper exercise and culture, (p.219)
Thir is more in harmony i^ith the thesis that taste is improvable end that
children can b" educated. But it conflicts with the thesis that the
experience of the senses is the effect of qualities of external objects
and cannot be modified by judgment. The more Gerard develops the concept
of a standard, especially in the first way, towards a regulative and idealistic
version, the more it clashes with some basic empiricist assumptions that he
makes.
Gerard often comes close to dividing taste between sense and judgment
and to dividing the standard of taste in a similar fashion, but he does not
actually come to the point of treating taste as two separate subjects.
This is surely just. The important and interesting truth about taste is
not the apparent oppositions within it, but that they are nevertheless
closely related to form a paradoxical whole. In attempting to resolve
this paradox, Gerard seems to produce a variety of modifications of either
side /
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side of the question; the Essay becomes a search for r mediating principle
with power to reconcile sense and reason and remain independent of them.
Gerard's worrying at what amounts to a single fundamental problem can easily
seem en expression of desire for some new departure, a radical revision of
outworn concents.
Significantly, there is a third principle, besides sensation and
judgment, in Gerard's account of taste, and he seems to have dimly recognised
its potential because in the third edition he re-woriced the section devoted
to it. The conce t is, of course, the imagination. It is a more or less
autonomous power between the senses and the judgment. But Gerard ultimately
fails to make much use of it; he even failed to integrate it well into his
Essay. There are signs of a certain distrust of it. In Part IV it hardly
appears; sense and judgment are left face to face.
With the muddled compromise mentioned above, in which the standard of
taste is left based on causal relations but yet able to influence opinions,
Gerard leaves the problem of opposing the argument that there is no disputing
about taste. He turns instead to discussing the contents of the standard of
teste. Once again he begins with bold attacking moves. He gives a whole
section to shoving that "General Approbation is not the immediate Standard of
Taste" (Part IV, section iv). That he has so little difficulty is in no
small way due to his interpretation of general approbation as a simple majority
verdict. Just as in the ca.se of the variety of individual tastes, Gerard
easily shews that standards of teste are affected by geo~raphy and history.
The conclusion he draws is that a true standard of taste must be based on
principles which escape the vicissitudes of time and place,
Gerard's purpose is to show that a standard of taste and even critical
judgment are impossible if the intrinsic qualities of works of art and so on
are not taken into account:
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No new work can obtain general approbation in an instant; it is of
slow growth, it requires considerable time to reach maturity. In
this interval, the intrinsic merit of the work is the same that it
is afterwards: but there will be no possible means of eppretieting
it. Must every man then suspend his judgment, till numbers be
prepared to declare their sentiments together ? Must he obstinately
refuse all credit to his own feelings and discernment, till the time
come for the public to give its voice ? This would be in some
measure inconsistent with that authority of sentiment, on account of
which it claims to be a standard. (p.239)
It is a splendid passage, but one suspects the opposition is nude of strew.
A naive majority-verdict version of the general approbation theory of the
standard of taste is surely a defenceless position. Its only value, in
the context of Gerard's "sscy, is that it allows him to bring out the
importance of intrinsic qualities.
By reducing the theory that the standard of taste is based on general
approbation to absurdity, Gerard makes way for the thesis that what is
required is justification of critical verdicts by reference to their contents,
their statements about their subject-matter. The standard of taste cannot
be simply a statistical average, because, for one thing, it would be unworkable
until a number of people had passed their verdicts.
The real problem Gerard raises here is how a new work (and all works at
some time are new) ever obtains any reputation at all, if refutation is solely
a matter of general approbation. Gerard says that in fact critics anticipate
the opinions of the many, trying to uphold their particular judgments by
pointing to qualities in the work of art which have had or should have a
determined effect. He claims that critics not only give reasons to justify
their views but base their reasons on more general observations, so that the
standard of taste is a matter of principle:
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The critic founds not his confidence merely on his feelings; he
justifies it by reasons; he shows that it has beauties similar,
equal, or superior to those which have generally pleesed. His
producing such reasons implies an acknowledgment, that sentiment
may be tried by general nrinciples, and is authorised by its
coincidence with them. (n.240)
Clearly, the general nrinciples are in some sense the basis of critical
authority.
An immediate uroblem is how Gerard's general principles are
distinguished from (and superior to) general approbation. This seems to
be the answer. Naive majority-verdict general approbation yields general¬
isations which are simply derived from nerticulprs, summary titles or pure
collections of results without system. Gerard's general principles, on the
other hand, are systematic, not only related to the data but also conditioned
by larger assumptions. They do not just classify the information, but
rationalise it according to previously determined concepts of organisation.
The categories of this higher form of generalisation have an authority
greater than and independent of that lent by mere responsiveness to the
nature of the particulars concerned.
The distinction is a very fine one, and Gerard struggles to elucidate
it. It is obliquely suggested in the first sentence of section iv of
Part IVs
Others, acknowledging the variety of men's tastes, in relation to
individual objects, to be real, h; ve supposed that a standard may
notwithstanding be inferred immediately from experience of their
judgments concerning these objects. (p.225)
The italicised word is the significant one. The opinion that the standard
of taste can be derived "immediately" from the particular judgments of men
is not Gerard's opinion. Such direct inferences from the responses of
taste are not his general principles.
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That is not to say, however, thet Gerard entirely rejects the simpler
tyoe of generalisations about teste;
When we deny that general approbation is the proner or immediate
standard, we are far from insinuating that it is of no account.
It is of very great account. Though it be not itself the standard,
it is the materials of which the standard must be composed; it is
the block from which it must be hewed out: it is the princinal
of those ingredients from which it must be extracted. It holds
the same place in this enquiry, that experiments and observations
concerning the real ihaenomens of things, hold in physical
investigations of the laws of the material world. (p.248)
After some twenty pages attacking general approbation as a standard of taste,
this re-instatement of the notion is at first sight surprising. The
explanation is contained in the metaphor from sculpture: the standard of
taste, in Gerard's view, does come from the results of general approbation,
but it requires to be worked cut with a tool, a method got from elsewhere.
It is this addition which distin mishes his general principles.
The lest sentence of the quotation above reveals the analogy which
governs Gerard's treatment of the standard of taste. The reference there
is to rudimentary scientific method. Gerard goes on to exnand the comparison.
He briefly explains the derivation and application of what he consistently
refers to as a lav; of nature. He evidently conceives of such a law as
something more than s mere generalisation. It must he able to account
"for phaenomena which at first sight appear unaccountable" (p.249)^ to
reconcile seeming discordances and show that they "proceed from the same
principle differently modified" (ibid.). In short, it answers many -umoses
which could hot be answered by a mere collection of the experiments from
which it is inferred (ibid,). The ver- icts of general approbation
com spond to s-uch collections, while the general principles of teste are
lik scientific laws.
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In Part III, section iii, "Of the influence of Taste on Criticism">
Gerard fore-shadowed the scientific analogy. The particular beauties and
faults perceived by taste are there said to be the "rude materials, and
nothing more" (p.17l) upon which the critic works!
In orde-"-, therefore, to form an able critic, taste must be attended
with a philosophical genius, which may subject these materials to a
regular induction, reduce them into classes, and. determine the
general rules which govern them. (r. 171)
"Phiosonhical" here means "scientific". If the scientific spirit is wanting,
"our observations will be trifling, superficial, unconnected, and perplexed
with too great particularity" (p.174). This is the fault Gerard finds in
the dicta of general approbation. In an extensive footnote (pp.173f.),
Gerard defends his conception of induction with the aid of a quotation from
Bacon's Novum OrgBmiwir which nuts it beyond doubt that he is assimilating
the business of criticism to that of scientific research, albeit along
rather out-of-date lines, even in the mid-eighteenth century.
Gerard compares the principles of teste not only with the laws of
science but also with those of mechanics. This allows him to draw a useful
analogy when it comes to establishing that the general principles will not
stifle creative genius but rather give the artist the knowledge to develop
his talents:
Prom 8 person who satisfies himself with observing and admiring a
number cf curious machines, the utmost that can be expected is,
the production of a simil-r machines it i only from him who,
either by his natural sagacity, or by study, has acquired a
comprehension of the general principles of mechanics, that we can
exnect the invention of new and dissimilar machines, or even any
considerable improvement of the former. The same must happen in
the fine arts. (pp.270f.)
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The general principles of taste, then, are not restricted to what has been
accomplished, but cover also a range of future possibilities. This
capacity, it might be said, is equivalent to the power of prediction of
scientific (or mechanical) theory. It is not going too far to add what
Gerard omits j that such potential is not confined to the creation of new
art but also enables the critic securely to extend his opinions from what
has been known and admired to what is new and debatable.
In a sentence summarising the argument, Gerard • lso discloses what
the general principles of taste ere:
Thus, as in natural philosophy it is not collections of experiments
and observations, but the general conclusions legitimately deduced
from them, that amount to an explication of the course of nature;
so in the fine arts it is not the several sentiments of inaividusls,
but just conclusions deduced from them, concerning the qualities in
objects which gratify taste, end the simple mental principles from
whose operation the gratification is derived, that serve immediately
for estimating excellence or faultiness. (p.266f.)
Clearly the general principles of taste are in a reel sense descriptive,
but their descrirtiveneso is not particularised. Like scientific laws,
they state conditions end consequences, end describe classes of events,
but they are not themselves reports of direct observations. lather they
are the reason for deciding which observation statements are accurate and
which are not.
But here the similarity between the principles and scientific laws
seems to end. For whereas the object of a scientific law is, as Gerard
says, "an explication of the course of nature", the object of the principles
of taste is not just to obtain an agreed description of a work of art but
"for estimating excellence or faultiness", that is to say, to authorise
critical 'udgments.
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No doubt Gerard was attracted to the scientific manner as a way round
the problem of the indisputability of taste because science seems to reject
neither empirical sensitivity to experience nor the concept of authority.
Its empiricism lies in its experimental tradition. Gerard correctly
identifies this. But the problem is what in the subject of taste is truly
equivalent to pxtvrimental evidence in science. Gerard appears to offer
two answers; the qualities of objects which evoke particular responses and
the general judgments of mankind in matters of taste. In fact, these ere
not separate answers so much as limiting extremes. Thet is to say, an
exprrimentally based "science of taste" must take for its data neither plain
descriptions of things merely nor plain verdicts of critics merely, but a
synthesis of the two. Gerard does not inquire too closely into how the
scientist of taste could proceed impartially to assemble such data in an
area wh re his judgment, or partiality, is expressly in operation as part
of his experiments.
This raises the second point, concerning scientific authority. Gerard
wes right in thinking that there is such e thing. It rests both on claims
to experimental verifiability, which Gerard can only weakly make for his
science of taste, and the methodology of science. Both these foundations
are, of course, constantly under examination by scientists and philosophers.
A fault in Gerard is that he too naively accepts one or two theories about
them.
But a greater failing is in not seeing that a science which justifies
itself by appealing to observation end correct method claims an authority
which is, in theory at least, imnersonsl. It is also, again in theory,
onen to revision. Gerard occasionally approaches these oeinicns. He does
som timeSxsuggest that the standard of taste is not a con equence of
privilege or extraordinary capacities, rnd he does sometimes imply, in
tracin the variation of taste because of history and geo raphy, that the
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of teste is mutable. But one could not say these were consistently held
opinions or represent his usual meaning when he talks of authority and the
standard of taste.
Gerard was not unusual in these misapprehensions. The background to
them ie the triumph of Newton. Here was a scientific achievement which
relied on impersonally-demonstrated universal laws, yet clearly it had
bestowed real power and status on its author. Newton himself had exploited
this paradox, as many scientists before and since have used their professional
eminence as a means to more worldly success. It has often been remarked how
unhelnful was Newton's overlordship to the science of his followers, because
his authority weighed heavily on them; but it was also a troublesome example
in other fields. For Newton a consolidation of his position as discoverer
of the new order set a magnificent precedent.
He established the authority of the scientist in strongly personel
terms (so that his admirers endowed him with a character to suit, they
thought, his noble achievements). He was recognised as the founder of a
school of thought. Extravagant compliments, like Pope's, were directed to
him. Many found his mathematical proofs beyond th m and, like Locke, had
to take the justness of his conclusions on trust; they could hardly do so
without investing him with personel authority. And all this set the style
for science in the eighteenth century. A scientist was a man who did
experiments, formul ted principles, laid down laws of nature and thus led
ignorant mankind to the greater knowledge he alone could understand for
himself.
Hence Gerard, impressed by the authority of science, was unable to
extricate it from associations of arbitrariness and absolutism. He can
see how great is the scope for individual variation and allow the highest
degree of responsiveness to the actual, multifarious facts of the testes
of men, yet he is also incapable of conceding that the rule cf authority,
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of personal power over the tastes of others, is thereby almost completely
undermined. Pertly, of course, he sees such an admission es en admission
of chaos, but partly he conceives it as unnecessary, because in science he
seems to see just that combination of mpiricism with authority which
would suit his needs.
There is, however, a much deeper problem at issue here. Gerard
wished to establish a scientific standard of taste. It would consist of
general principles "experimentally" derived from "the qualities in objects
which gratify taste, and the simple mental principles from whose operation
the gratification is derived" (p.266f.). Such a standard he regards as
indisputably authoritative. The reason for this belief is that the
standard woule be scientific, that is to say, besed on experiments. But
the core cf this belief is that somehow scientific research arrives at en
accurate description of actuality; that is to say, it tells the truth
about nature. In the "science of taste", then, the ultimate descriptions
would be given of the fixed entities which are the "objects" of taste.
The gratifying properties and the mental principles involved could be set
down for any given exercise of taste, end once the scientific critic, with
his perfected theory and method, had set down the account of the data,
variation in reports would be absurd. Any observer, from any point of
view, ought to see the same thing.
Gerard, however, has already shown that in fact time and place (that
is, variety of viewpoint) have a constant distorting effect on accounts of
objects and taste experience, and hence on the standard of taste as it is
known In real life. The scientific standard of taste, then, is somehow
to be unaffected by history and geography. Anyone, anywhere, at any time,
must be able to reach the scientific conclusion in matters of taste.
Practically, this has not, in Gerard's opinion, been possible until his
time. But is it possible at all ?
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A very similar problem occurs in physics in the question of the
existence or not of what is called. Absolute Space. For centuries the sun
was regarded as mobile in relation to the earth; daily observations confirmed
this. It was also accepted that the moon and planets, and even the stars
beyond, also moved round the earth. But attempts to define these motions
both accurately and with the degree of elegance thought appropriate to the
majesty of the heavens met with diminishing success until two important
changes were made.
First, sacrificing appearance to theoretical elegance, Copernicus
advocated the view that the earth and the other planets be supposed to move
relative to the sun, and, second, Kepler, sacrificing theoretical elegance
to careful observation (by Brahe) and calculation, replaced circular motion
with eliptical motion for planetary orbits. As a result, the 30lar system
could be described with fewer complicaticns and higher accuracy.
It was, of course, Isaac Newton who accomplished such a description.
But he also vrent further and universalised it. He abolished the distinction
betvreen celestial and terrestrial mechanics and made the same laws hold
everywhere. Thus, if he was right, his law of gravity applied not only to
the relative motions of the sun and earth or the earth and moon, but also to
the earth and a cannon-ball, or to two billiard ball3 - in short, to any two
(or more) bodies with mass. Furthermore, the gravitational influence la
mutual; the earth "attracts" the moon and the moon, to a lesser extent
proportional to its inferior size, "attracts" the earth. If, therefor, the
earth moves around th sun, the sun must move a little as a result; their
relationship is not like that of a ball on a string swung round a fixed centre
but rather of a (very unbalanced) dumb-bell whirled in the air.
If a dumb-bell were in fact whirled through the air on earth, the path
traced in space by one of its ends would be, of course, quite complex.
Firstly, it would whirl. Secondly, it would have a trajectory in the air,
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from the hand of the thrower to its fall to the ground. But in that time
the earth itself would move on in its orbit round the sun, so that the path
of the dumb-bell would move with it. If the sun were also moving, taking
the earth, end the dumb-bell (and all the planets and courts) along, thon
a further adjustment in the definition of the nath o " the dumb-bell-end
would be required; such a movement of the solar system could be in relation,
for instance, to the nearest stars. The nearest stars might also,
conceivably, be in motion, and indeed the whole material universe might be
shifting along together, taking its stars, our sun, the earth and cur
whirling dumb-bell with it.
Now, sunposing one bod/ (say, the end of our dumb-bell) happened, at
some instant, not to participate in the general movement of the material
universe. It would, of course, appear relative to the rest of the cosmos
to be moving; indeed, it would apparently be the only indisputably moving
object from all material points of view in the universe (excert its own).
But although it appeared to be in motion, it would, ex hypothesi. really be
at rest; Newton called this state of rest absolute. And although all the
o her parts of the material universe appeared at rest in relation to each
other, they would, again ex hypoth°si. really be in motion; Newton called
this Absolute Motion.
It was rossible that all, some or none of the bodies in the universe
were at any given time in Absolute Motion or not. Thus, although all might
maintain their distances from and aspects to each other, they could never¬
theless be changing their real places, despite appearances. Such change
of place requires that the places be fixed and immovable despite what
happens to the bodies. The arrangement of fixed, immutable places Newton
called Absolute Space. In relation to Absolute Space, everything in the
universe is unequivocally either at rest or in motion; that is to say, all
other forms of motion and rest arc in relation to other material bodies
only, and must be so described.
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Besides Absolute Space, Newton also postulated Absolute Time, an even,
equable succession of instants in one direction, past to present to future.
Any event, and every event, has one unique co-ordinate in Absolute Time which
identifies the point in the flow of time when that event occurs. Events
with the same value of time co-ordinate are simultaneous.
The aim of the concept of Absolute Motion is to allow Newton to speak
unequivocally of the real rather than of the apparent change of place of
objects, because the apparent change of place may be relative only to the
observer. Similarly, Gerard ims to find a standard of taste based not on
the apparent qualities of works of art but on their real qualities. He
points out that if a mastemiece were to appear "in an obscure and inconsiderable
country, which has little connexion or intercourse with forei nerss it could
obtain only a very limited approbation" (p.234). Yet it seems absurd to say
that the work's merit did not exist until it was universally recognised:
If the extent of the approbation which a work obtains, depend so much
on the celebrity of the country where it is produced, and on other
circumstances wholly accidental or extraneous, it cannot alone or
immediately be the measure of its intrinsic merit. (p.235)
Obviously, the standard of taste must not be distorted by accidental
circumstances, but must be time to the intrinsic merits of works of art.
Just as Gerard believes that a truly authoritative standard can only be
derived from descriptions of the intrinsic natures of works of art, and not
from the reports of observers, who may be biassed by historical or geographical
factors, Newton believes that an accurate physics must discount the distortions
of the observer's viewnoint and strive to describe the real positions of
objects and events in space and time.
All events, therefore, have four co-ordinates, three in Absolute Space
and one in Absolute Time, which define their positions in the Newtonian
universe. By comparing soece co-ordinates at known distances of tinm>, the
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direction and rate of change of objects in the universe could be calculated,
and, in principle, an expression derived cf all the possible ro itions of the
object for all time. Hence an ultimate description of the universe is possible,
although, of course, very difficult to achieve, since it would have to take
into account the act ons and interactions of vast numbers of objects, each
wit its own formula of possibilities.
The ultimate description would consist cf such formulae of potential
tracks in Absolute Space, which would express the rate3 of change of the co¬
ordinates of objects* 3y ins rting a particular time value, the spatial
co-ordinates for that instant could be computed. The formulae would be the
abstract framework of the life-histories of objects.
The value of these descriptions of all possible spatial positions of
objects for ell instants in time would be their absoluteness, their freedom
from the limitations of space and time. Obviously, in a chranging world,
objects at one time may easily have changed their positions in snace in a
short time after, so that a later observer will never see what his predecessors
saw. But if he has the co-ordinates of the bbjects he sees and of those
seen previously, and the formula for the rr te of change of the positions of
the objects, he can perform a calculation to confirm that what he observes
is equivalent to what was observed. When he has confirmed such an equivalence,
he can safely go on to compare his observations with his predecessors', and
make judgments as though he and they had seen the same thing. Thus, the
theory of Absolute Srace and Time made it feasible for observers to ignore
their own limitations in space and time in comparing their observations.
They could all refer their experiments to one standard formulation in order
to be sure they were discussing the same thing.
In a very similar way Gerard wishes the standard of trste to offer
absolute descriptions of works of art and qualities in objects which cause
emotions. Fven although different critics feel differently, they ou^ht, he
says, to be able to compute, from the information of their own experiences,
times and places, what the general formula for responses of taste to eny
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given object should be and use that as s standard of comparison, not only
between objects of taste but also between critics and their judgments of any
given object. Critics ought to be dealing, not simply with their feelings,
but with an extrapolation from them which is beyond the changes wrought by
time and place, an extrapolation which when associated with any particular
time and place generates the description of the appropriate and actual feeling,
just as the formula for the life-history of any object, when a value is
inserted in its space and time co-ordinates, will generate a description of
the object's position in Absolute Space and Time.
The concept of Absolute Space and Time involves a re-definition of
motion and rest in order to avoid circular, relativistic arguments. The
question "Does the earth really move?" could theoretically be answered
without reference to the sun, the planets or the stars, thus side-stepping
the retort that the earth's movement is only apparent end that it is the
others th't "really" move, Newton offers the possibility of a cosmology
which is not only accurate and elegant but also as basic as can be, and, in
fact, indisputable. Once the Absolute Velocity of the Absolute Motion in
Absolute Space of a body is known, no more fundamental definition of that
body can be offered. And once such information is gathered about one body,
because of the universality of Newtonian mechanics, the Absolute State of all
others relative to it can in nrinciole be calculated and hence the material
universe completely and basically described.
The practical difficulty is in making a start. Any object occupies
Absolute Space, by definition, but whether it is at rest or not in that place
is another question, Newton himself believed that Absolute Motion was only
detectable if it was an acceleration in Absolute Space, ana he offered some
(much disputed) reasons for thinking so. The general problem, however,
resolves itself into establishing what are the bodies whose motions are
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ab olute end in relation to which the motions of other bodies ere equivalent
to Absolute Potion. "So the question of whether there exists Absolute Space
reduces to the question whether the^e is a frame of reference more basic
than any other",*
If Absolute Space is in other words the most basic frame of reference,
then it has the function of a standard and provides a foundation for
authority. The justification of a Newtonian's claim that an actual mass is
in motion would ultimately be secured by reference to absolute change of
place. Once that was established, the Newtonian could clrim to be describing
not merely appearances but the actual states of things, real motion or real
re t, which underlay those appearances. He could, indeed, put those who
thought what they saw was true right about their delusions, without risking
the retort that he was equally prone to confuse his observations with reality.
The end of this process would be complete agreement and vindication of the
Newtonian's cosmology.
Newtonian philosophy, then, provides a model for Gerard's search for
an absolute standard, one not relative to time or place. Gerard's standard
of taste, which is beyond the vicissitudes of history and geography, hss a
parallel in Newton's Absolute Time end Space. Prom these metaphysical
presuppositions comes the assurance of Newton's theorising. That assurance
undoubtedly impressed Gerard, even if he never clearly recognised its origin.
In his strivings, however, to define the sure end scientific standard of taste,
he projects in the field of criticism a framework of metaphysical absoluteness
similar to that which Newton postulates in the physical world.
Absolute Space is the most basic frame of reference in Newtonian physics;
the standard cf taste is the most basic frame of reference in criticism.
Both are attempts to settle the problem of relativity in time and space.
Newton in effect banishes relativity from his system by taking his propositions
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concerning Absolute Space and Time as axiomatic. No eighteenth-century
thinker, excert Leibniz and perhaps Berkeley, questioned this move very
closely, end indeed Kent later elevated Newton's assumptions about space
and time into a. priori truths about the universe, Thi3 was partly because
Absolute Space and Time are concepts clearly enough related to ordinary
everyday ideas of place and duration, in a way that, for example, Einstein's
ideas of space and time are not,
Gerard's attempt to banish relativity from criticism is related to
Newton's in physics, for he tries to do it by appealing to the model of
natural philosophy. It might be said that only if there are basic frames
of reference in the sciences, such as physics, is Gerard justified in saying
that philosophical criticism can establish a most basic frame of reference,
the standard of taste, for itself. If, for instance, the concept of
Absolute Space and Time had to be anandoned or seriously doubted by
physicists, as has been the case at least since instein, Gerard's faith
in a scientific standard of taste as an escape from the problem of relativism
in criticism would be highly questionable. In other words, the empirical
certainty Newtonirn philosophy seemed to offer, and which Gerard, among
others, was anxious to make the basis of his theories, is a puch more
debatable concent than was thought in the eighteenth century.
There is, however, a much more obvious difference between Absolute
Space-Time and the standard of taste, which brings back into focus the
fun amental confusion in Gerard and the philosophical critics generally.
Absolute Space and Time are quite uniform. The differences between points
in them are purely mathematical and imply mo sort of qualitative distinction.
But the standard of taste, even when it is scientific, is evaluative.
Some critical judgments, some works of art are better than others, not just
differently oriented. It is as though some positions in space were
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superior to the rest, and all motions towards those points were therefore
^referable to other motions, so that space and time would have a centre or
centres. Such a conception of space and time is as mistaken, from the
awtonirn and scientific point of view, as the confusion of the two types
of standard or law already discussed. Even if science vindicated Gerard's
belief in the nossibility of an absolute standard of taste, it would only be
a descriptive, not a prescriptive, one, "is", not "ouvht".1
•1
dee also Appendix III,
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CHAPTER VII j CONCLUSION
In 1785, Prances Reynolds, sister of ir Joshua Reynolds the painter,
■published An Enquiry .oncerninr the Princi les of Taste. and of the Cri.-ins
of Our Ideas of beauty. &c.^ Undoubtedly the most remarkable feature of
the work occurs in the first chapter, "A SNATCH of the MENTAL SYSTEM
respecting our Perceptions of Taste, &c.":
On meditating on this subject, and marking the progressive stages or
degrees of human excellence, the great leading general truths, or
mental rests, as I may call them, the common, the beautiful, the
graceful, and the sublime. I have been naturally led to form e kind
of diagrammatic representation of their respective distances, &c. &c.
which I nresent to my reader on the opposite page, requ^stin^ him to
refer to it now and then as he roes on, in order to facilitate his
comprehension of my meaning. (p.3)
This diagram is reproduced here as it appears on page 2 of the original.
Sublimity, grace, beauty and truth, which lie outside the circle of neture,
together constitute the "region of intellectual pleasure, genius, or taste"
(p. 6). Other details of the diagram present a problem. As it stands,
beneath "B AU7Y" and within the circumference of the circle appears "COMMON
SENSE"f and beneath "TRUTH" appears "COMMON FORM". But on page nine of
the work the author states that "common sense seems to be diffusive truth,
and common form diffusive beauty", which suggests that "COMMON SENSE" and
"COMMON FORM" in the diagram have been interchanged and ought to go beneath
"TRUTH" and "BEAUTY" respectively.
The details, however, of this diagram are probably of less interest
then its origin. The author claims that she arrived at the idea of such
a representetionof the principles of taste quite independently, but she
also /
1 Frances Reynolds: -n nquiry Concerning the Principles of Teste, and of
the Origins of Our Ideas of Unuty. c., London 1785; Augustan Reprint
Society, No. 27, ^os Angeles, 1951.
SUBLIMITY
The diagram in Frances Reynolds's enquiry Concernin the Principlea of taste.
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also points out, in her own defence that it was at least anticipated by
reputable thinkers:
... however whimsical end absurd this delineation mey appear to my
reader, som thing analogous to the thought may be found in the works
of many eminent philosophers, particularly in those of Bacon and of
Locke: the latter suggesting that the whole system of morality might
be reduced to mathematical demonstration; and the former, in his
treatise on the Advancement of Learning, gives a description of the
stages of science very much resembling my delineation of the stages
of intellectual perfection, or taste. (p.3f).
Frances Reynolds's treatment of taste more reometrico. therefore, qualifies
her as a "philosophical critic".
Unfortunately, these fine beginnings do not lead very far. The book
is very hard to understand, even vrith the aid of a diagram, because it is
so rhapsodical in parts. One point that emerges is that the sublime is
contained in nature, so that the diagram ought to curl back on itself
somehow. On the whole one is forced to conclude that Frances Reynolds
represents the decadence of philosophical criticism, an essentially sterile
belief in the power of association with such philosophical names as Bacon
and Locke to justify and dignify quite preposterous speculations about
taste.
Perhaps this explains the impatience with criticism displayed by
Richard Payne Knight in his Principles of Taste.1 and his insistence on
emotion as op osed to reason in taste:
That, which constitutes the great characteristic difference between
liberal and mechanic art; and which gives to the former all its
superiority; is feeling or sentiment; e quality, that is always
easily perceived, but incapable of being described. (p.24l)
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If feelings cannot be described, the efforts of the philosophical critics to
pin them down are vain. And if "liberal and mech nic" art are fundamentally
different then the analogy between criticism and natural philosophy is
worthless.
Similar signs of a reaction against philosophical criticism appear in
the essays of Vicesimus Knox, In the essay entitled "On philosophical
criticism, and on the little assistance it gives to genius" (number lxxxiv),
Knox declares that "nature, glowing nature, suggested the exquisitely fine
language end ideas as they flowed, and left laborious criticism to weary
herself in foraing rules and systems from the unstudied efforts of her
A
happier temerity". In en earlier essay, number xxvii, "On the Refinements
of Theoretical Criticism"2 (which in earlier editions was called "On Modern
Criticism"), Knox writes that the^e is "in ell works of true taste and genius,
some thing of that elevated nature, which cannot be pointed out by verbal
description, which must be perceived by the vibrations it produces on the
nervous system, which must be felt as well as understood" (p.147). And
then he reveals the most unflattering side of the comparison, implicit in
all philosophical criticism, of the critic with the scientific researcher:
I would compare an abstruse philosopher, when he considers the works
of genius, to an anatomist, who will not declare a human body perfect
and beautiful till he has examined its internal conformation; while
the man of taste may be said to resemble a sensible spectator, who
at first sight, and without any laborious investigation, pronounces
a figure graceful in its symmetry, shape and colour, (p.148)
Knox's remark that the taste for metaphysical criticism is "particularly
prevalent among our thoughtful neighbours in North Britain,"3 reminds one
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of Wordsworth's venomous reflection on Adam Smith, "the worst critic, David
Hume not excepted, th't Scotland, a soil to which this sort of weed seems
natural, lias produced."1 Presumably Wordsworth would have included Karnes
end Gerard in this rebuke.
This is perhans the point to attempt a general assessment of philosophical
criticism, as represented by Addison, Burke, Karnes and Gerard. Each of
thorn is a philosophical critic because he turns to natural philosophy, or
science, to borrow ideas and methods. This is despite the fact that science
was responsible for the breakdown of traditional values in criticism, so
that the eighteenth century was faced with urgent problems. The shape of
the solutions given to these problems, and indeed of some of the problems
themselves, were in turn heavily influenced by scientific thinking.
Thus the philosophical critics link up what may be called the world
of science with the world of taste. The two were, however, most unequal.
The reason for linking them was the hope that the assurance and success of
science could be transferred along with its methods end patterns of thought
into matters of taste end criticism. The critics were themselves quite
well aware of what they were doing, although not perhaps of the extent to
which their thinking was informed and directed by scientific theories.
They acknowledged their borrowing of what they thought was the philosophical,
or scientific, method, and they knew, for instance, that the distinction
between primary and secondary qualities was philosophical. But they were
ignorant of how the basically atomistic nature of the psychology of ideas
led them straight into difficulties only roughly solved by the theory of
association, and their estimation of the value of the empirical approach
of science was always faulty.
It is here that the link between science and taste breaks down, for
the problem raised is that of authority. The philosophical critics hoped
that /
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that they would be able to extend the principles of justification which
seemed to apply to scientific theories to their own theories about criticism.
#
But apart from the fact that their understanding of science was relatively
crude, they failed to examine the concept of authority closely enough to be
aware of the tiroblem they faced. In other words, their concent of criticism
was as deficient in this respect as their theory of natural philosophy.
The authority they sought to establish was by and large a static
concept. They wented to pin down the facts, arrive at firm, unquestionable
propositions and be able to pronounce unquestionable verdicts. The lasting
impression from a deep analysis of philosophical criticism is the sense of
insecurity, almost panic, the critics seem to have felt in the face of
variations in critical opinions; they were desperate, it seoms, to promote
lasting agreement and reduce differences to the superficial, the merely
verbal. Of course, they were sophisticated enough to aJLlow for such small
discrepancies, but ultimately they wished to be able to condemn heterodox
views and ensure genuine and fundamental agreement.
They thought they could do so by turning to the facts of criticism.
Perhaps their most basic notion, which a contrast with the views of Dryden
brings out, is the belief in truth to nature as a guarantee of the stability
of knowledge. "mpiricsl investigation and re-investigation of reel objects
will, they believe, confirm the truth of their ideas. '11 the philosophical
critics share this concept of truth, and therefore they share the related
theory of verification by observation. Upon such observations, the
"experimental" evidence, they claim to base their deductions of the principles
of taste.
Having embraced the philosophical concept of empirical observation,
they were almost forced to adopt the philosophical methodology in order to
proceed from fact3 to principles. The actual details of the observations
are themselves worthless without systematisation. The critics were bound
to /
to need a methodology in order to deal with the mass of detailed evidence
upon which they claimed to rely. For if the truth was a matter of relation
to obs-rved fact, any generalised principle could only be justified by
showing how it was related to confirming instances, A methodology wss
needed to explain how facts authorised principles; science had such a
methodology, and the philosophical critics borrowed it.
Burke and Gerard, therefore, turn aside from the discussion of the
responses of human beings to objects to discuss how such information can
form the basis for generalisation. They explicitly appeal to scientific
procedures and try to explain the derivation of laws of nature. Their
main point is that natural laws are not just collections of particulars,
not mere averages. They are, however, unable to define the way in which
a law of nature both goes beyond the evidence on which it is based and also
is protected against too easy rejection in the face of counter-instances.
In another respect Burke emulates the scientific method. Like
Addison, he tries to limit the area of his research and avoid metaphysical
questions. They both refuse to speculate on the question of the inter¬
action of the physical and the mental. In Addison's case, it is the
problem of how ideas, derived from objects, affect the mind; in Burke's,
it is the interplay of mind and body. Rejecting these subjects, they turn
instead to a descriptive analysis in each case, because frcm that they see
some chance of practical success.
Addison's use of nhilosophical ways of thinking does not seem to go
beyond the description of tte pleasures of the imagination. He only
recommends the scientific met od as a way of establishing the facts afcout
what appeals to taste and does not go into the question of standards. One
might argue that it is implicit in Addison's philosophical criticism that
the facts about the pleasing qualities of objects and the principles of
their appeal to the imagination are not gathered merely for the sake of it,
but /
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but to form a just standard to which critics can appeal to justify themselves.
But Addison does not actually say so.
Kames and Garard, however, definitely do assert that the principles of
taste form a standard. They thus go beyond the limits of scientific authority.
It has already been pointed out how whet is involved is a confusion about the
A
meanings of "standard"' and "law". Having defined the conditions of normality
for judgments of taste, Kames and Gerard use that standard as though it
presented what ought to be the required judgment in any instance.
Both of them insist that the relationship of the stimulus of external
objects to the internal human response or emotion is a causal one. It is
true that they dilute the theory by allowing for a certain amount of deviation
in response, so that the effects of the seme cause are not always identical.
Yet their ability to reconcile a causal theory of emotion with a standard of
taste probably has a deerer origin. One suspects that their attitude to the
causal theory of emotion is anthropomorphic. Just as a man causes something
to come about by deciding on a course of action and then implementing it,
with all that that implies of willing a result, adjusting behaviour to arrive
at the realisation of intentions and, above all, the satisfaction of gaining
a successful outcome, so, in the view of Karnes and Gerard, the rousing of an
emotion by an object is a sort of intentional process which strives to achieve
a successful result. Such a notion of causality would enable Kames and
Gerard to think of human beings succeeding or failing to respond to stimuli.
In a situation where success end failure are real possibilities, prescriptive
standards are also possible. One can discriminate between correct and
incorrect responses.
Kames and Gerard in effect add the discriminatory powers of taste to




outlines. They are thus able to appeal to the authority of those philosophical
principles, their experimental truth, their correspondence with empirical
observation, to justify the verdicts critics pas on works of art end on other
critics' judgments. The standard of taste seems, in fret, to have a double
role. It directs both taste and criticism. One can verify the justness of
one's reactions to works of art by comparing them with the principles of taste,
and one can verify the justness of a critical judgment, by checking with the
standard of taste that the reactions the critic says are just in the case of a
given work of art of this particular type are in fact prescribed by the standard.
Burke also extends scientific authority beyond its limits, but in a
different way from Kases and Gerard. It might indeed seem that, like Addison,
he does not extend it at all, but is content with a description of the origin
of our ideas. The standard of taste does not seem to be e part of his purpose.
Yet the result of his analysis of the sublime and the beautiful comes very
close to what Gerard and Kames contrive as the standard of taste, and Burke's
theories do have the property of defining what emotional responses are proper
to certain types of stimuli.
Burke achieves this result, as has been explained, by calling on biological
necessities, self-preservation and propagation of the speci s, which are in
effect disguises for value judgments. The values in question are essentially
human, and so Burke's theories are more intimately anthropomorphic than those
of Kames end Gerard could be. Objects, according to Burke, actually have
qualities whose purpose is to stimulate the faculties human beings have to
ensure the survival of the species.
But Burke's use of the concept of survival does not only introduce the
prescriptive or mandatory element to his account of human reactions, similar
to that with which Kames and Gerard invest the standard of teste; because
the survival of which he speaks is that of the species rather thsn of the
individual, he also introduces the other feature of the standard of taste as
Kames and Gerard see it, that is,its status as the norm of human behaviour.
The standard of Kames and Gerard is the justification for condemning vitiated
taste /
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teste and narrow-minded criticism; in Burke, however, the normality of
human survival-mechanisms has a far more drastic authority, involving no
less than the life or death of human beings. Failure to respond to the
sublime and beautiful is not just bad teste, but a sign of incapacity to
promote the survival of the human race, Suoh a failure of the biological
mechanisms of survival in en individual is a condemnation because, according
to Burke, it is not normal to show such personal indifference to the
maintenance of the species. Because of the value of the continued existence
of humanity, the person who does not react appropriately to the sublime and
the beautiful is to be condemned, if not by men, then possibly by nature,
which will select for extinction those individuals unable to respond to
their survival instincts.
It is perhaps legitimate to project Burke's interest in instinctuel
responses and biological mechenisms into his expressionist theory of language.
If
For what is involved here is again the directness and naturalness of responses.
The speaker's emotions are communicated to the hearers hy the power of
sympathy. In Kam s there seems to be room for reasoned judgments concerning
what emotion is expressed and what expressions are appropriate to which
emotions. But Burke's expressionism has less room for criticism, because
it is a theory of communication. For Kames, it is a difficult scientific
research to discover the delicate relations between ideas which constitute
emotions; but for Burke it is an everyday occurrence that hearers respond
to speakers emotionally by sympathy, almost automatically intuiting what
emotion is being expressed.
Besides the question of ex^ressionistic authority, therefore, there
is another important feature of Burke's language theory. The concept of
sympathetic communication suggests a picture of society in which individuals
are continually washed by waves of emotion. A person expresses himself;
his /
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his hearers sympathetically experience his meaning, and in turn express
themselves; and more and more people, more and more distant from the source,
come to knew the common feeling. Thus the whole of humanity is linked by
ties of common feeling.
Burke's idea of sym athetic communications, evidently, is a social
Tarallel to the association of ideas in the psychology of the individual.
Burfce is nerhaps more successful than Addison, Karnes and Gerard in disguising
the way in which he is beset by the problems of atomistic ways of thought.
He does, of course, enjoy the advantage of seeming to deny the psychology of
ideas and the theory of association themselves. Yet his theory of communi¬
cation by sympathy suggests that he too felt constrained to account for the
way in which human individuals organised themselves into communities.
The problem of how a group of individuals become a community is only
one manifestation of a recurrent difficulty which the philosophical critics
face again and again. It is the question of how separate atoms can be
combined into coherent wholes. It is evident in the psychology of ideas
and the problem of how separate ideas are organised into trains of thought.
It reappears in a different form when the critics consider the standard of
taste, for then they have to explain how it is possible to have strong
convictions soundly based on genuine experience and yet take other people's
views into account. It also appears as the contrast between the worth of
the individual, especially the fine critic or artist, and his statistical
commonplaceness. Karnes in particular is acutely aware that the critical
opinions he favours are not necessarily those of the majority, and Gerard
too recognises how restricted is the European taste which he admires.
In Dryden, most of these problems sre not really present, because he
is fundamentally untouched by the metaphysical disturbance of science. He
3till believes in the possibility of knowing a kind of truth which is not
dependent on experience of nature, although it may be corroborated by such
experience. /
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experience. He need not therefore call on empirical evidence to authorise
his critical judgment. He is not face to face with the problems posed by
scientific notions of authority. It may be that his response to the challenge
science represented to traditional forms of authority was to retreat into the
kind of scepticism which allowed him to avoid facing the questions raised by
the scientific revolution, a scepticism which meant a refusal to assert
traditional authority in case it was therefore laid open to scientific doubt,
while at the same time he refused to accept fully the authority of empirical
science.
With Addison, however, that kind of authority seems to be the only true
one. But he contrasts art and science, fiction and fact, without seeming
to choose definitely one or other. It is as though they both could hold
his allegiance and that upstart science had not finally made fiction altogether
suspect. The usual explanation of this ambivalence is that Addison, already
in the early eighteenth century, takes the romantic road and calls on the
imagination and fancy to redeem a world chilled by science. But in fact
Addison demonstrates quite clearly the unecceetability of poetic fiction
when judged by the empirical authority of Locke and Newton. Addison is
nostalgic for poetry rather then prophetic, and is surely more important
for advocating that empirical investigation of taste that Burke and Kames
undertake and Gerard tries to justify as the standard of taste.
The central problem in Karnes's elements is atomism. He relentlessly
exposes the paradoxical dilemma of the individual and the group. His
empiricism and psychology of ideas drive on to the point where the cohesion
of society is a mystery and the standard of taste a seeming impossibility.
He escapes from the difficulties he besets himself with by insisting on the
uniformity of human nature. This enables him to leap all barriers separating
men. The justification of criticism he gives is therefore general, not
particular /
particular or individual. Kames succeeds in avoiding the problem set by
the impersonality of scientific authority by depersonalising taste. He
sweeps aside the difficulty of the atomic individualism of human beings
and their tastes by asserting that the differences there are among them
are negligible. Human exneriences are not .just equivalent but essentially
the same. Hence it is immaterial who h? s the experience of a work of art;
anyone can have it, according to Kames.
Gerard, however, is a far less single-minded thinker t an Kames, for
all the similarities between their theories of taste, A belief in the
uniformity of human nature is too simple a solution for him. He shows a
greater sensitivity to the duality of taste, the fact that it involves both
sensations and judgments. The more h examines the two asnects of taste,
the less able he is to reconcile them, In particular, the emotional
resnonses to works of art as experienced by the senses seem incompatible with
the concents of critical judgment and a standard of taste. The further
Gerard penetrates into the nature of emotions, the less it seems likely that
they can be directly influenced by judgment. And yet a standard of teste
is impossible unless criticism can be based on reasoned authority*
Perhans more than any of the other critics Gerard appeals to natural
philosophy and its methods to solve the problem of taste as he sees it.
Science's combination of empiricism and authority would seem to be the very
model for explaining the standard of trste as a combination of sensation end
judgment. The "philosophical method" means the derivation from experimental
evidence of general principles, laws of nature, which remain sensitive to
empirical observation, yet clearly direct future enquiries and serve to
correct any new results.
Gerard, however, seems unaware of a new duality implicit in the
concents of law and standard as he uses them. This duality parallels the
former /
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former, between sensation and judgment, and takes it to a deeper level in
the contrast between descriptive and prescriptive laws, "is" and "ought".
The problem can most clearly be seen in the case of Gerard's Essay. but it
is present to some degree in ell the nhilosonhical critics, exceot possibly
Addison, in so far as they wish to use descriptive, empirical accounts of
human nature and taste as the reasons for regulating that taste and arriving
at standards.
That Gerard was mistaken about scientific authority is pardonable
considering how confused the subject was even to scientists in his day.
At the very roots of natural nhilosonhy lay some metaphysical propositions
of staggering import made by Newton and left undisturbed, for centuries.
These propositions, regarding Absolute Time and Space, were Newton's way
of solving the problem of relativity in his ohysics and universslising his
mechanics. They are the justification of his transference of his mathematical
models to actual events.
In Newtonian physics there is in fact a certain degree of relativity.
For certain simple motions all material frames of reference are equivalent.
For instance, the measurement of the velocity of an object with respect to
one set of objects will be mathematically equivalent to the measure of the
same object's velocity with respect to another set of objects moving at a
constant speed in a fixed direction relative to the first set. Given the
necessary information, it is a straightforward calculation to convert one
value of the object's velocity into the other, expressing each as relative
to one or other set of objects, here acting as frames of reference.
It was theoretically possible, therefore, that, for instance, relative
to certain frames of reference, the motion of an object could be expressed
as many different numerical values, including zero. A natural question was
whether one of these values might be more basic that the others as a
description of the movement of the object. Newton believed that one value
was /
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was always more basic; it represented the real or Absolute Motion of the
body. Motion was not therefore completely relative. 'ny expression of
the velocity of a body relative to a given frame of reference could in
principle be compared by mathematical conversions with the value of the
Absolute Motion of the body; this would be a crude measurement of how true
the relative expression was.
Absolute Space is an extension of common-sense ideas about the relative
situations of objects. It converts into mathematical expression ordinary
ideas about places being above or below one another, or to left or right.
Such notions of place are dependent on the points of view of observers.
What is up for a European is down for an Australian, roughly speaking.
The equivalence of frames of reference in Newtonian physics, however,
makes it possible to convert "uropean upward motions into Australian downward
motions, and vice versa. And the theory of Absolute Space makes it possible,
in principle, to say which is the true direction, up or down.
Within the context of the th<ory of "bsolute Space and Time, then, it
is possible to give completely certain descriptions of objects' positions
and movements, in which terms like "above", "below", "faster" and so on have
quite definite meanings, translateable into mathematical values. Observers
in various places, instead of arguing about how what they saw relative to
their own view-points differed from what "the rest saw, could all convert
their measurements to the one common, Absolute standard and then make a
genuine comparison. In so doing, they would produce the ultimate, the most
basic description of events.
'hat the philosophical, critics wanted was the same sort of most basic
description of objects of tas and criticism. Once they had plotted such
standard accounts, the deviations of actual critical judgments could be
noted and explained as relative to the peculiar situation of the critic in
time and place, history and geography. The philosophical critics therefore
express /
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express the eighteenth-century belief that relativity does not have universal
significance, that there are basic frames of reference, absolute standards,
and that therefore final, definite descriptions of things as they are and
fixed agreements about them are possible. It seems unlikely that they would
have had such faith in a stable framework of the universe had Newton not made
it fundamental to his physics.
Absolute descriptions, whether in physics or in taste, cannot be made,
or play the part of standards, If every observer insists on his personal
point of view, that is to say, that the meanings he gives his terms are the
only right ones. Physicists and critics have both to be willing to pool
their resources, exchange observations and collate their data, regardless
Of personal considerations. Thus, at the same time as they were insisting
on the prime value of emotional responses, the Philosophical critics had also
to assert an impersonal, scientific attitude to such data. In ot er words,
they had to admit, in order to discount, the relativity of the positions of
individual critics. There was no assurance, except perhaps for Lord Kanes,
that any one critic's viewpoint enabled him to gain a direct insight into the
principles of taste, so that his experiences coincided with the standard of
taste. It was much more likely tV.st any individual's experiences were at
least slightly idiosyncratic, relative to the standard.
This complex attitude is apparent in Addison. He sees that what the
understanding thinks of as true about the world is different from th*3 actual
experiences of men. Compared with the imagination, the understanding is
less intimately associated with those experiences. Yet, because of the
"philosophical" distinction between primary end secondary qualities, he
thinks the understanding is better able to know what the sources of
experience are really like. He therefore chooses impersonal scientific
fact as the truth, and appeals to empirical research rs a way of authorising
critical /
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critical descriptions. The personal exoerience of individuals, enriched
by the pleasures of the imagination, are not as reliable as the sober
investigations of the scientific understanding, even in matters of teste.
Burke follows on from Addison, but in effect tries to square the
circle by re-introducing the human element into impersonal scientific
thinking, at a level somewhat above the personal, it is true. Instead
of keeping the personal prejudices of critics out of the description of
taste, Burke generalises them into conditioning biological impulses which
he tries to show are firmly built in to the operations of taste. He
refuses to reletivise the position, not just of the individual, but of man
in general and treats the value of humanity as thou h it too were an
absolute. He seems to be offering an impersonal, scientific account, but
this is an illusion caused by his substitution for the individual human
being of a generalised abstract, the human species. He treats the species
as though it were not made uo of individuals all with separate points of
view, and is content with the vague suggestion that the species has its own
point of view which transcends the relativistic limitations of its members.
But it is obvious that the value of humanity is not therefore an absolute,
but relative to the species} human beings may value themselves, but cats,
monkeys and dinosaurs may not.
Lord Karnes by-passes the problem of the relativity of inaividual
views by fusing them into general views not limited by individual
differences. Impersonal scientific standards are not, for him, difficult
to achieve, because he neutralises the significance of individuality by
his thesis of the uniformity of human nature. Every observer's personal
point of view more or less coincides with the absolute description.
Hume, however, by insisting on the argument that there is no disputing
about tastes, faced Gerard with rampant relativism. Under this pressure
Gerard /
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Gerard, resorted to natural philosophy as Newton had left it, with en
authoritarian background ultimately based on the theory of Absolute Space
and Time. More clearly than any of the other critics, Gerard shows the
paradoxical nature of teste, its division into sensation and judgment,
private end rnblic, relative and ebsolute, and he also shows how the
philosophical critics would use the methodology of science to link the two
sides in each case.
It is obvious, however, that the philosophical critics were in general
using scientific methodology for a definite purpose. They saw themselves
a3 faced with the problem of taste and criticism, the problem of authority
and judgment among such veriety of opinion, end they adopted a scientific
attitude as a means to solving that problem. Would they have adopted
scientific methods if natural philosophy had not achieved the perticular
stability and success Newton's classical formulations had given it? Surely
not. In the fin'l analysis, the philosophical critics must be regarded as
incurious about the methods they borrowed, because they were alreed committed
to finding an authoritative, stable standard of taste. A method of research
which led to a different kind of conclusion would have lacked interest for
them. But luckily the methods of natural philosophy did not seem to lead
in any other direction but the one they wished to go. One way of regarding
their work is to see it as a determined attempt to reconcile the paradoxical
difference between private and public taste. But another way is to see it
as an effort to justify an age-old caielusion in an apparently new way.
Frcro the twentieth-century point of view, then, the philosophical
critics must be accused of missing the significance of natural philosophy
for criticism. The value of that example is not the way in ivhich science
can (if it can) produce conclusive demonstrations, accurate descriptions and
a /
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a truthful picture of the world, but the fact that it does so by testing and
re-testing, collecting opinions end revising them, changing theories, checking
them with experiments and fresh observations, innovating and, above ell,
discussing and debating. The conduct of that debate, and the way in which
scientific theories are criticised, are of more importance for literary critics
end theorisers about art than any success that natural philosophy may have in
arriving at the truth about nature.
Respite the fact that the final judgment on them is not a very favourable
one, the present writer must confess his admiration for the writers he has
discussed. It requires to be stressed how enterprising these men were, and
how industrious. The urge to literary expressions is widespread, but its
fulfilment involves too much perseverance for most men. It is easy to criticise
a finished work, and it is right to do so, but the critic ought always to
acknowledge his indebtedness to the author for communicating the stimulation
of his thoughts. And remembering the amateur status of such authors as Burke,
Kames and Gerard, at least in criticism, one is struck by their energy and
enthu iasm. Not that these men were fools; they were sensible of their
intellectual worth, though not inclined, perhaps, to claim exceptional genius.
But th ir common conviction that an intelligent man's remarks on a subject
like taste are worth setting down is just and admirable. Whatever the result
of their speculations, their alertness of mind, their inquisitiveness end their
desire to state opinions for the benefit of others are wholly laudable and
represent a real contribution to literature.
APPENDIX I.
"As in Mathematics, so in Natural Philosophy, the Investigation of
difficult Things by the Method of Analysis, ought ever to precede the
Method of Composition. This Analysis consists in making Experiments and
Observations, and in drawing general Conclusions from them by Induction,
and admitting of no Objections against the Conclusions, but such as are
taken from Experiments, or other certain Truths. For Hypotheses are not
to be regarded in experimental Philosophy. And although the arguing from
"xperiments and Observations by Induction be no Demonstration of general
Conclusions; yet it is the best way of arguing which the Nature of Things
admits of, end may be looked upon as so much the stronger, by how much the
Induction is more general. And if no Exception occur from Phenomena, the
Conclusion may be pronounced generally. But if at any time afterwards any
Exception shall occur from Experiments, it may then begin to be pronounced
with such Exceptions as occur. By this way of Analysis we may proceed
from Compounds to Ingredients, and from Motions to the Forces producing
them; and in general, from Effects to their Causes, and from particular
Causes to more general ones, till the Argument end in the most general.
This is the Method of Analysis: And the synthesis con1 ists in assuming
the Causes discover'd, and establish'd as Principles, and by them
explaining the Phaenomena proceeding from them, and proving the Explanations'!
(Penultimate paragraph of Book III of Newton's Onticks. 1716, ed. I. Bernard
Cohen, New York, 1952. See above, page 50).
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APPENDIX II.
It is regrettable that David Hume never produced the full study of
criticism which he seems to promise in the introduction to his Treatise of
Human Nature. His handful of essays on taste and various passing references
A
to the subject have been collected together by Mossner in an attempt to
fill the gap, but the result is inevitably disappointing, Hume's extant
criticism consists of stimulating insights of a tantalising brevity and
does not do justice to his capacities.
Hume's remarks on the study of criticism in the introduction to the
Treatise, however, suggest that it would in any case have been difficult
to treat him simply as a critic. In an extended meraphor, he canpsres
logic, morals, criticism and politics to the outer defences of e country,
which he proposes to by-pass and, "instead of taking now and then a castle
or village on the frontier, to march up directly to the capital or center
of these sciences, to human nature itself" (p.xx). Hence a study of Hume
the critic could only be included in a study of Hume the philosopher of
human nature, something beyond the scope of the present work.
Furthermore, although the title page of the Treatise announces Hume's
intention of introducing "the experimental Method of Reasoning into MORAL
SUBJECTS"f his relationship with scientific thinking and Newtonianism is
neither simple nor straightforward. His discussions of causality, the
problem of "is" and "ought" and the evidence for miracles raise problems
in the philosophy of science which are also beyond the scope of this work.
Neither Addison, Burke, Kames nor Gerard make such positive contributions
to the debate about the theory of the natural philosophy which influenced
their criticism.
1 Ernest C. Mossner: "Hume's 'Of Criticism'," in Studies in Criticism and
Aesthetics. 1660-1800: Essays in Honor nf Samuel Holt l!nrikr ed. Howard
Anderson and John S. Shea, Minneapolis, 1967, pu.232-248.
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APPENDIX III.
In 1776 Gerard published his Dissertation On Subjects relating to The
Genius and the Evidences of Christianity. It is ironic in the light of
whet has been said above concerning Absolute Space and Time to find in the
fourth section of the second Dissertation the following passage:
In numberless ways, false opinions may gain ground; and when they
have been once adopted, they may be for ages transmitted from some
to others, without being at all suspected or examined: but an
opinion's subsisting ever so long while it is not examined, affords
no sort of presumption of its truth. The Ptolemaic system of the
world was long the received hypothesis: but its reception was no
proof of its truth. During all that time, it was taken for granted
without examination: most men wanted the means of bringing it to a
proper trial; if a few had them, and used them, they disbelieved it;
and as soon as it was generally examined, it was generally exploded.
It did not require repeated examinations to confute it; it fell at
once, upon the first scrutiny of unprejudiced reason. Many false
hypotheses have reighed in every science, through long periods of time.
Attend to such of them as are now abandoned; yai will find that they
were established on false principles which, during their reign, were
never called in question. Their prevalence, therefore, truly
proceeded from men's having never examined these principles: as soon
as these were examined, it appeared that they had been all along taken
for granted without evidence; that, therefore, however well the
several parts of the superstructure hung together, the whole hypothesis
was nevertheless a mere baseless fabric. (pn.451f.)
That Gerard's acceptance of Newtonian cosmology was complacent is confirmed
at the end of Pert III, section iv, of the Tssay on Taste:
The /
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The Newtonian theory is not more satisfying to the tinderstending, by
the just reasonings on which it is founded, than agreeable to taste,
by its simplicity end elegance...When the mundane system is truly
explained, it appears to be adjusted with the nicest regularity and
pronortion; the sense of which at once confirms the theory, and
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